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CONTENTS

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SOCIAL NORM-MAKING AS A COMPONENT OF LAW-MAKING

Abstract

The reasons of the modernization inertia of the law-making process as a normative basis for the reformation of post-Soviet society are examined. The possibility and admissibility of social norm-making process in juridical reglamentation: harmonious combination of legal rules and other means of normative culture (morals, customs, traditions, ethics, corporate norms, etc.) based on the idea of the normative pluralism and the author's conception of the sociology of law-making are justified. Social self-regulation allows to cope more successfully with the situation of excessive legal regulation of social life; to simplify the solution of the task to reduce and optimize the overly "effuse" array of regulations.

Another direction of modernization of the reforming post-Soviet society legal grounds is seen in the usage of the social context of the law formation process – the involvement of citizens into participation at different stages of voluntary associations. The initial thesis emphasizes the idea that the results of legislative policy will be socially legitimate under the conditions of its connectedness with the public space, setting the dialogue between the equal actors-politicians: the state and the civil society.

Keywords: law-making process, juridical pluralism, social norms, social norm-making process, legislative policy, public sphere, legal socialization.

The modern picture of the world is characterized by the aggravation of contradictions in the normative system used to regulate public relations. On the one hand, *a legal order* is recognized as an effective means of establishing consensus, peace and safety. Traditionally, the jurists are inclined to treat the legal toolkit as an integrating

mechanism capable of overcoming contradictions and conflicts posing threats to the unity and integrity of society. On the other hand, the stream of normative and legal material has fallen upon contemporary society and one needs professional legal assistance to be guided through its labyrinths. Western societies have encountered the situation of an excessive regulation of social life; American lawyers, observing this phenomenon, write about a law "explosion" and laws polluting social environment and interfering into citizens' private life. The sociologists of law, trying to find a consensus in difficult mutual relations of various elements of the state-organized society, develop the models of relations between law and society (for example, W. Evan's construction of "the system model of law and society"[1], D. Campbell's idea about an "experimental society").

A peculiar situation is developing in the post-Soviet states: the majority of reformatory ideas, national projects, and ways of modernization of economic and social relations are accompanied by the attempts to provide a proper effective legal regulation. However, I believe that a twenty years' "search" for a true methodological reference point in the legal policy has not led to any considerable results. The problems of the effective regulation of social relations, improvement, democratization and scientific provision of the norm-making process remain pressing. What is the reason for such an inertial process of modernization of law-making activity as the legal basis for reforming the post-Soviet society?

One of the ways to overcome this contradiction, first of all, is the application of the legal regulation of a harmonious combination of rules of law and *other means of normative culture* (morals, customs, traditions, norms of ethics, corporate norms, business practices, etc.). Secondly, we could improve the mechanism of the norm-making activity, namely, by using *social contexts* of law-making.

Based on the recognition of the social nature of law[2] the source of its formation could be found in social relations, their dynamics, social practices generating conflicts, changes in parity of social forces, the emergence of new needs, mechanisms of interest protection, as well as some other social transformations. The problem, both theoretical, and practical, is reduced to the defining of those blocks of social contradictions and concentration of social tension, causing conflicts in society which demand the setting of a legally provided order. The methodological complexity of this process finds its reflection in the correct defining of forms and means of social regulation such as the use of tools of *legal culture* (rules of law, means and types of legal regulation, legal sanctions, etc.) or possibilities of *other kinds of social regulation* (norms of morals, religion, ideology, ethics, etc.) or *their reasonable combination*. In other words, it is a question of admissibility and possibility of social norm making with a view of achieving a solidary order and public safety. The traditional societies of Africa and Asia still practice *social norm-making* which in essence is the authorization by the state of the customs recognized by society. The question is whether the modern state is ready to "allow" to use the norms developed in a different informal and administrative way in order to establish an order.

The need for law and a legal order arises during people's interaction while carrying out some joint activity upon the distribution of "roles" in social actions. If the content of

"roles" (original rights and duties) formed during the communication process under the influence of the collective will of the parties, does not lead to the emergence of mutual objections but on the contrary, a voluntary execution promotes the satisfaction and realization of interests then we witness the self-regulation of the developed relation and the emergence of culture of *normative social behavior*. The action of the developed rule renews when the situations are repeated. Numerous repetitions get reflected in public consciousness as steady forms of a fair common communication. Thus, the developed custom is maintained only to the degree in which the facts of social life express its reality or the legislator perceives the steady form of actually developed norms and provides them with an obligatory and legally significant quality.

The structure of modern society preserves a number of non-state centers generating norms of behavior such as enterprises, trade unions, political parties, religious organizations, public associations, international organizations and transnational corporations. The scientists of the last century L.Petrazycki, G.Gurvitch paid attention to the existence in social space "of different systems of norms which competed with the general legal system – the official law"[3], they called this phenomenon *legal pluralism*. Usually such means of social regulation, the so-called business practices, develop within the frame of certain social formations, either for the local application or for the external corporate communication in the absence of legislatively set legal standards. Thereby, the social practice fills the gap in a legal regulation, reflecting the dynamics and variety of modern life. However, a question arises how the legislator should treat a similar experience of social self-regulation, whether he should use the material of the actually developed social regulation? Hypothetically, one could identify three possible answers: 1) the legal fixing of actually developed social norms (recognition of regulation properties and conformity to social values); 2) the legal fixing of legal ways of prohibiting those of them which break the principles of law and values accepted by society; 3) the de-facto recognition of the legal indifference and self-value of norms introducing a regulating influence towards the phenomena of non-legal nature. Within the limits of legislative sociology the analysis of the actually developed norms of social regulation allowing to receive the information about gaps in the legal regulation is rather important. It is also essential to analyze the content and technical and legal drawbacks of the current legislation as well as the manifestative negative tendencies accompanied by the social intensity and deviant behavior. With reference to this article content special attention should be paid to the mechanism of *the social self-regulation*: the search for and the establishment of balance between the interests of the members of a social community, the valuable potential of the norm in the making corresponding to the collective consciousness, a source of authority of feasibility along with some other aspects of the self-developing standard culture of modern society. The use of social contexts of law formation, especially a harmonious inclusion into the norm system not only of the rules of law, but also other means of culture (morals, customs, traditions, norms of ethics, business practices, etc.) makes it possible to cope much more successfully with the situation of an excessive legal regulation of social life; to simplify the solving of the problem of reduction

and optimization of unreasonably "expanded" volume of regulatory legal acts; and to increase the general efficiency of streamlining of public relations.

It is obvious that not only law but also other social values (norms of religion, morals, customs and traditions) are the tools of reconciliation of interests, and, hence, the reaching of social integration. During the whole process of historical evolution law has accumulated the most advanced cultural values. However, this difficult way of legal history was invariably accompanied by crises of moral ideals and law which essence, according to P.A.Sorokin, consisted "of gradual devaluation of ethical and legal norms"[4]. When describing the observed crisis of "all major aspects of life, way and culture of Western society" the outstanding sociologist wrote, "If neither religious, ethical and legal values control our behavior then what remains? Nothing but a brute force and deceit. Thus, it leads to "the right of the strongest." This is the main feature of modern crisis in ethics and law."[5] Further, when analyzing the system of sensual ethics and law, the researcher states that "the principle of unlimited relativism has been entered into the world of moral values; however, the arbitrary character of this relativism generates conflicts and struggle... In the chaos of norms clashing with each other moral values... gradually lose their integrating force and open the way to a rough violence."[6] Since there is no uniform moral code then there is no pressure of a homogeneous public opinion which could form someone's moral senses and beliefs. Therefore, there is no uniform moral consciousness which could have an effective regulating force in interhuman relations."[7] When finishing his work, the author comes to the conclusion that "Without the transition to the ideational ethics and law, without the new absolutization and universalization of values society cannot avoid... the deadlock. Such is the verdict of history concerning last crises of sensual ethics and law, and such should be the sentence concerning the present crisis."[8]

The presented fragment of P.A. Sorokin's reasoning serves as the confirmation of the idea about the society's *integrating* power of moral and legal values coordinated and recognized as universal and common for the whole society.

Another outstanding Russian philosopher and jurist I.A. Ilyin trying to comprehend the historical epoch experienced by the people, notes "that all sides of spiritual life... are in the condition of a deep and serious crisis. Mankind has become lost in its spiritual life... And if the problem to organize peace and fair co-habitation of people on Earth is the goal of law and sense of justice then the modern crisis bares first of all *a deep illness of modern sense of justice*."[9] The author believes that the process of forming *a normal sense of justice* contains an unshakable power using the spirit of life as its source of food while at the same time defining and bringing up the spirit's life on the earth. The normal sense of justice is not reduced to the true knowledge of positive law; it includes all basic functions of a spiritual life: *a spiritually trained will*, feeling, and imagination, all cultural and economic displays of a human soul. The scientist believes that the normal sense of justice is one of the historical process factors. Its real power is expressed in the fact that everywhere where it operates with a bigger intensity and bigger volume, the order of public life appears not only to be more perfect, but also stronger and steadier."[10]

What conclusions could we possibly come to when generalizing the judgments of the scientists of the last century and analyzing the legal experience of the present?

The harmonious functioning of society members and their collectives, their fulfillment of various professional and social roles, their mutual support and assistance are possible in a socially integrated society where the culture of conflict resolution and establishing balance between opposite interests has been mastered. A universally recognized system of moral values embodied in legal institutes should become a basis for the mechanism coordinating interests. The mankind of the end of the XX century trying to overcome the consequences of the inherited crisis of spiritual culture developed the principles of a mutual dialogue, recognizing human life, man's rights and freedom, dignity and safety as the main values. However, the beginning of a new millennium revealed the weakness of integration processes and exposed the depth of contradictions between people along with the pretentiousness of many proclaimed principles, the absence of full understanding and recognition of the values declared universal by Western culture. Academician D.S. Likhachov believed that the revival of society, especially the post-Soviet one, will occur only in the course of the renewal of spiritual life and culture. The improvement of the moral make-up of the people, the "normalization" of legal consciousness, the understanding of globalization processes from the point of view of self-value of human life are, in my opinion, the basic conditions which will allow to get out of the prolonged crisis. Law plays a significant role in this process as it should accumulate conventional values of modern society and activate their practical implementation in interpersonal legal communication.

Thereupon, it seems pertinent to mention the issue of the relation between morals and law that has long become traditional in the theory and philosophy of law dealing with the question whether the existence of law is the recognition of the powerlessness of morals. I would like to present the arguments of my teacher professor O.E. Leist. In his last work "Essence of Law" Oleg Ernestovich wrote, "Morals are not better than law while law is not worse than morals. They are different. Unlike morals law gives a chance to react to the violence of malicious people with the power of state compulsion and to render evil for evil and that is something that morals are incapable of doing. Law empowers one to make contracts with strangers, even with individuals having a dubious reputation, having protected the execution of obligations by bail, penalty and other legal means. Law allowed to transfer centuries old moral maxims about the spiritual equality of people into the area of practical life relations and law order of a civil society. The moral calls for charity and help to the needy move law into the system of man's social rights promoting the civil society socialization.

Law is more rough and angrier than morals, it is more often subject to abuse, especially by the mighty of the world making laws and putting them into practice. However, morals, with all their spirituality and aesthetic beauty, practically have no power to restrain the malicious, vicious and unscrupulous people from harming others …

Neither law, nor morals embody … the cosmic plan of nature. If it were so, they would be much more perfect. They are human creations bearing countless prints of weaknesses

of human nature, the prevalence of feelings over reason, society imperfections, the unskillfulness of legislators, and drawbacks of the political system. But for this reason they are more suitable for a daily human life, then, say, a chemically pure harmony of Space or mathematically faultless Divine Foresight."[11] I can't but agree with these judgments and I would like to add some comments regarding the problems of law-making as a phenomenon accumulating the achievements of culture. If we deny "the powerlessness" of morals in modern society and, at the same time, the impossibility of replacing law with morals we should recognize as valuable their mutual functioning and interpenetration as moral views by themselves cannot solve superchallenges of a medical, technical, informational etc. nature. For example, the questions of bioethics in medicine are insoluble without the "easy" and "unostentatious" intervention of law as they affect human rights and the responsibility of the state. But on the whole the immorality of many state decisions regarding *the legislative policy* of totalitarian regimes requires a firm condemnation and change. The examples of the Belarusian criminal and criminal proceedings legislation and the practice of their application such as the Law of the Republic of Belarus "About Mass Actions" can be used as an illustration. For example, article 193 of the Criminal Code provides criminal punishment of up to a 2 year imprisonment for the organization of an action or participation in an action of a political party, another public association, a religious organization when there is a decision about their liquidation or suspension of their activity or if the organization has not passed the state registration; articles 108, 125, 126, 127 of the Criminal Proceedings Code of the Republic of Belarus expand the range of individuals having the right to make the *individual* decision regarding the imprisonment and detention breaking the norms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Experience shows that the repressiveness of Belarusian legislative policy especially increases during the period of preparation for presidential elections.

To restrain the "immoral" legislator and place him into the condition of publicity and under control the civil society when implementing the ideas of theories of natural law, constitutionalism, a legal state, and human rights, has developed a system of political and legal means. Jurisprudence treats the problem of the legislation "morality" in a wider context including the analysis of the correlation between two phenomena: *Law and Legal act*. Law as an objective phenomenon is formed historically in the course of human communication, cognition and activity. Legal act as a subjective category represents the result of a conscious activity of competent state bodies. It is not always possible to equate them. Ordinary consciousness considers Legal acts to be "fair" and "unfair", "good" and "bad", "moral" and "immoral", "fixing rigts" or "generating arbitrariness". The importance of legislative norms increases during the epoch of radical social changes. If the legal act does not meet public expectations and does not produce effective changes it causes irritation and disappointment generating hidden or obvious counteractions. During such periods scientists-thinkers try to find approaches to solve these problems. I believe these are the premises for addressing the tradition of *differentiating between law* and *legal act*. The old tradition was described in the legal doctrines of I. Kant and G. Hegel and many other thinkers. This idea

is a peculiar challenge to the legislator. The correlation between lawful and unlawful laws can serve as a methodological basis for the legislative policy. It is possible to differentiate between law and legal act and to analyze the content of a legal act regarding the defining of its legal character only at the level of the scientific and professional sense of justice. It should be done only at this level. A citizen with an ordinary sense of justice also has the right to analyze the legal act critically. A stable legal order in society is provided for by the action of the legality principle (the essence of which is for all legal subjects to follow the requirements of legal acts). Due to this each citizen is obliged to obey the legal act (lawful or unlawful). If the citizen disagrees then he should try to change it using democratic institutes. This is the general universal legal imperative serving as the basis of public safety and stability, the provision of rights and the acquisition of real freedom. Unfortunately, the mechanism of people's participation in a norm-making activity is usually non-existent in the states with an authoritative regime, the lack of publicity of the legislative policy and the absence of a dialogue between the state and a civil society.

In the modern theory of law the concept of differentiation between the law and the legal act, the lawful and unlawful acts has found both supporters and opponents. A great contribution to the theory was made by academician V.S. Nersesjants. The main question which leads to discussions and disagreements concerns the definition of the *criterion* used to differentiate lawful and unlawful laws. It seems that principles of law can serve as a criterion of acceptance of a lawful law. The principles are understood as universal imperatives and approved by a centuries-old practice of human communication postulates. There are other requirements demanding that norms of legal act did not violate *human rights* provided for by international legal documents and the constitution of the given state. They should also correspond to the *values* recognized in a certain society including moral, ethical, and religious values. According to V.S. Nersesjants's libertarian legal theory, the basis of the differentiation between the law and legal act is the formal equality principle (including the formality of freedom and justice).[12] The legal act which is the form of the expression of the legal equality principle, i.e. intrinsic properties of law that obtained a state-imperious obligatory recognition and protection, becomes a lawful act.[13] "When analyzing the differentiation and correlation (conformity or discrepancies, coincidence or discrepancy) of the phenomenon and essence in the sphere of law … the **essence** of law (considering law in comparison with the legal act) is the formal equality principle while the phenomenon in its differentiation with the legal essence (considering the legal act in comparison with law) means official and imperious standard **phenomena** having a valid power of a compulsory and obligatory rule". If the phenomenon (the legal act, norms of different sources of positive law) corresponds to the legal essence then we can speak about **a lawful act**; if the phenomenon (the legal act, norms of different sources of positive law) does not correspond to the legal essence and contradicts it, then it is the question about **the unlawful act**.[14]

Thus, the concept of differentiation of law and the legal act forms a methodological basis for the system critical analysis of the legislation in post-Soviet states and the change of a vector of legal thinking and legal consciousness from the dominating legal positivism

to the integrative perception of law and the social context of its formation with one aspect being *the social norm making*.

When dealing with the social norm-making one faces several questions regarding the theory of law and which remain debatable such as whether *legal pluralism* in the sphere of legal regulation is possible or whether there can be other *legal subsystems* corresponding to the official law or contradicting it (business habits and practices developing in collectives of private enterprises, local normative acts of every possible public association including professional, political, creative, scientific, religious, youth, sports and others. Is it appropriate to define their status as *legal subsystems* and what are the consequences of their application? Is it possible to use the normative self-regulation that received a positive public resonance and effective practice without its legislative fixing?

The legal literature of the Soviet period widely discussed the problems of participation of public organizations in a law-making activity together with state bodies when executing some functions of the state character (management of sanatoria and rest houses, trade unions, and consumer cooperation activity). The forecasts were produced about the prospects of the expansion of such participation as a condition for the development of democratic tendencies in the management of public affairs. The condition of the local norm-making was analyzed. Addressing these issues now is due to the need to clear the sphere of social relations from the excessive legal regulation, to draw more attention to the social potential of non-judicial forms of regulation along with the inclusion into the norm-making activity of the institutes of a forming civil society. In order to preserve a certain sphere of social self-regulation of the facts of reality becoming more complicated, apparently, it is necessary to think about the possibility of a more active and wider use of the social norms developed by various centers of local communities or, namely, the *original culture* of collective creativity. They seem convincing, rational, motivated, and fair from the point of view of the social community members. However, the acceptance of such forms of social behavior as *positive* and leading to the preservation of order and social solidarity, in my opinion, is possible only in the presence of the following conditions: "legitimization" of a normative system that is the perception of social norms by the values of culture; the observance of law principles, in particular, the legality principle; a high level (in I.A.Ilyin's terms, *normal*) sense of justice and the legal culture of society; an accurate mechanism of the functioning of all institutes of social control (family, educational institutions, professional, political, and religious organizations, mass media etc.) . In general, the presented picture of social self-regulation reflects the action of the principle "everything that is not forbidden by law is allowed". One of the essential conditions for the recognition of the social norm-making is the change of the legislative policy theory such as the rejection of monism in legislative activity, its decentralization, and the acceptance of other sources generating law. The problem issue is the practical question about the legal consequences of the application of social regulation norms. It is the issue of a possible conflict situation in which the interests of one party of a public relation are broken by the activity (inactivity) of the other party. Theoretically, the conflict can be considered in court and in the absence

of the official rule of law with the use of the institute of law analogy (the application of law principles). This method is similar to the judiciary practice of the countries of the English-Saxon legal system (Common Law) based on the use of judicial precedents. However, the use of this institute did not become a regular practice in post-Soviet courts.

The second direction of the modernization of the legal basis for the reforming of a post-Soviet society is the improvement of the mechanism of norm-making, namely, in the use of *social contexts* of law-making and attracting participation at its different stages of public associations of citizens. I believe that the starting point is the thesis that the results of the legislative policy will be socially legitimate under the condition of its connectedness with public space. The parameters of public space are defined, firstly, by the mutual recognition of the participants involved in the process of law-making (institutes of the state and institutes of a civil society). Secondly, the results are equal (they are equal in the right to action and recognition but differ in their manner of carrying out an action and the scale of responsibility). Thirdly, there is a competition of opinions, offers, positions, and initiatives. Fourthly, there is a responsibility of each party for the realization of the together simulated decision and an original "common" business in which the initiative of each of the parties is shown and recognized as a compromise. Thus, the dialogue of equal actors-politicians participating in the formation of the legislative policy in the sphere of law-making is started where the actors are the state and a civil society. The consequences of their performing social roles are inadequate and are defined by legal statuses. However, "...publicity executes the function of control over the activity of state bodies. The control transforms publicity into the only legitimate source of laws"[15] and "… on the one hand, publicity becomes an organizing principle extending to the machinery of the state in the form of the principle of separation of powers and the joint making of political decisions and to the society in general. On the other hand, it remains the sphere for the opinion formation and discussions accessible, according to the idea, to all citizens without any exception."[16] The thesis about *the social nature of law* and a great number of sources which form it promote the recognition of the public character of the establishment of legal decisions. This idea is proved by the elimination of "narrow" normative characteristics of law in the Soviet jurisprudence, the multidimensional perception of law including three basic forms of its existence such as legal norms, a sense of justice and legal relations.

It is possible to look at the construction of the law-making process to illustrate the display of publicity in the course of law forming.

According to the author's concept, one can provisionally identify three stages in the course of law-making: 1) defining objective needs for the legal regulation of public relations; 2) norm-making (setting legal norms); 3) socialization of legal norms.[17]

At the first stage of law-making one creates only a potential possibility for the emergence of a certain model of behavior of participants of social relations. During the second stage the transformation of the possibility into real legal norms takes place. The third stage finishes the process of law-making by the real activity of legal norms in concrete legal relations. It is accompanied by the emergence of legal consequences for the participants

of social communication; these consequences can either meet their interests or contradict them. On the whole, the result of this stage could be the legal order expected by the members of society. Then it will be possible to state that the legal norms established in various forms are law. Otherwise, in the situation of a legal "disorder", a legal conflict, and the infringement of rights and freedoms of society members along with many other circumstances it would be almost impossible to claim that the result of a long process of the social transformation of norms became *law*.

Let's consider potential possibilities for the participation of citizens and their associations in each stage of law-making. The initial moment has a mainly social character. Its purpose is to detect vulnerable problems and contradictions of social life which cannot be leveled in any other way except for the lawful, legally significant and guaranteed way. These problems can turn out to be a consequence of the backlog of the content of the existing legal norms from the dynamics of social changes; another reason could be the incorrectness of legal instructions that became evident during their realization; it could be social conflictness caused by the infringement of partner roles and obligations during typical repeating acts of communication in the absence of an appropriate legal regime.

One of the directions of sociological research of the initial stage of law-making is the detection, analysis of interests of various social groups and their coordination with individual and state interests (the theory of interests of R. Pound which could be used in the procedure of interest coordination as a methodological basis is quite remarkable). The state that has proclaimed as its supreme value the person and that has identified the people as the only source of power (article 2, article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus) is obliged to consider the public opinion, expectations, mood, and ideas about the problems which require legal intervention.

In modern democratic states there functions the system of mechanisms of the coordination of social interests and legal solving of social conflicts such as the activity of political parties aimed at revealing the valid common beginning in various group and corporate interests which could become a state policy and the basis of the legislation; the technology of the election process in the course of which socially significant interests of certain groups of society are protected by corresponding candidates and parties; parliamentary procedures of the coordination of various sociopolitical positions; the legislative process finishing with the adoption of the bill removing or reducing social pressure.

The search of the model of the interest coordination as the bases of a socially caused legislation could be done in the direction of democratization and improvement of the institutional aspects of legislative activity in the post-Soviet states. The perspectives in this respect could be seen as follows: first of all, the legal provision of the content and procedural and remedial aspects of the participation of public institutes in the legislative activity; secondly, the expansion of a circle of legal subjects of the legislative initiative; the real realization of institutes of direct democracy; thirdly, the use of culture of the normative social self-regulation of social relations. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of forming the models of behavior by public institutes together with state bodies, i.e., the

participation of public organizations will give future models social legitimacy while the state component will provide a legal guarantee.

A substantial scientific concept of the future regulatory legal act should become the result of the initial stage of the law-making process.

Apparently, the development of the scientific concept of the legal act demands the carrying out of detailed sociological research, gathering and analysis of the empirical material based on the studying of the public opinion, interests, expectations, value beliefs etc. The research process should be joined not only by the scientific personnel but also by the institutes of a civil society including various public organizations interested in the settlement of created social contradictions (public associations, political parties, voters, certain categories of the population whose interests are directly affected by the normative solving of the arisen situation).

The second stage of the process of law-making has a different mission. It is connected mainly with the state activity carried out by official state structures having the right to make obligatory and legally significant decisions. Accordingly, the nature of this stage of law-making changes as it acquires a strictly formal state character. Its goal is to transform the content of legal attitudes of the developed social practice that finds its reflection in public consciousness in the form of requirements, interests, and expectations in relation to a new legal order. The overcoming of the state legislative monopoly can be achieved through the democratization of the norm-making process. The generalization and analysis of the legislative practice of Belarus and some countries of Eastern Europe allowed to formulate a number of problem positions.

First of all, it is possible to state that the existing legislative acts and regulations essentially limit the constitutional right of Belarusian citizens to participate in the solution of state matters (article 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus); they restrain the right of political parties and other public associations to promote the revealing and expression of the citizen's political will (article 5); secondly, the present Constitution does not provide for the right of the legislative initiative of public organizations in the name of their managing bodies, thus, the possibility of the display of the national (public) initiative has essentially decreased; thirdly, from the point of view of the lawmaking social conditionality the mechanism of the revealing of the public opinion, interests and requirements of various social groups and the expression of their valid common aspiration by public associations (political parties, trade unions, women's organizations, creative unions etc.) thus considerably lowering the social level of the approval of future laws. These observations show that the legislative (norm-making) process acquires a statism character. The Belarusian legislation does not reflect (except for the referendum institute) the constitutional position that "a direct participation of citizens in society and state administrative office is provided for by the holding of the referenda, the discussion of draft laws and issues of national and local significance, in other ways defined by the law" (part 2 article 37 of the Constitution). Let's analyze the possibility provided by the Constitution to discuss the questions significant for the whole society or its certain part. It is the question of national

discussions of bills (that is what it was called in the Soviet history). Obviously, the public discussion of the bills had a formal character while the reaction of the legislator to the public opinion was more than simply reserved; partially taken into account offers and remarks of the citizens did not change the basic positions initially approved by the higher party bodies. Nevertheless, it is necessary to reanimate the institute of public discussions of bills having adopted the corresponding legal act for the development of the constitutional position in part 2 article 37. It is important to use positive sides of such campaigns which include the initiation of a civil activity, participation of citizens in an important political process, and the development of legal knowledge and culture.

Another important display of the social context of the norm-making activity is the participation in it of public associations. The comparative research of the norm-making activity of public organizations in the state of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods shows a more active participation of public organizations in the norm-making of the Soviet state. Certainly, the ways of the Soviet norm-making do not create any illusions today about the degree of democracy of the norm-making process, as well as the involvement of citizens and their public associations in the government and society. One can see in this process the prevalence of the role of directing bodies of political organizations (the CPSU Central Committee, the Central Committee of VLKSM), a propaganda character of many joint regulatory legal acts containing more declarative norms than legal mechanisms of the regulation of problem situations; the formal character of attracting associations of workers to the joint adoption of legal acts as well as many other things. However, when we compare this historical period with the practice of norm-making with the period of democratic transformations in post-Soviet states we have to admit that there is a tendency in the decrease of the norm-making activity of public associations. Belarusian legislation does not provide for any form of participation of public associations in the norm-making activity. The state does not promote the norm-making initiative of the public. As an illustration I would like to describe the situation that concerns the need to regulate the mechanism for the alternative military serving. A number of Belarusian organizations including the enlightening establishment "Center of Legal Transformation", the Republican youth public association "Civil Forum", the Civil campaign "For Alternative Civil Service in Belarus" expressed their desire to participate in the development of the bill. The requests about the inclusion of their experts into the working group of the bill were sent to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus but they did not receive any answer.

A bit different picture is observed in the Russian Federation where the legal bases of the participation of public associations in the norm-making process jointly with the state bodies (for example, article 21 of the Federal law of May 19, 1995 "About Public Associations"[18]) are being gradually formed; the offers of Russian trade unions and their associations are taken into account when the drafts of the bills dealing with the social and labor rights of workers are considered by the federal state bodies (article 11 of the Federal law of January 12, 1996 "About Trade Unions, Their Rights and Activity Guarantees"[19]); public associations also participate in the development of drafts of laws and other legal acts

regulating the relations in the field of the protection of consumer rights (article 45 of the Federal law of January 9, 1996 "About Protection of Consumer Rights"[20]).

We will try to understand how important and significant the participation of public organizations in the norm-making activity is and whether it lowers the quality of made decisions.

Let's start with the main postulate of the modern norm-making activity stating that the legislation that is being improved should be lawful, expressing the compromise of interests of all interested subjects. It would be reasonable to involve public organizations, political parties which can present the interests and needs of their members in this rather complicated process of achieving the agreement and the balance of interests of the individual, social groups and the state. Therefore, various forms of participation of public institutes in the norm-making process seem quite promising. They could develop drafts of regulatory legal acts together with state bodies or independently in the process of realizing their right of the legislative initiative. The legislative fixing of the norm-making public participation could strengthen the social support of the legal norms established by them and on the whole could promote the acceleration of the process of forming the institutes of a civil society.

The process of law-making does not come to the end with the coming of legal acts into effect and their publication. The final law-making stage is *the socialization of law norms,* their adaptation by public consciousness and the realization in the behavior of the social communication participants. In this case it is possible to speak about the realization of *positivation* of law as a creative process of the normative concretization of legal principles with reference to specific relations of a particular historical epoch. Is it possible to assert then that the result of this process is law? The answer to this question should probably be searched for in the practice of the legal norm action and in the boomerang effect which causes the influence of the created legal instructions on social relations in the nature of changes made by them.

For legal norms to cause corresponding social changes they need to be *applied* (using the terminology of the Russian jurist of XIX century M. Kapustin) to the facts of real life. If there is no contact with the specific social facts of real life situations law (in the form of legal act, another source of law) cannot reveal its intrinsic properties and goal. The potential of the legal norm and its legal content such as the rights and duties of subjects of legal relations in the form of injunctions, positive permissions or obligations are shown in the presence of a specific legal fact (the legal structure) in the real collision with a life situation. The theoretical model of legal regulation "is imposed" on the individual reality that requires legal regulation. Its efficiency and effectiveness depend on how accurately and harmoniously the elements (means) of legal influence (legal norms, legal facts, subjective rights, legal duties, acts of law realization, enforcement acts) carry out their functions in the mechanism of legal regulation and how the latter corresponds to the mechanism of the social action of the legal norm. Did the action of the legal instruction cause those social changes which the legislator was guided by when developing the abstract model of the

legal regulation? Was the legal order required and expected by the participants of public life established taking into account the condition that the legal order was contingent with the establishing of social unity and stability?

Legal norms need to turn into a factor of social life if they are to have a regulating influence on the social environment (to create legal conditions for the realization of interests of legal subjects or their protection to resolve legal conflicts or on the whole to form "a pacifying environment"). This is the essence of their socialization, i.e. the mastering of legal norms by public consciousness, their introduction into the sphere of social relations, their adaptations to real conditions, as well as the influence on social environment. There is no reason to speak about legal instructions as law in force until they become the elements of the way of life of society, a part of its consciousness and existence.

Hence, the creative cycle of law-making comes to the end at the contact of the theoretical model of the legal norm with social reality and upon the acquisition of law by public consciousness and behavior. The practice of its adaptation (socialization) allows to measure its efficiency degree or "the quality" of legal norms and, in other words, it provides that the empirical material which should be traced by the corresponding structures (legislative, scientific, sociological and others) in order to continually improve the legislation. As a matter of fact, this stage completes the process of law-making while at the same time it is the beginning of a new phase of its modernization.

Obviously, it would be wrong and unfair to make only the legislator responsible for everything. All "creative" forces of society as a uniform organism are responsible for "the destiny" of law and the condition of the legislation system on the whole as the more democratic the state is and the more civil society is developed, the more responsible all its social components are in relation to the direction of the legal policy, the level of the legal system and legal order.

Notes

1 See Evan W. M. Social Structure and Law: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives / Sage Publications. The International Professional Publishers. Newbury Park; London; New Delhi, 1990. P. 217–231, 236–239.

2 For the justification of the social nature of law see: Соколова А.А. Социальные аспекты правообразования. Минск: ЕГУ, 2003. С. 3–44.

3 Карбонье Ж. Юридическая социология. М.: Прогресс, 1986. С.112.

4 See: Сорокин П.А. Человек. Цивилизация. Общество. М.: Политиздат, 1992. С. 500.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. P. 502.

7 Ibid. P. 503.

8 Ibid. P. 504.

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17 Соколова А.А. Социальные аспекты правообразования. С. 51.

18 СР. РФ. 1995. N 21. Ст. 1930.

19 СР. РФ. 1996. N 3. Ст. 148.

20 СР. РФ. 1996. N 3. Ст. 140.

Olga Breskaya

ON POSSIBILITIES OF SOCIAL ETHICS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Abstract

The article examines the socio-historical context of ethical issues in contemporary Eastern Europe with the application to the ethical principles of Antiquity and Modernity, American civil ethical ideals and Soviet moral Codex. The author implemented the methodology of E. Durkheim, who underlined the idea that ethics and moral norms develop along with the emotional and intellectual belonging to the group, in the conducted case-study within which the individual and collective aspects of norms, values and belonging are viewed and compared in several groups in Belarus and Moldova. According to the data received the indicators of social ethics "grow" along with the level of group identity and the degree of individual freedom and possibilities for personal self-realization approved by the group.

Keywords: social ethics, associability, Eastern Europe, solidarity, group norms, values.

> For anomie to end, there must then exist, or be formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually needed.
>
> *E. Durkheim*
>
> *"The Division of Labor in Society"*

Projects of social ethics in Eastern Europe are drifting between the ideas about ethics implanted in a private, deeply individual life of a citizen, the forming system of norms of social groups aspiring to find its public dimension, and the existing elements of the state ideology which address the issues of ethics in order to justify the public order in the country. Like other social problems the problem of so-

cial ethics does not lead to any extensive discussion in Eastern Europe both in the public sphere and in the internal academic discourse.

In 2000 a Russian sociologist Gennady Batygin started the discussion about the necessity of deliberating on ethical issues[1] in sociology in his article "How the Sociology of Morales is not Possible" the name of which already denied any prospect of a further discussion of this topic. The theses put forward by G. Batygin confirmed the impossibility of using the sociological methodology for the studying of moral questions. The scholar applied M.Weber's conception of "value neutral sociology" to explain such an impossibility within social knowledge. If the sociologist shares this position he is incapable of evaluating moral behavior if he does not have a certain moral position prior to the beginning of his research. G. Batygin believes that the study of morality also becomes more complicated as the transformation of a moral norm into the subject of a scientific analysis (moral sociology) is possible only under the condition of bringing down the transcendental "I" to the level of the factual thing.[2] Considering such prerequisites, G. Batygin made a conclusion about the impossibility of studying collective morals by a sociologist:

> "The insoluble problem is that before observing "as things" the sociologist of morals should construct the subject of his research: social facts can be established only in a certain "condition of the spirit", in a certain cogitative position taken by the researcher and thanks to which it is possible to see the individual over himself".

To prove his hypothesis about the hidden nature of moral facts for the sociologist G. Batygin presented the results of the research in which 93% of respondents noticed that they had faced immoral behavior of other people but only 2% behaved themselves immorally. The strangeness of "the moral fact" for the sociological analysis, connected, first of all, with the necessity to understand the human action in terms of ethical or unethical by the very person performing it, made G. Batygin come to the conclusion that only ethicists and moralists can deal with morals while sociologists should leave such a field.

However, the results provided by G. Batygin confirm the idea that at the individual level the person either does not think about morals or does not want to recognize the immorality of his acts. If 93% of citizens face immoral behavior then how only 2% can perform immoral acts? How is it possible for the society to exist if everybody breaks the norms of all others? G. Batygin's reasoning mostly concerns individual ethics but one can get an impression that the ethical system is something relative and is difficult to translate into the language of objective facts and sociological variables and that ethics are reduced to the evaluative categories of an individual . But for what reason do the overwhelming majority of respondents note the immoral behavior of their associates?

The answer to this question, obviously, is not only for moralists and philosophers, but also for sociologists to define as such results testify to the weakness of the social norms built on the boundaries of individual and group morals. The practical importance of social ethics in the formation of societies in Eastern Europe demands their studying according

to sociological categories which could help to translate "the silence" of the majority of individuals into signs characterizing either the absence or the presence of certain standard practices at the level of social groups and communities. As social ethics connects several levels of actors they require certain work needed to harmonize individual, group and public ideas about the good and the desirable patterns of behavior. Based on the idea of the **necessity** of the ordered social action social ethics appears inseparably linked to the problem of the social whole as **an associated unity** as presented by Durkheim. Such a unity means the existence of intellectual senses supporting it, as well as the emotional feelings shared by society members along with the obligations and the power of authority of society.

> It is impossible to assume that we act only because we were ordered being completely abstracted thus from the content of action. In order for us to become its agent, the executor, it is necessary for it to affect the sphere of our feelings and be seen by us as desirable in certain respects. The duty or debt, hence, expresses only one aspect of the moral with the aspect being abstract. The known desirability is another sign not less essential than the first one.[3]

> It is well-known that morals set rules and examples which integrate a group and a society but at the same time there arise some questions: as the result of what unity are morals born out of? Is social communication of the people in the group in itself an intellectual, emotional or moral factor? Durkheim answered this question in the following way, "If morals exist they can have as their goal only the group formed by a known set of associated individuals, i.e. the society, however, under the condition that the society can be considered as a special individual who differs qualitatively from individuals comprising it. Thus, morals begin there where the attachment to the group emerges whatever the latter might be".[4]

Consequently, social ethics do not only raise questions about the obligatory norms but also address the problem of constructing the social as such.

Between Antiquity and Modernity: from Ethics of the Agent to Ethics of the Act

The question for respondents in G. Batygin's article dealt with the ethical evaluation of man's actions. However, were ethics always connected exclusively with the action? The reference to the value of ethics in classical antiquity considerably clarifies the problem of their weakness in modern societies. In Ancient Greece ethics were connected with the idea of the good, dignity, happiness and soul. Following moral principles made the man happy and society prospering and stable. In Greeks' understanding the concept *eudaimonia*[5] being the central concept of the antique ethical thought, along with the concept of *aretê*, contained simultaneously several meanings and depending on the treatment

the virtue could be associated either with happiness with an active participation while it could also serve as a major and central component of happiness along with the activity, or it was the only means to achieve happiness.[6] Richard Parry, a modern researcher of antique moral philosophy, does not advise to directly correlate antique theories of *eudaimonia* with modern discussions dealing with both morals (answering the question, "what should everybody do?") and with the consideration of immorality (correlated with the idea, "What is good only for one"). He believes it is due to a different function and the value of ethics in antique and modern societies. The difference lies in the fact that ethics of Antiquity are *agent-centered* while ethics of Modernity concentrate on the actions of a man (*action-centered*).[7] Modern ethics are engaged in studying the actions of a man and their consequences and their evaluation from the position of morals and immorality while Antique moral theory concentrated on the most moral subject and its qualities. R. Parry underlines that Greeks and Romans searched for the criteria required to form a virtuous person:

> They are disturbed by the condition of mind and character, a set of values, the attitude of the man to himself and to others as well as by the concept of the man's own place in the common life of community … For ancient people a virtuous man was equated to a handicraftsman, for example, a doctor. To act as a doctor did not mean simply having a set of effective medical actions. It was the knowledge of when such actions are expedient along with others and this kind of knowledge cannot always be accurately defined in advance. To understand what it means to be a doctor, we should address the opinion of the doctor and even his motivation. All this finds its reflection in concrete actions but is not simply reduced to these actions. In the same way what defines a virtuous person is not reduced to actions which he or she produces or does not produce, and for that matter, it is not defined by any set of possible correct actions. It is more likely that the existence of a virtuous person involves the forming of character qualities typical of only a virtuous person in the light of which they are responsible for those actions which are required from them by fairness.[8]

For example, antique ethics paid attention to the qualities of a man promoting his perfection in virtue. Courage, moderation, wisdom and justice "were fixed in the history of culture as four cardinal virtues of antiquity".[9] At the same time morality was connected with the idea of personal perfection, the forming of "skills of a happy life" and its addressing other people. Such ideas about ethics for a separate participant of social relations harmonically connected individual goals and public values into a uniform complete ethical system. The classification of ethical systems written about by R. Parry, brings us to the conclusion that the world in which we live is on the contrary plural and torn, and the evaluation of the morality of an act does not occur just on the basis of the unity of individual, group and social ethics. On the one hand, we judge the act of a man proceeding from our idea about the due or a universal legal norm, on the other hand, a modern man himself seldom thinks

about the fact that social groups, organizations and structures can be built in such a way that the social norm system became the continuation of individual ideas about the due.

Ethics and Public Discourse

Philosophers of antique policies, founders of American democracy, leaders of communist regimes and civil activists of post-Soviet societies were interested in the question about how possible and necessary ethics are at the level of society. The most stable social systems were realizing the idea that the order in societies is based not only on the existence of the strong power and rigid ideology, i.e. "vertical unity", but also on the presence of common social norms offering their members certain moral principles which would be coordinated with the ideas about the necessary and the valuable for separate citizens. For example, the founders of "The Moral Codex of the Builder of Communism" accepted in the USSR in 1961 tried to connect ideological slogans and ethical principles so that, according to their remark, significant ideas of communism could "penetrate" public knowledge.[10] The contradictoriness of "the moral codex" was due to the fact that its founders tried to unite the moral principles of participation in the public life based on collectivist beginnings with the principles of the religious doctrine against which the Soviet state fought. The proclaimed ethical requirements did not say anything about the individual and private dimension of communistic ethics thus leaving the individual involvement "uninvolved". At first sight, the codex contains all necessary components of the social moral unity such as the aspiration to create a uniform universal order based on the principles of equality, participation, and humanism. However, individual freedom, religiousness, a civic position and happiness would not fit the requirements of a collective character.[11] Throughout the Soviet decades individual ethics were opposed to group or society ethics established "from above". All elements outside of the private life were structured according to a uniform ideological principle. Despite the fact that the socialization in any group assumes a certain share of compulsion, the experience of the Soviet decades led the ideological element to the maximum development.

One peculiar example is the declaration of principles of prosperity and preservation of unity of the USA introduced by American intellectuals and democracy founders B. Franklin and T. Jefferson who shared the ideas about the normative order of the world structure the basis of which is the reason, "The reason penetrates and manages Nature and God's laws and … it can make people adhere to it not only in the field of philosophy and ethics, but also in politics, economy, law, education, and even art and literature".[12]

Franklin and Jefferson were interested in Christian churches in America promoting the forming of public morals based on reasonable principles. The result of such aspirations was the concept of public religion introduced by B. Franklin in 1749. The concept was called "democratic belief" or "civil religion". The youth of Philadelphia, according to this concept, was supposed to be trained in the spirit of "public religion" the main principles of which included the following[13]:

> There is one God who created all things.
> He manages the world with his foresight.
> He should be revered with admiration, prayer and gratitude.
> The most pleasing service to God is doing good to the man.
> The soul of the man is immortal.

In the same spirit T. Jefferson used the Declaration of Independence to proclaim the principles of the importance of public religion in the course of maintaining the unity and social order. However, he expanded the concept "public religion", "We consider the truths to be self-evident: people are created equal and given by the Creator certain inalienable rights which among others include the right to life, freedom and pursuit of happiness".[14] T. Jefferson and B. Franklin did not invent the specified principles but consistently developed the concept of Enlightenment based on the idea of the reasonable structure of the Natural and Divine Principles and used those to construct a universal social and political order. The concept of civil religion, principles of individualism and democracy became the basis of the model which made it possible to use vertical and horizontal vectors of social ethics.

> We create families, celebrate religious life, open schools and tell stories which form the images of ourselves and the world, which our children will know and which will guide their actions.[15]

The principles of the USA civil religion promoted the forming of the whole network of institutes maintaining relations between civil and religious ethos, between the participation of the people in a public[16] and religious life the main feature of which is "getting involved" (P. Bell's idea).

Disconnectedness of Ethics

The integrity of social ethics is provided with the degree of interrelation of various levels of the ethical system including individual and collective ones. They started speaking about the professional etiquette of a sociologist, psychologist, businessman, etc. addressing the models of Western professional codes or appealing to religious and historical traditions of the region in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. However, for the most part, all these documents in reality remain marginal codes. It was insufficient just to translate them into a Slavic language if one wanted to develop group ethics. The absence of supporting institutional and social structures of group ethics had its effect. At the same time the existence of social forms themselves such as professional groups and corporations as well as the presence of a normative order in them is not such an obvious fact in modern societies of Eastern Europe. In such a situation the normative nature of the group can be revealed most brightly as a group that represents an integrity and can productively function in the

presence of certain rules and examples of behavior; however, the presence of rules requires the group to permanently produce and reproduce them.

One more problem of the region that does not stimulate the forming of social ethics and that is connected with the consequences of the display of the collective life dysfunctions long existing in Eastern Europe is the difficulties connected with the constructing by individuals of the borders of the private and the public in a functional manner which move either towards the privatization of the public or towards making the private public. Overindividualized societies such as the societies of Eastern Europe of today experience problems with the creation of steady functional groups, corporate structures as such social forms are built at the crossing of individual and group practices uniting their participants into a solidary community with its own ethics, norm, and traditions.

Umberto Eko asserts that individual ethics begin with the presence of the Other. It is possible to assume that social ethics begin with the existence of social groups aspiring to create the normative and valuable orders while the possibility of social ethics becomes real thanks to the participation of various groups in the course of the creation of general universal ethical and social orders. This process always has a border character as the forming of common norms and rules of behavior is connected with the processes of the creation of groups and certain mechanisms of participation in a political[17], economic or religious life. It frequently becomes difficult to separate the process of forming a political system or economic modernization from the birth of new parties, classes, social strata and the creation of examples and norms in these social formations. The division of public labor and the formation of new professional groups with their ethical system have become vivid examples of such parallel development observed by the classic of sociology. The group and norm are so closely connected with each other in the course of creating a common order that the amorphy of the social system called anomie by E. Durkheim can end only if new groups are formed in which "there is an intellectual and moral similarity".[18]

Like Durkheim, A. MacIntyre finishes his book "After Virtue" with the words of hope that exists in modern society waiting for "another St. Benedict"[19] who is an example of behavior and the founder of certain practices in the situation of the social ethics weakness. A. MacIntyre connects the existence of virtue and ethical order with the formation of intermediary structures capable of maintaining and supporting morals, "At this stage it is important to construct local forms of society within the frameworks of which civil mindedness, intellectual and moral life could survive the centuries of gloom which have already approached us".

The creation of local forms is not the only condition needed to form social ethics but it is connected with one more opposition of "social – individual" as G. Batygin believes that "dualism making the studying of social facts an insoluble problem lies in the understanding of morals as a sociological phenomenon. On the one hand, morals are a supraindividual reality and appear to be "a thing" delimited from a free will. On the other hand, a moral action is possible only as an action of transcendental "I".[20] Thus, no matter what level social ethics cover, be it the level of groups or society on the whole it should have the basis cor-

responding to the idea about the due of a separate person as a representative of this group and society. In other words, morals themselves should be a constant live form existing in a discourse prospect. Consequently, social ethics are impossible without the presence of their three components including a) the existence of a social group in which b) the norm and the example are consciously supported by its members while c) its norm and example organically combine the goals and interests of the individual and the group. Let's consider how this hypothesis is realized in the Eastern Europe region using empirical data.

Existence of Groups and Associativity

What can be easier than answering the question, "Do social groups exist in society?" However, if we change this question for a person into "name social groups in which you are an active/passive member?" the results will be unexpected for the societies of Eastern Europe. For example, for Belarusians, active participation in any social groups and organizations, based on the results of EWS national research[21] in 1996 made up the minimum percentage parity fluctuating from 0.1% (in professional associations) to 2.4% (in trade unions) while "non-membership" was about 97–98% in the majority of groups and organizations reaching the maximum value in charitable and humanitarian organizations (99.1%) (see tab.1).

When analyzing the data of the fifth wave of EWS research (2005-2008) it is possible to see that the dynamics of the membership in various groups and organizations of Eastern Europe is characterized by an increase in the number of citizens who take an active part in different social groups and organizations. This fact is a proof of the processes of emergence of social relations and normative practices in social groups in Eastern Europe while there is a reduction of similar processes in the USA. The example provided below (see tab.2) testifies to the changes of the character of participation in religious groups in Eastern Europe. It presents the overall picture in other groups.

Table 1. **Membership in groups and organizations (by country)**

Types of groups and organizations	Membership type	Belarus 1996 %	Moldova 1996 %	Russia 1996 %	Ukraine 1996 %	USA 1996 %	Norway 1996 %
Churches and religious organizations	Active	2.3	12.5	1.9	2.0	49.8	8.3
	Passive	5.5	20.0	3.7	7.0	27.5	23.7
	Not a member	92.2	67.5	94.4	91.0	22.7	67.5
Sport and recreation	Active	1.9	4.2	3.3	1.7	25.7	23.4
	Passive	4.5	5.6	2.9	2.8	17.4	16.0
	Not a member	93.6	90.2	93.8	95.5	56.9	60.7

Art, music and education	Active	1.6	4.8	3.3	1.7	24.3	14.9
	Passive	3.4	4.4	2.3	3.3	15.2	6.8
	Not a member	94.9	90.9	94.4	94.9	60.6	78.2
Trade unions	Active	2.4	5.9	7.2	3.1	9.8	15.5
	Passive	40.4	30.4	32.7	30.2	12.5	31.5
	Not a member	57.2	63.7	60.1	66.7	77.7	52.9
Political parties	Active	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.6	20.8	3.2
	Passive	1.4	2.0	1.1	0.9	29.0	12.3
	Not a member	98.2	97.1	98.1	98.4	50.3	84.5
Professional	Active	0.1	1.7	0.9	0.9	22.3	9.0
	Passive	1.9	2.0	1.4	1.8	12.3	16.8
	Not a member	97.9	96.2	97.7	97.4	65.4	74.2
Charitable and humanitarian	Active	0.2	1.5	0.5	0.5	27.3	9.1
	Passive	0.7	2.4	0.9	1.0	14.9	19.2
	Not a member	99.1	96.0	98.5	98.5	57.8	71.8

Table 2. **Membership in Church or religious organizations (by country)**

Member-ship type	Belarus 1996 %	Moldova 1996 %	Moldova 2006 %	Russia 1995 %	Russia 2006 %	Ukraine 1996 %	Ukraine 2006 %	The USA 1995 %	The USA 2006 %
Active	2.3	12.5	12.9	1.9	2.6	2.0	5.6	49.8	37.9
Passive	5.5	20.0	19.7	3.7	8.6	7.0	11.3	27.5	28.5
Not a member	92.2	67.5	67.4	94.4	88.8	91.0	83.1	22.7	33.7

Statistics of the non-active membership in social groups and organizations addresses this question to the very nature of a social connection. What is it? As society is not just a set of individuals who compose it but also a type of social connections then what is the nature of such connections? When studying the types of social connections E. Durkheim expressed an idea that “social solidarity” is a pure moral phenomenon” difficult to study and that it is necessary “to change the internal fact that is eluding us with an external fact that symbolizes it and study the former with the help of the latter”.[22] E. Durkheim offered to study law as an external fact. This article suggests carrying out such an analysis with the help of the answers of the respondents who represent various collective associations such

as Church, university, an economic corporation. The respondents marked various correlations of indicators characterizing types of social interactions.

Ethics and Socialness

A short comparative study about the nature of a corporation in Eastern Europe which I recently conducted with a Moldavian historian Svetlana Suvejke revealed a peculiar complication. All research respondents came across this difficulty when filling in the questionnaire.[23] All respondents quite easily answered all questions connected with the presence of group identity, solidarity, ethics, values, holidays, and symbols but a great number of participants experienced difficulties when answering the question, "how clearly does the group with which you associate yourself formulate group norms which you should follow?" The perplexity of the respondents regarding the mechanisms of forming by the obligatory group of the example system found its reflection in clarifications, such as who and how creates a group norm and how it is formulated for everyone as well as who decides on its execution. Such clarifications connected with the beliefs of the respondents about the presence of certain rules of behavior and moral requirements in their groups and dealing with the mechanisms of their articulation and social control upon a deeper analysis of the problem allowed to move all these counter questions of the respondents into a new problem area for the researcher. This area includes such issues as whether the group has any value in a sense that it establishes significant and mandatory collective examples of behavior and norms for an individual and society on the whole and what the conditions are for the interaction of the individual and collective principles upon which the forming of the normative system is most successful.

The existence of solidarity in their corporations was marked by university staff (the lowest indicator, 26.7%), employees of companies (33.3%) and members of Church (the highest indicator, 83.3%). Respondents identified the existence of periodical solidarity while 63.3% of university staff and 40% of the economic corporation personnel stated that solidarity exists only in specific situations.

In comparison with Belarus University in Moldova demonstrates a high degree of solidarity (36.7% against 26.7% in Belarus) but has got lower results when dealing with the answer "in specific situations" (43.3% against 63.3% in Belarus). Like in Belarus, solidarity in University in Moldova is articulated with a lower intensity but the hypothesis remains unclear. It is possible that 63% of respondents from University in Belarus and 43% in Moldova who speak about periodical solidarity have higher individualistic values and goals and they don't want to participate in collective practices of the corporation or the corporation does not provide conditions for the realization of their individual interests and goals.

The highest level of the feeling of one's personal individuality is found among respondents from Church both in Belarus and Moldova. Respondents also show the smallest gap in their answers about their self-perception in the family. These indicators are lower for University and Corporation with 26.7% in Belarus in two groups and 46.7% (in a com-

pany) and 40% (in University) in Moldova. The family takes the most important place for three corporations among groups in which the individual feels the fullness and integrity of his individual existence (see tab. 4).

Table 3. **Do you believe that inside the corporation you are part of there is an intragroup solidarity and support of each other?**

	Company (Brest) %	Company (Kishinev) %	University (Brest) %	University (Kishinev) %	Church (Brest) %	Church (Kishinev) %
Yes	33.3	30.0	26.7	36.7	83.3	63.3
No	16.7	10.0	6.7	16.7	0.0	0.0
Sometimes	40.0	46.7	63.3	43.3	16.7	16.7
I have not thought about it	10.0	13.3	3.3	3.3	0.0	20.0

Table 4. **In what group or organization do you feel that you are really yourself?**

	Company Belarus %	Company Moldova %	University Belarus %	University Moldova %	Church Belarus %	Church Moldova %
In the family	86.7	93.3	83.3	86.7	80.0	60.0
In the hobby sphere	3.3	10.0	20.0	13.3	6.7	10.0
In church	10.0	6.7	20.0	13.3	83.3	56.7
Among friends	40.0	50.0	56.7	56.7	46.7	63.3
At work	26.7	46.7	26.7	40.0	26.7	16.7
In Internet-communities	0.0	13.3	13.3	13.3	6.7	0.0
Nowhere	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 5. **In your opinion, what type of personality does the corporation you belong to form?**

	Company Belarus %	Company Moldova %	University Belarus %	University Moldova %	Church Belarus %	Church Moldova %
Creative	13.3	23.3	20.0	46.7	33.3	40.0
Independent	16.7	23.3	20.0	26.7	46.7	50.0
Capable of compulsion	23.3	6.7	43.3	10.0	0.0	6.7
Oriented to the collective	36.7	43.3	13.3	36.7	26.7	13.3

Oriented to one's own goals	20.0	10.0	33.3	10.0	10.0	6.7
Solidary	0	13.3	6.7	13.3	30.0	30.0
With entrepreneurial qualities	3.3	20.0	0.0	3.3	3.3	3.3

The answers to the next question in total give more than 100% as respondents could choose several answers simultaneously. The type of the individual formed by Corporation (see tab. 5) also identifies the style of relations inside it and the correlation between the individual and collective principles in Corporation, the type of solidarity, and the peculiarities of corporate culture. The higher the degree of freedom and level of individual development which are offered by Corporation the more connected is the solidarity with the organic type.

The most important type for a Belarusian economic corporation is "the individual oriented to the collective" (36.7%) and "the individual capable of compulsion" (23.3%). If we look at University then the most important type of the individual is "the individual capable of compulsion" (43.3%) and "the individual oriented to his own goals" (46.7%) as well as a creative and independent individual (20%). The representatives of Church in Belarus rank the "independent" type of the individual as number one (46.7%), then they place the "creative" type (33.3%) and then "solidary" (30%) who should be "oriented to the collective" (26.7%) but not at all capable of compulsion. The type of the individual "oriented to the collective" is the least popular in University while the "individual" type of the man is to the greatest degree formed by Church in the opinion of the respondents.

The economic corporation in Moldova places "the oriented to the collective type of the individual" first (43.3% against 36.7% in Belarus), then it chooses "creative and independent types" (23.3% against 13.3% and 16.7% in Belarus) and then "entrepreneur" (20% against 3% in Belarus).

The data characterizing the situation in the university corporation in Moldova differ from those in Belarus as 46.7% of respondents believe that University forms a creative type of an individual (against 20% in Belarus), the type of the individual oriented to the collective (36.7% against 13.3% in Belarus), independent (26.7% against 20% in Belarus), capable of compulsion (10% against 43.3% in Belarus) and oriented to one's own goals (10% against 33.3% in Belarus). The type of the individual formed by each of these corporations in Moldova and Belarus is to a great extent identical for Church indicators.

Respondents ranked the values using the scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is the minimum value and 10 is the maximum value. In Belarus University staff appreciate the values of free spiritual development (6.6), relations (6.2), communication with people with similar ideas (congenial souls - 6.2), a high social prestige of one's corporation (4.9). A high social prestige in the corporation was especially important for instructors (4.9 against 3.9 in the economic corporation and 3.6 in Church).

The personnel of the economic enterprise find, first of all, material values important (6.6), then communication with congenial people (5.8) while trust ranks third (5.5).

Table 6. **What values does your corporation offer you?**

Values	Company (Brest)	Company (Kishinev)	University (Brest)	University (Kishinev)	Church (Brest)	Church (Kishinev)
Material well-being	6.6	7.4	4.9	4.4	3.1	3.9
Personal independence	4.4	7.0	5.6	4.6	7.3	5.9
Professional self-realization	5.4	7.8	6.2	7.5	6.6	5.1
Relations	4.8	7.2	6.2	6.3	8.3	6.1
Everyday comfort	4.4	6.5	4.0	3.1	4.0	3.9
High social prestige	3.9	5.8	4.9	5.0	3.6	5.0
Free spiritual development	3.7	5.5	6.6	4.7	9.4	7.7
Ability to solve important social problems	3.6	5.8	4.8	4.5	6.5	4.7
Successful upbringing of children	4.9	6.8	5.9	4.4	8.8	6.1
Communication with congenial souls	5.8	6.1	6.2	5.2	9.2	6.5
Entertainment	4.2	4.9	2.8	2.7	4.3	3.2
Power over people	2.8	4.3	1.6	2.5	1.4	2.6
To love and be loved	3.7	6.2	3.8	3.2	8.0	6.7
Strong health	5.1	6.5	4.1	3.2	7.0	6.2
Strong family and relationships	5.3	7.2	5.1	3.8	8.8	5.6
Trust	5.5	7.3	5.0	4.2	9.3	7.2
Solidarity	4.9	6.4	4.2	4.1	8.5	6.1
Ethical norms	4.6	7.5	5.3	5.5	9.2	7.3

Such values as personal independence, trust, solidarity and ethical norms were evaluated by Church respondents much higher than by the representatives of two other corporations.

The importance of ethical, collective and simultaneously individual values and norms is higher for Church respondents than for the respondents of the economic corporation and University. Its representatives value highly such things as interpersonal relations, free spiritual development, and a high social prestige. Professional self-realization as a criterion of correlation including the individual and collective interests is high for all groups.

Contrary to Belarus data about the economic corporation in Moldova (see tab.6) presuppose "personal independence" (7 against 4.4 in Belarus), "professional self-realization" (7.8 against 5.4 in Belarus), "ethical norms" (7.5 against 4.6 in Belarus) and "trust" (7.3 against 5.5 in Belarus).

Many values are much less important for University in Moldova in comparison with University in Belarus. For example, "personal independence" is 4.6 (5.6 in Belarus), "free spiritual development" is 4.7 (6.6 in Belarus), "trust" is 4.2 (5.0 in Belarus). However, the value of "professional self-realization" is higher with 7.5 points (6.2 in Belarus). Solidarity and ethical norms occupy the same position on the scale of corporate values.

On the whole, Church in Moldova has a similar correlation with other corporations but the values attached by the respondents in Moldova are lower than those in Belarus. Personal independence in Church is valued higher than in University but lower than in Corporation.

Table 7. **Do you have any moral obligations towards the groups you belong to?**

	Company Belarus %	Company Moldova %	University Belarus %	University Moldova %	Church Belarus %	Church Moldova %
Yes	53.3	63.3	76.7	70.0	96.7	70.0
No	6.7	6.7	3.3	0.0	0.0	10.0
Haven't thought about it	16.7	3.3	6.7	20.0	3.3	10.0
It is difficult to say	23.3	26.7	10.0	6.7	0.0	10.0
No data available	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0

The feeling of responsibility towards social groups to which respondents belong is the strongest among Church representatives in Belarus and is quite equal in University and Church in Moldova.

Table 8. **How clearly does the group or organization you belong to formulate groups norms which you should follow? (an open question)**

	Company Belarus %	Company Moldova %	University Belarus %	University Moldova %	Church Belarus %	Church Moldova %
Clearly	56.7	36.7	66.7	46.7	90.0	66.7
Partially	20.0	6.7	20.0	23.3	10.0	0.0
Does not formulate	10.0	23.3	0.0	3.3	0.0	10.0
No data available	13.3	0.0	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Haven't thought about it	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0
It is difficult to say	0.0	23.3	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0
No data available	0.0	3.3	0.0	6.7	0.0	3.3

In the opinion of the majority of their representatives the normative system in three corporations in Belarus (see tab.7) has been formed quite clearly. In Moldova the ratio of answers in corporations in comparison with each other is quite similar to Belarus but it is evaluated by the respondents much lower than in Belarus.

The results of the case study clearly identify the conditions in which group ethics are formed most successfully. These conditions include a harmonic combination of the individual and collective values and moral norms. The antique model of "ethics of the actor" developed in a religious group is seen in the ethics of the act, the principles of the man's spiritual development are transferred to it as well. The more individual freedoms and opportunities for self-realization the group offers the more successfully the practices of solidarity are realized, the higher the indicators of the group identity are as well as the aspiration of the individual to trust and responsibility towards the group. At the same time the degree of the rigidness of the moral norm does not always have a linear interrelation with the degree of the moral responsibility in relation to the group (see tab.7-8). The group and ethics are united with each other with the help of interpenetrating connections. On the one hand, ethics support the integrity of the group but, on the other, the group produces the system of norms and moral obligations and the stability of this normative structure of the group and society depends on the character of such reproduction. The stability of social ethics depends on how successfully the group manages to simultaneously build a social norm through itself and its interrelation with the individual and public values. At the same time the moral norm of the group has a paradoxical character as it becomes more stable and actual the more dynamic and discursive it is. "If traditional morals are not doubted and if there is no need in their innovating then they are dying," wrote E.Durkheim.[24] This work based on the analysis of the case results is really being done.

Notes

1 There is a certain distinction between the notions "ethics" (from Greek *ethos*) and "morals" (from Latin *moralis*) in certain approaches. This difference is defined in the following way: ethics is the science about morals. However, both these notions are connected with the ideas about virtue, duty, good, norms of behavior so quite frequently such a differentiation between the notions could be explained by Cicero's translation of the Greek word *ethos* into Latin "*moralis*".

2 Here Batygin refers to the neo-Kantian rule of "distancing" from "life" reality in order to understand its rational sense" / Батыгин Г.С. Как невозможна социология морали // Оправдание морали: Сб. научных статей: К 70-летию профессора Ю.В. Согомонова / Отв. Ред. В.И. Бакштановский, А.Ю. Согомонов. М., Тюмень: Экспресс, 2000. С. 108–119.

3 Дюркгейм Э. Определение моральных фактов / Пер. с фр. А.Б. Гофмана //Теоретическая социология. Антология: В 2-х ч. / Под ред. С.П. Баньковской. М.: Книжный дом «Университет», 2002. Режим доступа: http://www.soc.univ.kiev.ua/LIB/PUB/B/BANKOVSKAYA/ts.1.pdf

4 Ibid.

[5] The Greek word *eudaimonia* means simultaneously the well-being in life and the rightness of acts, the word comes from the combination of two words "*eu*" (well) and "*daimon*" (divine or spirit).

[6] Parry Richard. Ancient Ethical Theory in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published Tue Aug 3, 2004; substantive revision Fri Aug 7, 2009. The mode of access is: http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient

[7] When conditionally dividing modern moral philosophers into consequentialists who treat the morality of the act from the position of the known or expected consequences and deontologists who treat the morality of the act on the basis of the adherence to certain norms, prohibitions, commandments R. Parry emphasizes that the first group of scientists believes that the degree of the act morality is defined by the indicator of the creation of the biggest good for the biggest amount of people // See: Parry, Richard. Ancient Ethical Theory in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published Tue Aug3, 2004; substantive revision Fri Aug 7, 2009. The mode of access is: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient/

[8] Ibid.

[9] Гусейнов А.А. История этических учений. М., 2003. С. 324.

[10] See the article: Судьба дала мне шанс, беседа с Ф.М. Бурлацким. «Российский адвокат» № 5. 2007.

[11] 1) Devotion to the ideals of communism, love to the socialist motherland, to the socialist countries. 2) Conscientious work for the well-being of society: who does not work does not eat. 3) Everyone's care about the preservation and increase of the public property. 4) A high awareness of the public duty, intolerance of the public interests breaches. 5) Collectivism and comrade's mutual assistance: one for all, all for one. 6) Humane relations and mutual respect between people: a man is a friend, a comrade and a brother to a man. 7) Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, simplicity and modesty in public and private life. 8) Mutual respect in the family, care about the upbringing of the children. 9) Intolerance of injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism, and money-grabbing. 10) Friendship and brotherhood among all peoples of the USSR. 11) Intolerance of the enemies of communism, peace and freedom of peoples. 12) Brother solidarity with the working people in all countries, with all peoples.

[12] Betsworth, Roger G. Social Ethics: An Examination of American Moral Traditions. Louisville: Westminster // John Knox Press, 1990. P. 54.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Джефферсон Т. Декларация Независимости Соединенных Штатов Америки // Скидмор М.Дж., Трипп М.К. Американская система государственного управления. М., 1993. С. 331–334.

[15] Betsworth, Roger G. P. 18.

[16] Public life is the life which the participants of different groups take part in and agree about its rules. In this respect the words of H. Arendt in the book "VITA ACTIVA" clarify the connection between the private and public life of a man: "who like slaves had no access to the public or like barbarians did not even set up the open to all public sphere was not even a man" // See: Арендт, Х. Пространство публичного и сфера частного (из книги "VITA ACTIVA" Или о деятельной жизни»). СПб., 2000. The mode of access is: http://old.belintellectuals.eu/library/book.php?id=195

[17] Сутор Б. Малая политическая этика // Политическая и экономическая этика/ Пер. с нем. С. Курбатовой, К. Костюка. М.: ФАИР-ПРЕСС, 2001.

18 Durkheim, Ê. The elementary forms of the religious life. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965. P. 5.

19 Макинтайр А. После добродетели: Исследования теории морали. М.: Академический Проект; Екатеринбург: Деловая книга, 2000.

20 Батыгин Г.С., 2000.

21 Here we provide the results of the research project World Value Survey (WVS) thanks to which several waves of research of the value system were carried out in many countries of the world. In this case we present the results for those countries of Eastern Europe where the research was conducted by the WVS group. The data for Belarus from the last wave of the survey in 2005-2008 are not available; consequently, the conclusions are made on the basis of the comparison with Belarus neighboring countries.

22 Дюркгейм Э. О разделении общественного труда / Пер. с фр. А.Б. Гофмана, прим. В.В. Сапова. М.: Канон, 1996. С. 71.

23 90 respondents were interviewed in Brest: 30 university instructors, 30 employees of the economic corporation of the state property form (an open joint stock company with 100 employees) and 30 members of the parish of Belarusian Orthodox Church. 90 respondents were interviewed in Kishinev: 30 university instructors, 30 employees of the economic corporation of the private property form (an open joint stock company with 60 employees) and 30 members of the parish of Orthodox Church of Bessarabia Metropolitanate. For convenience we will use the terms "university", "company", "Church" when describing the answers: "members of the corporation of university", "members of the economic corporation", and "members of the corporation of Church" // See: Бреская О., Сувейкэ С. Индивид и корпорация в публичном пространстве. Вильнюс: ЕГУ, 2011.

24 A modern researcher of Durkheim's works Hans Joas believes that only a few notice that the classic of sociology was engaged in not so much the questions of the preservation of the traditional morals but rather in the conditions which allow the new morals to develop. See: Hans Joas. Durkheim's intellectual development. The problem of emergence of new morality and new institutions as a leitmotif in Durkheim's oeuvre in *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist*. Turner, S.P., Routledge, 1993.

Andrew Schumann

SOCIAL ETHICS IN THE CONDITIONS OF UNDERDEVELOPED PUBLICITY AND THE ROLE OF HETERARCHIES

Abstract

In the paper I consider negative corollaries of the fact that in Belarus all kinds of publicity including publicity in politics, science, and culture are underdeveloped and sick. As a result, in such a society we have no real social ethics as a whole; there are only substitutes for it. Belarusian society may be described in terms of hierarchies that combine hierarchies with horizontal relations. In open societies horizontal relations are communicatively open like that in NGO. The feature that Belarusian society shares with many other post-Soviet societies is that horizontal relations are hidden and informal and they are used for personal interests.

Keywords: ethics, applied ethics, universal ethics, science, society, heterarchy.

Social and humanitarian knowledge in Western countries underwent a number of essential transformations in the 20th century. They did not affect social and humanitarian knowledge in the former USSR and do not have any impact on it on the post-Soviet territory now. Therefore, social and humanitarian layers of Western and our (post-Soviet) societies are absolutely incommensurable. We live in different universes. Only highly qualified professionals who are well aware of the latest trends in Western society's humanitarian sphere may feel this distinction. There are very few such specialists on the post-Soviet territory. The brightest illustration of the incommensurability of social and humanitarian knowledge in Western and post-Soviet societies is the difference in *ethics*.

In the West, ethics has gone through significant transformations. Ethics methodology has changed dramatically. In post-Soviet society including Belarusian ethics methodology has remained almost un-

changed since the 19th century. This is the neo-Kantian ethics of prescriptive imperatives. Such ethics is called universal. It lays a claim to comprehensive knowledge and absolute truth.

1. Consequences of universal ethics for Belarusian society

The best known adherent of universal ethics in the first half of the 20th century was probably Albert Schweitzer who became the most prominent founder of altruism ideas. Schweitzer chose a very complex mission for himself as he used his own modest means to open a hospital in a small village Lambaréné (now it is the Republic of Gabon, Africa) where he treated local residents free of charge. The phrase "True ethics begins where people stop using words" was his motto. However, Schweitzer believed that there can be a sort of universal ethics that is common for everyone, "Ethics is a boundlessly expanded responsibility towards everything living". Consequently, Schweitzer's altruism bringing "civilization" and "genuine ethics" (it was Christianity for Schweitzer) to the wild, barbarian nations can be considered as the underside of the cruel colonization of Africa that was being carried out by European countries at that time. It is no wonder, therefore, that Africans who personally knew Albert Schweitzer did not say many good things about him and blamed him for his arrogance in relation to the natives.

Albert Schweitzer did a lot of good and, undoubtedly, he deserves a lot of warm and cordial words. However, the universalist treatment of ethics offered by him subsequently began to be treated as dangerous. According to this outdated ethical methodology one group of people was given the whole range of powers for ethical discourse (in Schweitzer's case this group consisted of white colonizers). To counterbalance it many researchers began to develop a new methodology of ethics as, in their opinion, ethical discourse should be based on a multilateral dialogue. As a result, universal ethics was substituted by *applied* ethics.

The main distinctive feature of the latter is that ethics should be the result of a wide public discussion of ethical problems the given community is worried about. Ethics cannot be general ethics or ethics for everyone; it should be specific and solve crucial problems of the given group of people within the framework of which the discussion was arranged. Ethics should be the result of an open dialogue! What does it look like in practice? Instead of the single common ethics for all there began to develop sets of applied ethics – medical, business, etc. These ethics are not only the result of efforts made by specialists but also the outcome of a wide public discussion.

So, universal ethics (German: die allgemeine Ethik, English: normative ethics) and applied ethics (German: die angewandte Ethik, English: applied ethics) differ by a research method. Universal ethics represents an attempt to construct a uniform aprioristic theory which could systemically state what people believe to be right or wrong in human behaviour. Such ethics is also called normative. Kant was its bright exponent. Applied ethics considers specific situations of private or public life from the moral point of view, strictly distin-

guishing spheres of behavior.* Therefore, applied ethics is split up into a number of ethics: medical, business, etc. By its method it is descriptive (English: descriptive ethics); another name for it in this context is situational (English: situational ethics, situated ethics).

It is important to keep in mind that the emergence and development of applied ethics is directly connected with the deepening of ideas of liberalism and democracy as well as with the transition from understanding democracy as the hegemony of the majority to understanding it as the protection of freedom of the minority.

What is the situation with ethics in this country? It is a variant of universal ethics, or, to be more exact, de-ideologized ethics of Marxism and Leninism. Our universities teach exactly this kind of ethics. It is divided into two parts: (1) the history of ethical doctrines and (2) ethical categories. Such ethics has no relation to reality. Having taken such a course, the student will not be able to apply these ethics in life as it is abstract and the student only needs to memorize the interpretations of ethics as offered by Aristotle or Kant. Contrary to this approach to ethics teaching, Western universities offer trainings on corresponding applied ethics instead of an abstract description of universal ethics. For example, future programmers are offered a training on information ethics (in this country it is not taught at all though prepare a considerable quantity of technical experts are trained).

Duplicating universal ethics in Belarus has the following negative sides:

1. It hampers the development of publicity. The absence of applied ethics in this country means the absence of public discussions of ethical problems. For example, very few Belarusians think about the fact that in the domestic public health system it is not the patient who orders treatment but the state. Accordingly, the doctor rendering medical aid is responsible for his actions not to the patient, but to the state. Such a system leads to a variety of ethical consequences including lack of transparency and absence of control over doctor's actions in relation to patients (bribery, rudeness, and impossibility to prove medical error). But such issues are not discussed in our society at all.

2. Most people associate ethics with propaganda; therefore, it is considered to be something external in relation to the person's inner world and daily life. The majority of Belarusians associate ethical standards with non-significant abstract regulations related to either legal norms such as "not to steal" and "not to kill" or to etiquette such as "to offer your seat to somebody in public transport". Let's consider the requirement "to offer one's seat". We treat this requirement as social advertising: it is widely advertised in public transport. It is addressed to young people who should give their seat to the elderly. Besides, there is an interdepartmental order of the Ministry of Health in our country according to which retired people can be refused planned treatment in case of serious illnesses. Let us see: at

* For more details see (1) Julian NidaRumelin (Hrsg.). Angewandte Ethik. Die Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung. Ein Handbuch. 2. Aufl. Kroner, Stuttgart 2005; (2) Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 1993; (3) Peter Singer. Applied Ethics. Oxford University Press, 1986; (4) R.F. Chadwick. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. London, Academic Press Singer, 1997; (5) Hugh LaFollette. Ethics in Practice (2nd Edition). Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

one and the same time we coax to "give seats to the elderly in transport" and "not to give them medical treatment". In public society priorities would obviously be placed differently.

3. Our society appears ethically insensible and devalued from the point of view of values. Ethical behaviour is impossible without ethical intuition that can be formed only in one way – as a result of a live discussion of concrete ethical problems. Belarusians do not discuss such problems; hence their ethical intuition does not have a chance to be formed. Consequently, almost nobody is involved in volunteer activities while strongly pronounced petty-bourgeois priorities of consumer society have been formed in our society. Ethical questions are considered to be minor.

As we can see, the underdevelopment of publicity in Belarus affects not only the political and public sphere of our state, but directly and negatively influences our ethics.

Now let us try to reveal social roots of the underdevelopment of public ethics in our state.

2. Informal heterarchy as a new form of the organisation of a post-Soviet society

The term "heterarchy" is more and more frequently used for the analysis of the organizational structure of a post-information society. David Stark [1] was the first to use it. Heterarchy is understood as a special form of government emerging as an adaptive reaction of large institutions to the instability of external environment, "Heterarchies represent a new model of organisation which is neither a market nor a hierarchy. If hierarchy includes the relations of dependence and the market means independence, then heterarchy represents interdependent relations" [2]. The heterarchical models of the organisation of an enterprise or firm have an internal variety in the context of a built-up vertical. This variety is based on the horizontal distribution of power and a certain autonomy of horizontal formations both in relation to other horizontal formations and in relation to the single centre. In this context, each division is involved in search for innovative decisions while the system as a whole appears to be more flexible and capable of training in the conditions of an unstable environment. In post-Soviet scientific organisations heterarchy reveals itself in the fact that certain divisions can find more attractive sources of external financing than other divisions in the same scientific institute though the divisions can have the same status.

The Soviet model of society had a hierarchical organisation that was integrated into a single planned economic system. In the system direct or indirect financing of social projects was done from the state budget. With the reduction of budgetary financing general social and cultural policy in the post-Soviet countries began to concentrate on strengthening economic independence. Thereby, a heterarchical model of social system management began to form spontaneously in the post-Soviet states.

At the same time a peculiar feature of post-Soviet forms of managing enterprises and firms is that an *informal heterarchy* is being formed [3], that is, the prevalence of informal

ways of interaction (economic and social practices which are not completely institutionalized, i.e. they have not been formalized and, accordingly, they are not transparent for official institutes). I.B. Olimpieva was the first to use the term "informal heterarchy"[4]. If in Western countries heterarchy has a formal character (all interactions are formalized and reflected upon within the framework of a specific organisation), in the post-Soviet countries heterarchy serves as a latent mechanism of adaptation. A vivid example of informal heterarchy in a scientific organisation is observed in a typical situation when the order for a scientific department does not come directly from the customer – an enterprise – but through an intermediary firm. In this case the order can be drawn without involving the accounts department of the scientific organisation and can be registered only in the documentation of the intermediary firm. A distinctive feature of informal heterarchy is the closeness of information.

Spontaneously emerged heterarchies represent a more adaptive form of organisation of activity than hierarchy. However, what consequences are caused by the fact that post-Soviet heterarchies are informal, hidden, closed, non-transparent to society and have a secret mechanism of decision-making? In fact, the consequences are significant. In such social environment *external social statuses are not something important and self-organized publicity appears impossible*. Belonging to some influential heterarchy and aspiration to climb the career ladder within the frameworks of this heterarchy are much more important in this environment. There is no publicity as such.

Heterarchies themselves are in the situation of tight competition; therefore, they inevitably clash. In other words, we can see "a war of all against all". Taking into account the fact that the real subject of the decision-making is heterarchy then the genuine (sometimes even secret) subject of the majority of conflicts is the very heterarchies. In such society ethical values lose their essence and promptly lose importance.

At example of the situation when social statuses do not play a considerable role. The art director of the Belarus opera company Margarita Izvorska Yelizarieva (the wife of the director of the ballet theater company Valentin Nikolaevich Elizariev) decided to defend her thesis for a post-doctor's degree on art criticism. She successfully passed all the necessary defence procedures. There is no doubt that her thesis was not worse than others. It should be noted that in this country there is one centralised highest authority which makes the final decision, VAK. As far as post-doctor theses are concerned, VAK sends the thesis to an additional anonymous reviewer (actually, only three people in the country know the person's name, they include the VAK chair, deputy chair, and the chair of the VAK expert council). The review of this reviewer is the decisive factor. We should remember that the defence of the post-doctor's thesis before it goes in VAK takes a long time (in certain cases more than a year) and passes through very difficult and repeated procedures of expert evaluation. The VAK did not validate the defense by Yelizarieva.

The phenomenon of VAK is unique as there are no analogues to it in any developed country in the world. Actually, it means that three people in the country decide who will join the scientific elite having defended the post-doctor's thesis and will become a dean, a

vice-rector, rector, or a member of the dissertation defence committee, etc. and who will not be able to do it. Possibilities for a prejudiced attitude here are simply unlimited.

Let us analyse this example in terms of the heterarchical society functioning. It is clear that Yelizarieva is a representative of a certain heterarchy controlling the structure of opera and ballet in this country. It is also obvious that this heterarchy has nothing to do with heterarchies controlling the academic environment. There are very few crossing points. The social status of Yelizarieva has a real social weight mainly within the limits of her heterarchy outside of which it can be devaluated. This is, in fact, what happened. Any elderly professor (female or male) of art criticism having certain weight within the limits of the academic heterarchy can appear absolutely indifferent to Yelizarieva's merits as an art director of the opera company.

In Belarusian society the real social weight of the social status is provided exclusively by the heterarchical importance of the status. If the person turns out to be thrown outside the borders of his heterarchy the person actually becomes nobody while his previous merits and external social statuses have no more value in the opinion of others (or almost no value). The person has to start from scratch and to try to enter another heterarchy (which is very difficult to do). The vivid example of the last few years is Alexander Kozulin's destiny. Once Kozulin was part of Lukashenko's establishment but having lost his place in that heterarchy he lost his position in all official structures. We could provide numerous examples when people who used to hold higher positions in the past found themselves in the street. For example, there were several waves of serious shifts in law enforcement bodies when rather young men were compelled to retire.

Let us make a summary. The heterarchic structure of our society cultivates a special type of a person. It is an unsociable person who does not believe in ethical values, he is rather aggressive, guided by rigid pragmatism who aspires to make utilitarian decisions and trusts only numbers. Society on the whole appears to be disunited, and existence in this society is uncomfortable as one is constantly under pressure.

3. Social ethics and symbolic capital

Usually, when one speaks about capital, money comes to mind, i.e. monetary capital. Everyone knows that if one has money one can afford much, if not everything. However, besides monetary capital it is possible to identify other kinds of capital.

Capital as such represents any resources which can be used in the manufacture of goods and rendering of services. This definition is quite wide. According to it, the notion "capital" is quite extensive and includes things which are not connected with economy directly. Thereupon, the division of capital into economic and symbolic is quite important. *Economic* capital is a set of goods, property and assets used for the receipt of profit. *Symbolic* capital is a cultural evaluation of goods or services attributing additional cultural importance to the goods or services thus increasing the surplus value of these goods or services. For example, the painting of a known artist can cost ten, hundreds, or thousands

times more than the painting of an unknown provincial artist. The key role in the painting's price is played not so much by the quality of the work and not the expenses involved in the painting's creation but by the degree of publicity of the artist and the degree of the public resonance of the artist's creativity. All these things comprise the symbolic capital of the painting.

Sometimes there are defaults in economy, i.e. inability to fulfil one's obligations by the borrower when obligations turn out not to be supported with economic capital. Defaults can happen to firms, corporations and even states. This kind of default is called economic. But sometimes defaults that happen in society are not economic. Sometimes situations arise when obligations are not supported with symbolic capital. This variant of default is called symbolic.

The question whether the economic default is likely to happen is widely discussed by economists of different countries, including Belarus. But the probability of a symbolic default is rarely discussed. Let us discuss this problem with reference to Belarusian society.

Karl Marx's economic theory describes an industrial society, i.e. a society based on industry when the key element is the production of goods. Modern society stopped being industrial a long time ago. The society is postindustrial or informational when priority is given not to the production of goods but to the rendering of services.

Marx's scheme is realized in an industrial society as there is the basis (industrial, economic relations) and the superstructure (cultural, symbolic relations) where the superstructure is completely derivative from the basis. Industrial society leaves little room for symbolic capital. The transition from the feudal formation to the capitalist one is, first of all, the reduction of symbolic capital and its depreciation. Public statuses and titles of nobility are not as important as economic capital. Everybody rushed to produce goods and make money.

On the contrary, the role of symbolic capital has sharply increased in postindustrial society. It was caused by the priority given not to the production of goods but to the sphere of services. One always could and will always be able to see an appreciable share of symbolic capital in services. Sausage or a tooth-brush contains no symbolic capital (like other consumer goods) but if we take fashion (show of fashions) or the cinema there is already nothing there except for symbolic capital. Accordingly, the surplus value varies greatly. In modern society Marx's scheme about the domination of the basis over the superstructure is no longer true. Everything has turned upside down. The superstructure already defines the basis. Symbolic capital dominates economic capital. The development of information technology strengthens this domination. Money and goods are not as important as information and technologies. Such re-evaluation promptly began to transform the whole civilised society in the direction of a considerable growth of the importance of publicity and openness. Society based on symbolic capital becomes transparent.

Belarus went through the world financial and economic crises more easily than the adjacent countries. The reason is that this country prefers a bird in the hand. We are still

developing an industrial economy and if one is to speak about postindustrial spheres (information, sphere of services) then the strategy of their realisation is industrial and authoritative. Industrial economy in modern conditions gives a minimum. It is the best strategy in a crisis. But in normal conditions it leads to stagnation. People should always count on the maximum and try to achieve it. The use of symbolic capital in economy is an aspiration to the maximum, a possibility to make money out of air, soap bubbles, things which cannot be touched and felt such as information technology, leisure, entertainment, and culture.

Belarusian leadership sets the goal of society's transition from the industrial to the postindustrial level but it realises the tasks in the spirit of industrial thinking. The Soviet Union faced this problem before. The union failed in many respects because the industrial society of the USSR stagnated and did not not fit global dynamics.

There is one curious fact worth mentioning. The development of computer equipment and software in the USSR in the 1950-60s was going in parallel with their development in the USA and England. But then one could notice a noticeable lag. In the 1970s the party leaders made a surprising decision to completely copy IBM samples though from a technical point of view it is much more difficult to copy stolen samples than to develop one's own. Engineers came up with a tender name for their invention – "draloscope". As a result the development of information technology in the USSR was a total failure in the 1980s. The Soviet Union did not turn into a postindustrial society.

The reason for the failure is the not the lack of intellectuals capable of creating technologies but the underdeveloped forms of social communications, industrial thinking of the top managers incapable of organizing the realization of these technologies, and complete ignorance about symbolic capital and its turns.

In this country publicity is not formed and as a consequence symbolic capital is not produced. We mainly import it. Let's make a simple test. We can ask any passer-by in the streets of Minsk to name modern Belarusian writers, artists, publicists, and scientists. The biggest majority will not be able to name anyone. If the names are given then the name will not be repeated. It means that we do not produce symbolic capital in the sphere of culture and science. People have statuses of writers, artists, publicists, and scientists but there is no symbolic capital involved. Actually, we are facing a symbolic default in the intelligentsia environment of Belarus.

And what about the state? We are continuing to build a post-industrial society without symbolic capital, i.e. using industrial methods. It will undoubtedly lead to the default. What are the potential threats? Scenarios are different. We could repeat the destiny of the USSR when the society was self-dissolved. But most likely it will lead to the loss of independence and assimilation of our society. As such we basically consume Russian and Western symbolic capital. It is also bad that in modern economy symbolic and economic capitals are indivisible, therefore the symbolic default will be reflected painfully on economy on the whole.

Social ethics is a major component of symbolic capital. Thanks to social ethics some acts are attributed symbolic importance. If symbolic capital is not developed in society and is only imported, then social ethics remains underdeveloped as well. In our society problems with symbolic capital lead to the problems with social ethics.

4. Social ethics and the position of the expert in society

Let's consider now the interrelation between social ethics and the level of development of scientific (or, on a wider scale, expert) community. Social ethics does not appear by itself. There should be experts who formulate it.

In this country a considerable quantity of people are involved in research, teaching and engineering and design activities. Therefore, it is possible to say that Belarus has got a large scientific community. At the same time we could state that the activity within this community is ineffective. In Belarus there are no schools of thought with at least the minimum regional influence. There are no schools of thought well-known in the world.

The situation with the Belarusian scientific community reminds an extremely ineffective organisation of scientific activities in the USSR. In those days a large quantity of people were involved in science while the return on the efforts invested was the lowest. That, however, allowed to solve the unemployment problem in the Soviet Union. A big number of scientific, research and teaching positions guaranteed maximum employment for intellectuals. The situation in modern Belarus is somewhat similar. There are many higher educational establishments in the country. This is done, firstly, to solve the unemployment problem for young people (youth unemployment is postponed for five years); secondly, there are a great number of vacancies for intelligentsia. At the same time the quality of higher education is quite low and scientific activity of teachers is ineffective.

The Soviet Union used exclusively administrative means to regulate scientific community. The same situation is observed in modern Belarus. All scientific community is centrally regulated with the management extending to all layers of scientific activity including the essence and social aspects.

The content of scientific research is regulated by approving collective scientific topics (for each chair, faculty, centre etc.) . These topics are approved in a centralized manner and should correspond to the priority directions of scientific activity as defined by the leaders of the country. Individual scientific topics which cannot be fit into collective scientific topics cannot be used. The same rule applies to collective scientific topics which cannot be researched if they do not correspond to priority directions.

In humanities such centralised regulation of the content of scientific research often means the imitation of scientific activity. An individual topic in such cases is artificially adopted to fit the collective topic and priority direction. Everything is like it was in the Soviet academic environment. An ordinary thesis on humanitarian disciplines is quite often a standard compilation of various sources on the declared topic while the main issue is the formal conformity to the collective topic and priority direction.

Such a desire to regulate the content of scientific research complicates the forming of high-quality schools of thought. Self-organising of scientific community in the conditions when the content of scientific research is regulated from the above is impossible.

However, administrative means are used to regulate not only the research content but also the organisation process, i.e. all social aspects. Candidates to top positions are appointed from the above. The key positions are affirmed personally by the president of the country. If the social system has a strict hierarchical structure, agents should behave in a special way. They should not show the initiative as it is punishable. They should react exclusively to the instructions from the above. Therefore, instead of activities our scientists wait for further instructions of their bosses.

Statuses of scientists in this country are also distributed in a centralized manner. There is a special body, the Higher certifying commission (VAK) which possesses all powers to assign scientific degrees and ranks. VAK has even begun to exceed its powers during the past couple of years.

According to its authorised documents, VAK confirms the decision of awarding the candidate's degree and awards the doctor's degree. It means that when working with candidates' theses VAK should check all the documents which reflect the thesis defence, within the limits of this or that Council for thesis defence regarding their conformity to formal requirements (for example, correspondence of the thesis topic to the speciality on which the defence was held) . It is not VAK's responsibility to check the content of the thesis. However, recently VAK very often did not confirm the decision of the Thesis Defence Council identifying the content as the reason for decline. It means that some people from the VAK Advisory Council possess unlimited powers.

In the case with theses for a post-doctor's degree everything seems to be even more authoritative. The VAK Advisory Council appoints an additional secret reviewer whose decision the defence recognition depends on. It should be kept in mind that the post-doctor's degree opens a possibility of occupying administrative positions in Belarusian science. It is a necessary step if one wants to make an administrative career. Only the VAK Advisory Council has the right to decide who can become the doctor and who cannot. It means that the Council decides who will have an administrative career in the country and who will not.

As we see, some people upon entering the VAK Advisory Council possess special powers to distribute the statuses of scientists (when awarding degrees and ranks). Possibilities for the prejudiced relation are unlimited such as squaring accounts, infringing one clan in favour of another, lobbying interests of certain people, etc.

In the system managed with the administrative means we can speak about the specific position of the expert as an individual agent of scientific activity.

All over the world the expert receives the corresponding status due to his expert knowledge. Such a person is initially considered to be independent and self-contained. The expert is invited if there is a need to fulfil a certain task. In this case the expert is offered prospective projects, an adequate remuneration and other forms of incentives. The degree

of the expert's importance is defined thus by the expert's public name. It is believed that the expert knowledge should be checked for correctness within the frame of a public debate while it should also stand the fire of public criticism from expert community. The more we respect the expert within this community, the more his services cost. In other words, the expert's public name brings in a high income.

In this country, just like in the Soviet Union the dominant idea is that there are no irreplaceable people. Accordingly, the expert position is only a position, a vacancy. Actually, it means that the person is made a favour when he is invited to take the position of the expert of this or that level as there are always a lot of candidates interested in that position. The position of the expert means inclusion into the management system of a scientific organisation.

All over the world the status of the expert is based on the expert's public name. At first there should be an independent expert, then there is the status and the post. In our country the public status of the expert is the effect of the post, no more. There is no concept of an independent expert. The higher the position the person holds, the higher his public status is. There are no public statuses outside of the system as such. Top management possess unlimited possibilities and can appoint anyone to hold the position. It turns out that public statuses are distributed purely administratively. One is made an influential scientist by the decision from the above.

Due to the fact that everything is controlled administratively in Belarusian society, there is no concept of an independent expert and there is no concept of the public status of a scientist separately from his position. Such system completely lacks full-grown publicity in the science system. This is seen, for example, in the attitude to scientific publications.

All over the world a scientific publication is a public statement of the expert about himself. Interest in publications is very high. It is connected to the fact that the independent expert can make himself a public name through publications. Publications represent the space of objective evaluation of their work by experts. Publications check the depth of the expert's knowledge. Serious publications are valued very highly all over the world. It is extremely difficult to receive it as the system of anonymous reviewing is rather rigid.

There is no interest in scientific articles in Belarusian science. Texts written by other scientists are neither traced down nor read. There is no sense in doing it as experts are appointed to the posts from the above irrespectively of the level of their knowledge. Therefore, scientific publications are treated exclusively formally just as a necessary step for the thesis defense and scientific reports. The conventional attitude to publications makes Belarusian scientific journals unreadable even within the country. People send their articles for the publication to magazines which are included into the VAK list of scientific journals but they themselves do not read these journals. It is a strange game of pretending to be scientists. Articles are written, but frequently are not read.

When there is no real full-scale publicity, reviews of articles do not concern the content of texts. It is not interesting to anybody as articles after all are not read by anyone. Reviewing has a formal character (the content is not really reviewed) and mentions only

social aspects. The authors of the articles should be members of certain scientific clans. Then this is enough for the text to be published. A person "from the outside" will never be able to have his article published. The higher the scientific clan patronage of the article's author the easier it is to publish the article. The clan is responsible for the publication of these or those authors.

The absence of full-scale publicity in Belarusian science presupposes its clannishness and heterarchy character. A career in science is a result of a complex positioning struggle, network communication, and live participation in informal heterarchies. Publications cannot produce a significant impact on scientific career. All depends on the decisions of the bosses. One can affect such a decision only through network communications. It is impossible to stand and win this struggle alone. Therefore, one's scientific career always develops within the context of this or that clan with the clan being a narrow group of people ready to lobby their own members and to push out strangers. The more influential the clan is, the easier it is to make a career. Different clans supervise different scientific environments. The higher the possibilities the more rigid the clan environment.

One cannot expect innovations in the clan and heterarchy science. Environment is very conservative. It is impossible to produce cardinally new knowledge in such conditions. A scientific career cannot be made through discoveries and innovations in Belarusian society. One should correspond to formal requirements and to belong to a clan. This is a necessary and sufficient condition. Scientific discoveries are a deviation of the system, and any deviation is suppressed by the system.

Thus, firstly, Belarusian science is managed exclusively with the help of administrative means, secondly, full-scale publicity is non-existent, thirdly, everything is controlled by clans. It is next to impossible to change the situation. It is connected with Belarusian mentality and the fact that the Soviet form of the organisation of science in Belarus still has not been reformed. The ways of entering a scientific elite career remains unchanged.

The only way out is the gradual integration of Belarusian science into the world science. Belarusian science should try to enter the world science on a competitive basis. Belarusian academic community should try to be integrated into the world community without any preferences. Preferences are always a good feeding trough for narrow clans. But clans are the main enemy of publicity in science lack of which makes real scientific discoveries impossible.

All countries where democratic transformations passed easily enough and penetrated all spheres of society have got a high level of expert thinking. For example, such small countries with stable democracy as Slovenia and Estonia, publish their own prestigious philosophy magazines *Acta Analytica* and *Studia Philosophica Estonica*. *Acta Analytica* is considered to be one of the most prestigious professional journals in the world (proved by the fact that it is published in the prestigious scientific publishing house *Springer*).

Countries experiencing certain difficulties with the democratisation of society have got specific problems with the quality of humanitarian knowledge and humanitarian thinking. One of the most vivid examples is Albania. The majority of the European state-

of-the-art reviews treat Albanian society in the context of two problems: organised crime and drug smuggling. At the same time, there is no philosophical tradition in Albania worth mentioning. Thereupon, the world community aspires to help in every possible way with democratizing in the conditions of underdeveloped publicity and the role of heterarchies in Albanian society. For example, an American university (University of New York Tirana) was opened in Tirana. The majority of its instructors are invited scientists who defended their theses in European or American universities. The international magazine *Albanian Journal of Politics* began to be published. Its goal is to improve the level of expert evaluations in the political science sphere. Indirect dividends from these undertakings are more than obvious, namely, the strengthening of expert positions of Albanians in the solving of disputable geopolitical situations.

Other problematic European countries include Lithuania, Serbia and to a much smaller degree Bulgaria (since some positive changes have been observed lately). But the most problematic society is ours. We are an absolute champion of the list, but only from the end. There are no scientific magazines of international level published in Belarus! It is better to say nothing about the quality of teaching staff where only very few have weighty publications in English. But even if somebody has got such an article these publications are not considered prestigious in our country. We are completely isolated from the world community in the sphere of expert thinking.

Prestigious local journals have no interest for anyone outside our country. Two most powerful local journals *Reports of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus* and *Vesti Natsyjanalnaj akademii nauk Belarusi* (News of the National Academy of Sciences) are published in Russian or Belarusian. What does it mean? It means that these journals have no impact factor for the world community, i.e. that a publication in these journals will be considered neither scientific nor prestigious by a European scientist. The journal of the international level must be in English. Another obligatory requirement is for its editorial board to include recognised world specialists. In most cases the overwhelming majority of our scientists are known only to ourselves. Thus, it becomes a vicious circle. The third major requirement is to have scientists from different countries published. The more influential the name of the scientist is the better it is for the journal.

As we can see there are grave problems with the expert community in Belarus. Authoritarian regulation of the scientific community and the negative role of informal heterarchies (clans) completely kill full-scale publicity in the scientific and expert community and make actual research in the sphere of humanitarian knowledge impossible. Accordingly, we can make extremely sad conclusions that the pitiable situation in our country with social ethics will not change. We do not have those expert groups which could reform the theoretical bases of social ethics while the absence of high-grade publicity in all spheres, including the scientific one, make it impossible to transfer the symbolical capital, and so, we will not have real social ethics still for many long years.

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RELIGIOUS INSTITUTES AND FORMATION OF THE SOCIAL STATE IN RUSSIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Abstract

The article examines the participation of Church institutions in social politics in the history of Russia. In every historical period state authority regulated the degree to which the Church and society structures were admitted into the social sphere. In contemporary Russia, the complex of social problems is so critical that the characteristic of Russia as a welfare state could be challenged. In the Russian Eastern Orthodox Church, which positions itself as an active participant of the socio-political processes in Russia, there have been considerable changes that are supposed to enforce the presence of Church in civil society, including the social sphere. The author presents the analysis how the roles of the state and the Church in the social sphere were historically divided in Russia and what kind of situation exists today.

Keywords: Welfare state, civil society, social policy, Eastern Orthodox Church, Russia, charity, state policy.

Over the past 20 years, Russia has undergone radical political, and social and economic transformations connected with the transition from socialist economy to "the free market" (Симонян). Dramatic changes also took place in state social policy. According to the Constitution, Russia is "a social State whose policy is aimed at creating conditions for a worthy life and a free development of man" (article 7). However, the question whether it is possible to call the policy carried out by the modern Russian government "social" remains open. The public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Analytical Centre in 2009 show that Russian society hopes for active regulation by the state of the social sphere[1] whereas in practice only 24 % of the interviewed feel they can "rely on social protection and support from society and the state".

In the last two decades, researchers note the growing influence of religious factors in the country's political life. Sociological polls show a gradually increasing trust of the population in church and religious organizations (48% in 2009 against 38% in 1997). 73% of the population in Russia (some polls give the figure of up to 90%) identify themselves as Orthodox (there are approximately 6-7% Muslims and about 1% Catholics and Protestants).

During the Soviet period, the Church was excluded from all spheres of public life. After perestroika the Orthodox Church received a unique opportunity to restore its presence in the country's social and political life. Today the Orthodox Church aspires to take a significant part in social life. However, while the importance of the Orthodox Church in the public and political sphere is not in doubt, its influence on the everyday life of a post-Soviet individual has long been the subject for fierce disputes among Russian sociologists. This article makes an attempt to describe the history of the participation of religious institutions, of the Orthodox Church in the first place and in the social life of the Russian population in the context of "the distribution of powers" with state institutes.

History of the Emergence of Social Activity in Russia

The emergence of charity in medieval Russia is connected with the emergence of the idea of the necessity to help the poor who could not support themselves independently. In Old Russian texts they are called "poverty-stricken" or "poor"; the reasons for their difficult condition included political internecine wars and periodic natural cataclysms causing poor harvests (Афанасьев, с. 124). After the adoption of Christianity in Russia assistance to beggars becomes one of the main Christian virtues. "Love for the poor" is an important quality of princes recorded in Russian chronicles as princes distributed alms, fed the poor during important holidays or in connection with the remembrance of the dead.

At the turn of the 15th–16th centuries one could notice some changes both in relation to beggary and in the understanding of the role of monasteries in society. «The Tale of Warlord Dracula» created in Russia contains an episode of physical destruction of beggars as a way of solving a social problem. By the 16th century beggary becomes a socially significant phenomenon and is discussed by Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich and members of the Stoglavy Sobor (Hundred Chapter Synod). From the end of the 17th century one can observe a crisis in the state policy concerning the poor. Several decrees were issued to clear the streets from numerous beggars (Об общественном призрении в России, с. 31).

The state system of help and/or struggle against undesirable phenomena in society such as beggary, children's homelessness and infanticide, prostitution, etc. starts to be formed in the Russian empire in the first half of the 18th century. The legislation defines the categories of the population which had the right to receive help including the elderly and crippled soldiers, illegitimate babies and orphans. As the maintenance of an efficient army was considered the main state goal, Emperor Peter I paid primary attention to the support of the brass hats. Emperor Peter I also declared war on the "idle" beggars and clerics; the giving of alms in the streets was forbidden and penalties could be imposed.

During the reign of Catherine the Great a systematic formation of the state legislation concerning the support of beggars, the crippled, and orphans started. Catherine II exempted the nobility from military duties, issued "the Charter of the Cities" and introduced elements of local self-government though in some rather limited forms. In the course of forming the governorates departments of charity support were created. Their members included representatives of different social estates. The departments had the right to open national schools, orphanages, hospitals, almshouses using both local budget and private funds. Private donations became legally allowed. The existing procedure of registering a charitable donation was complex and cumbersome (each donation required the sanction of the emperor); nevertheless, various charitable organizations based mainly on the donations of individuals began to be founded at the end of the 18th century in Russia. At the same time the system of charitable institutions of the imperial house, which were traditionally run by female members of the imperial family was developed (Ульянова).

The structure of Russian society was dramatically changed during the period of great reforms (1860–1870) (Горнов). The peasant reform that was carried out led to the impoverishment of a great number of peasants, their sharp stratification and the destruction of the traditional way of living of the rural community. The processes taking place in the peasant environment coincided with the beginning of industrialization and, accordingly, with the growth of urban population; moreover, there was a demographic increase in Russia. The industrialization in Russia was uneven and dynamic, and by 1913 Russia occupied the 5–6th place in the world by GDP and was almost equal to France (Ахинов, Калашников. С. 83).

These factors led to the emergence and quick growth of social problems. In the middle of the 19th century the state did not take upon itself the obligation to render assistance to the population layers that had no social protection making the estates responsible for the assistance to the needy. Nevertheless, the problems of the working class forced the state to pass a number of laws gradually regulating the working conditions of juveniles (1882), women (1885), and factory workers (1886) as well as the laws about medical insurance and factory workers (1886) and factory inspections.

The growth of public activity in the solution of social problems began during the post-reform period. A developed system of institutions providing assistance to the poor (almshouses, shelters, hospitals, labor support establishments, etc.) was in existence at the beginning of the 20th century. It was formed gradually and had no uniform departmental subordination. In the absence of the state system of social support in the 19th century – the beginning of the 20th century it was charity that became the main element of the help to the low-income groups. There being no centralized system of social structures, the system of local structures prevailed. By 1902 there were 11,040 charity bodies (institutions and societies) in Russia, 72% of which operated in cities. Out of 6,278 charitable organizations 30% were intended for children and 70% for adults. The Empress Aleksandra Fedorovna was the direct patron of "Labor Assistance Tutelage" that united under its aegis

hundreds of workhouses and the patron of the All-Russian Motherhood and Infancy Protection Tutelage (1913).

The reign of Nikolay II (1894–1917) was characterized by the consolidation of public forces to help the poor. It was part of a conscious government policy. Its most significant result was the adoption in 1912 of social laws which regulated accident and illness insurance. At the same time, a whole complex of social problems (the most crucial ones were pauperization in cities and increasing stratification of the rural population) had been aggravating by the First World War; according to experts' estimations, "the number of the needy" in Russia was 8 million people in 1915 (Ульянова. С. 249).

After the October revolution (1917) the Bolshevist power tries to establish a rigid "labor discipline" in the conditions of civil war and destruction. The declaration of "proletariat dictatorship" required the organization of the workers' social security, but it turned out to be impracticable in reality in the days of military communism. "The Provision of workers' social security" of October 31st, 1918 introduced a uniform system of insurance which included medical aid, allowances, pensions and natural assistance the money for which was supposed to be withdrawn from the budget of enterprises and businessmen (Косарев, 1999. С. 19–20). However, in the conditions of the massive task of nationalization the declared program was realized only on paper. In practice, the authorities supported mainly "the creators of the revolution" as in 1920 out of one million people who received pension 2/3 were Red Army men and members of their families while only 1/3 included workers, employees and members of their families. Old-age pensions for workers in some industrial branches were introduced in the second half of the 1930s. By 1928 the state scheme of social protection covered almost 11 million people but "the key beneficiaries of social protection and public health services were industrial workers and children while peasants were again excluded and forced out to the margins of social protection" (Лебина, Романов, Ярская-Смирнова. С. 26–35).

The selective support was clearly visible in all spheres of social policy, and new social exclusive castes and nomenclature were quickly developed. For example, in June, 1920 the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars adopted the decree "On pensions to individuals who rendered great services to the Workers' and Peasants' revolution". This system of selective support, benefits and privileges created during the first years of the Soviet power was characteristic of Soviet social policy of the period that followed. Moreover, the legislation was used to identify categories of individuals called "lishentsy" (people deprived of rights) who were refused civil rights and were not included into any level of social policy.[2] The deprivation of the right to vote automatically affected members of the family who lived at the expense of and were dependent economically on the deprived individual. In the 1920s, peasants who could afford to hire laborers made up the most numerous category of "the lishentsy" (Федорова. С. 491). Former cenobites, the large families of the orthodox clergy, and priests' widows found themselves outside of the framework of social support. In the conditions of the total centralization and distribution of basic foods on the basis of the rationing (card) system, these categories of the population were doomed to extinction.

State policy was directed at the creation of the most effective system of socialist production and maximum mobilization of the population for intensive productive work. The institutions of social care created in the 1920s combined features of care and control including the regularization and regulation of an individual's social behavior.

The new power focused on the question of creating "a new Soviet person"; during this process it was necessary to get rid of "diseases of the past", the key issues being poverty, illiteracy, child homelessness, the slavish position of women in the family, insanitary conditions, housing, etc. One of the first directions in the social sphere policy was the active involvement of women in the labor market and the creation of the system of "social motherhood" where the education of children was to become a collective business while the woman was to be liberated from "kitchen slavery" and to become a full-fledged working woman. Another main direction was the struggle against children's homelessness. For the first time the cruel treatment of children was condemned while the upbringing of the new Soviet youth was declared one of priority social problems.

The Soviet state was to make a radical qualitative change called "conservative modernization" in the works of the sociologist A. Vishnevsky. The sanitary and epidemiologic reform carried out by the Soviet leadership directed at decreasing the death rate did not coincide with the general direction of policies directed at the prompt industrialization of the country and the maximum mobilization of human resources for this purpose. The policy in the social sphere acquires rigid, even perverted, forms after 1929 that was the year of "the Great Turn" when "the care of philanthropic character was replaced by a rigid social control quite often having a shade of dictatorship or even terror" (Лебина, Романов, Ярская-Смирнова. С. 43). The search for "wreckers" and "enemies" in society led to the liquidation of all public organizations including those engaged in social work in the 1930s. During that period both the criminal liability and social insurance were organized according to the economic priorities of the government. At the same time, the requirements of the state in relation to the worker were becoming tougher and tougher. Since 1927, the absence at the workplace without a good reason (the illness certified by a medical certificate) could lead to the worker's dismissal, eviction from living space provided by the enterprise, and the loss of other privileges. The rules, according to which the worker could apply for social protection and sick-list payment, constantly became tougher during the 1930s. The peak of the toughening of control was reached in 1940 when a worker leaving the workplace without permission could be brought to court and sent to prison (Лебина, Романов, Ярская-Смирнова. С. 44). The USSR had a developed system of forced labor camps (GULAG) where "the maximum mobilization of human resources" hundreds of thousands of prisoners ensured not even the most basic elements of social protection (Иванов). A. Vishnevsky believes that there were three basic factors which produced a catastrophic impact on the development of the social and demographic situation in the USSR in the 20th century: wars, political repressions, and hunger (Вишневский. С. 116).

Starting with the second half of the 1950s, it is possible to speak about the transformation of social protection legislation into an independent branch. On July 14, 1956 the law

on the state pensions was passed, in 1964 pensions were extended to collective farmers and since then the general pension provision has become available in the USSR. All the citizens of the USSR received access to free health care services. Since the mid 1960s the improvement of the well-being of Soviet citizens becomes one of the priority spheres of the state policy. It is possible to point out the following directions of social policy in the 1960–1980s:

- childhood and motherhood protection;
- granting of free general education;
- free health care system;
- system of pension provision;
- housing sphere.

The material provision of social services was organized in three directions: state social security, state social insurance, and social security of collective farmers.

In the USSR, a large-scale provision of social benefits was carried out through the labor employment of the individual, namely, through enterprises and trade unions. Medical and health improving services (for example, sanatoria, and rest homes), accommodation, food, holidays, education (including kindergartens), and surcharges to pension were provided in the workplace (Волчкова, Минина. С. 66-67). This sphere made up a considerable part of the costs of the enterprise and was the key element needed to stimulate work and behavior in the labor market. The significance of support from the production side increased in the 1990s because of a relative decrease in the monetary salary. Modern researchers claim that the Soviet social policy, having formed paternalist relations between the state and citizens, was inefficient because instead of reducing it increased the differences in the standards of living of different categories of citizens: the Soviet social policy was directed at the protection of the interest of the nomenclature (military, partocracy / bureaucratic, working-class), rather than trying to reconcile the interests of various social groups. Categories of citizens were differentiated according to the degree of their "right" to receive the social support of the state (Титмус. Шкаратан. 1998; Тихонов. Шкаратан. 2001). Nevertheless, the socialist system formed by the 1980s provided some general minimum of living standards to all citizens and promoted social inclusion through labor activity (Ахинов. Калашников. С. 104–108).

In the 1990s, the Russian state, remaining socially-oriented under the Constitution, in practice began to shift responsibility for the preservation of the minimum standards of life to the citizens (Гонтмахер). In the 1990s, in Russia the number of the unemployed increases, and an influx of refugees from the former republics of the USSR arrived. Inequality and poverty became the main determinants of the social development of modern Russia (Schwethelm). The reforms of the 1990s were considered as exclusively economic liberalization without clearly developed social purposes while "the shock therapy" used by the reformers led to the increase of the socially unprotected layers of the population (Коваленко Е., Строкова Е). At the same time, both in the 1990s and today the decrease in state expenditure in the social sphere remains a priority task in budget planning (Григорьева. с. 20). During Yeltsin's presidency there was a tendency to delegate powers

to the regional level; in 1991–1992 alone, 25 laws dealing with various aspects of social security were passed.

By the beginning of 2000, Russian society was in the state of anomie; there was a deep distrust of all power institutes. The Russian state itself was characterized, on the one hand, by the adoption of non-coordinated, inconsistent legislation and weakness in terms of enforcing its own laws, and traditionally as not a law-abiding society, on the other, received the name "criminal" (vs. the concept "legal") (Бочаров).Since 1991, there have been several stages of reforming the social protection system. For example, in 1993–1994 it was declared that the state was moving away from the principles of social security towards the social protection principles (the Convention of the development of social services of the Russian Federation, August 4, 1993) adopted in European countries (Фирсов. С. 186). In connection with it, the program for the creation of the system of social services was developed. However, in practice the preferential system of protection of exclusive groups of citizens had been preserved. In 1996–1997, a complex program of social reforms to be implemented by 2000 was developed but it was stopped by the crisis in 1998 after which the whole social policy was reoriented towards the preservation of the minimum social guarantees, provision of payment of salaries, pensions, grants and development of employment.

In 2000, another change in the social concept took place as the idea of a subsidiary state was introduced as an antithesis to the social one. In recent years, a tendency towards the formation of an authoritarian political system has been observed in Russia while simultaneously one can observe the realization of the liberal concept in the social sphere directed at the decentralization of the state's social functions, the reduction of financing the sphere of social services (Социальная поддержка: уроки кризисов).

Several national projects were started in 2000. They included "education", "health", "development of the agrarian-industrial complex", and housing. Attempts to analyze the consequences of the reforms were undertaken in 2006 by a collective of authors from the Saratov region. The results of the analysis are used in the present research. The authors define the initiated projects as "system imitation" and give the following reasons for their inefficiency: the mainly declarative character of actions; a high degree of voluntarism during the realization of national projects as they have no uniform basic document (federal laws play a minor subordinated role in the realization of national projects); the fragmentary sporadic character of the measures taken does not lead to the solution of the problems in this or that sphere (health protection, education, provision of affordable accommodation), and to even greater disproportions in the given sphere (Национальные проекты. С. 142–143).

Another social reform carried out by the Russian government in 2004 (the law of August 22, 2004) caused a highly negative reaction in Russian society, first of all, among the groups least protected in the social sphere such as pensioners, invalids and individuals who suffered from the Chernobyl disaster. Unofficially, the law was called "the monetization of social benefits", in many respects reflecting the essence of the reform. In fact, the state took another step to give up the functions of the social protection of citizens, provi-

sion of social benefits and guarantees and made regional authorities pay indemnifications to the citizens who were deprived of the rights earlier guaranteed at the federal level.

In 2010, more legislative initiatives in the social sphere were introduced. They were aimed at the reduction of expenses of the federal budget connected with the social sphere. Two projects were met with a negative public response. They dealt with the introduction of a new educational standard including the decrease in the number of free educational establishments and reduction of programs of free primary and secondary education (FSES).[3] The second "improvement" was the project of the budget for 2011–2012, in which it was offered to cut down the expenses of social funds used to pay sick-lists, child birth and children's benefits considerably.[4]

The model of the socialist social policy was destroyed in Russia. Some of its elements have been preserved only in the system of benefits and privileges for civil servants; the remainders of free medical care and a number of elements of the educational process. Despite the theoretical change of the system of approaches in the last decade, in practice the social policy continues to be realized as separate activities carried out exclusively by the state (in the name of the president / government) whereas a uniform complex system of the social protection has never been created.

Sociologist O.N. Yanitsky states that a society of "total risk" has been formed in Russia. The main source of the catastrophic nature of the risk society is the revision of the basic standard model of society and the change from the positive logic of social development to the negative one. For example, if the normative ideal of the previous epochs was the achievement of equality, the main value of "the total risk society" is the provision of safety. There has even appeared the term "spiritual safety". The society's normative ideal acquires a protective character, namely, not the achievement of the best but the prevention of the worst. According to the researcher, one can see the collapse of the Soviet system being exploited to build up a clan-corporate type of society in modern Russia. At the same time, the policy is aimed at the reduction of risks by demodernization and the transfer of society to a lower level of social organization (Яницкий).

History of the Division of Powers in the Social Sphere: Conditions and Conflicts

In medieval Russia, the supreme power of the prince imposed functions of the legal and social protection of some levels of the population on the Orthodox Church. It was during the reign of the grand duke Vladimir with whose name the adoption of Christianity in Russia is associated when the concept "people of the church" was introduced. That group included widows, the poor, pilgrims, serfs who received their liberty in their owner's will. The tenth part of all judicial duties, trade, cattle and bread (desyatina) introduced by Prince Vladimir was intended for the maintenance of monasteries and churches and was spent on almshouses, hospitals, and homes for the pilgrims (Щапов. С. 76–87). The materials of the Hundred Chapter Synod (1555) testify that princes (and then the tsar)

expected church institutions to take care of patients, cripples, orphans and the old. Support money was allocated from the state treasury and donations were given. The Synod Code (Sobornoye Ulozheniye) of 1649 also registered the duty of the church to take care of beggars, cripples, and orphans.

The Spiritual Regulations adopted in 1721 showed radical differences in the attitude to beggars and alms in relation to them. It was stated that the individual should work to provide for his livelihood while the one who does not work does not eat; the feeding of useless people brings an economic damages to the state.

When taking care of the support of the crippled and aged soldiers, Peter I solved the problem of their support by placing them in monasteries. "Coronal money" (the money received by clergy when conducting wedding ceremonies) was allocated for the maintenance of invalids, and a tax on all salaries (except those of the soldiers) was imposed. In 1715, the order to build hospitals or almshouses attached to the churches was issued.

Since the beginning of the 18th century the state legislatively has legally limited the emergence of new monasteries; the justification for the existence of monasteries was their charitable functions. It was the duty of some monasteries and all convents "to serve beggars, the aged and babies". By 1870, the opening of monasteries was made possible only if there was an educational or charitable institution under them.

In the 1860s, during the reforms the most acute question was who would be responsible for the material upkeep of parish priests, church buildings and the needy in the parishes. The state did not take any obligations to solve these issues materially but allowed the creation of parish trusteeships, which had to take upon themselves responsibility for providing parishes with schools, hospitals, and almshouses as well as repairing churches and maintaining shelters.

It was characteristic of the Russian empire to administer charitable institutions within the system of state bodies; however, charitable organizations were created and financed at the expense of private donations. One can say with confidence that the main determinant for the development of the system of charity in the Russian empire was a maximum of state administration with a minimum of state financing. For this reason charity legislation was focused on regulating mutual relations between the philanthropist and legal bodies (during the pre-reform period such bodies included the Department of establishments of the Empress Maria, the Philanthropic society, etc.) which took upon themselves the duty to spend the money according to the philanthropist's will. This situation emphasizes the domination of the paternalist principle. During the imperial period, charity in Russia is connected with the imperial court; it did not look as public work but rather as a form of royal alms and was concentrated mainly in the capitals not affecting the main bulk of the peasant population.

After the Great Reforms of the 1860s, social structures begin to be formed in Russia. The biggest part of social establishments in Russia appears exactly in the second half of the 19th century; the development of social structures in the post-reform period was inseparably linked with the improvement of the system of self-governing. When the de-

centralization of powers turned into one of the dominants of social and economic development in the 1860–1890s and the local governments became responsible for all aspects of life, charities gradually became an integral function of the new system (Ульянова. С. 248).

In the post-reform period, philanthropy connected with the development of the public initiative developed considerably. Philanthropy became a major factor in the non-state sphere of society where people could carry out their civil rights in a non-legal state (till 1905 in Russia it was almost impossible to organize private societies). Charities were more tolerated by the state, and the number of philanthropic societies much more surpassed all others till 1917. The exclusive role in that relation was played by zemstvo (local governments) and city municipal structures, parish priests being traditionally their most active members. The donations of separate citizens for the development of the system of social assistance were the basic source of the development in this sphere in the post-reform period. Only 5% of the budget of the social support system came from the treasury, zemstvo, cities and class societies while 95 % came from private charity, i.e. donations. Zemstvo and city charity were directed towards the creation of the system of health care, education, employment, care of the old, the sick, invalids, and homeless children. Simultaneously, there was a desire to provide a regular, scientific basis for this activity and to unite the efforts of regional public figures. In the charitable environment, the idea of moving the emphasis from *helping* beggars (the poor) to *preventiing* the pauperization of the population was formulated. To this end workhouse, discount canteens and cheap condominiums for workers, etc. were created.

When characterizing the imperial period of Russia's history, it is possible to say that the state was negative in its attitude to the representatives of the society who spoke in favor of the social justice and construction of a fair state. The bias of the authorities against any public initiative or social activity extended even in relation to the zemstvo establishments, which were opened legally in Russia after the great reforms of the 1860s.

A radical change in the system of the state social policy took place after 1917 as the Soviet power gradually destroyed all areas of social life that had got stronger during the previous period. The idea of charity was declared a bourgeois vestige based on hypocrisy. The period between 1917 and 1988 could be identified as a conflict between state and church institution; during this period emphasis was made on the exclusion of the church from social life. So, the first decrees of the Soviet power proclaimed the separation of the school from the church, the introduction of civil marriage and a ban on the church conducting divorce cases, a ban on the social and educational activity of the church along with the exclusion of monasteries from social and economic life. The Soviet power did not allow church institutions to organize help for the famine-stricken people in 1921–1922 and launched a campaign for the forcible withdrawal of church valuables. During the early Soviet period, the church community tried to resist the discriminatory policy of the Soviet state. Religious charity saw it as its task to support the people and social layers who were doomed to extinction by the authorities.

Article 17 of the ordinance of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (ARCEC) and the CPC "On Religious Associations" of April 6, 1929 forbade all kinds of social services to be carried out by religious associations: "Religious Associations are forbidden: a) to create mutual aid cash desks, to use the property at their disposal for any other purposes, except for the satisfaction of religious requirements; to render material support to their members, c) to organize specifically children's, youth, female, prayer and other meetings...". The rigid ban on any social activity of religious structures continued to function till the mid–1980s. Simultaneously, the official church management took an active part in the social and political discussions at the international level where it proved the superiority of the socialist system and the complete solution of all social problems in the USSR (Belyakova N.).

Changes in the mutual relations between the authorities and church institutions in the second half of the 1980s are reflected in the fact that, using the desire of the church to strengthen its influence on society, the state decided to let church institutions enter the social sphere, the state financing of which began to be considerably reduced. According to article 18 of the Federal law "On the Freedom of Worship and Religious Associations" of 1997, religious organizations have the right to carry out charities both directly and by establishing charitable organizations". At the same time, the state is ready "to assist and support charitable activities of religious organizations as well as the realization of socially significant cultural and educational programs and events by them".

Characterizing the division of powers in the social sphere in the history of Russia, it is possible to make the following observations:

• At each historical stage state power regulated the degree to which the church or social structures were admitted to the social sphere. At the same time, the authorities always aspired to control the system of help, defined the ideology of support, and the subjects and objects of help formulating the institutional support legally.

• The stages of state policy in the social sphere were characterized by a demonstrative rupture with the previous paradigm of development; the market of social services could not develop in Russia as all the time it was redistributed according to the rules and laws of the existing power (Фирсов)

Role and Influence of Religious Institutions on the Social Sphere in Russia

The spread of Christianity in Russia was accompanied by the emergence of the monks that provided for the destruction or ignoring of social barriers. Since the 10th century socially unprotected layers of the population such as widows, orphans, illegitimate children and beggars were under the protection of the church. A gradual introduction of church norms into the family sphere promoted the improvement in the condition of women and children. The Kiev-Pechersky Paterik describing the history of the best-known monastery in Kiev underlines the independence of monks from the power of the grand duke and re-

sistance to his power in cases of injustice. Christianity brought a new attitude to work also described in the Kiev-Pechersky Paterik showing that Prince Nikolay (a holy person), reverend Feodosiy (a boyar by origin) were engaged in manual labor considered beneath for their status. Monastic communities in medieval Russia embody Christian human relations and show an active social position in terms of helping townspeople at the time of famine and distribute salt and bread. Often monasteries, being an object of active donations, became intermediaries in organizing help to the poor.

It is possible to identify the following directions of social activity of the church during the pre-imperial period: care of the sick and the poor, the burial of pilgrims (the creation of hospitals, almshouses, and shelters mainly at the monasteries); educational activity (monastic schools or schools at the diocesan centre were quite popular); emergency support for the population during natural disasters such as epidemics, poor harvests, and raids by nomads. The unique feature of the Orthodox Church's social activity is that the centers of this activity were monasteries, diocesan centers, and separate city parishes while rural parishes in central Russia did not become centers of social activity, unlike the parishes of southwest and northwest Russia (Стефанович). By the 17th century cadastres register almshouses attached to parish churches ("log huts for the poor", "widow homes"). On the whole, it was the monasteries that in many places became the centers of social and economic life of the regions. Moreover, monastic communities also played important social functions as they took care of the old, lonely women, etc.

One of the important social functions was the right of bishops and metropolitans (and sometimes abbots of monasteries), who came from Byzantium, to hand in petitions to the authorities, i.e. to protect, petition for the offended or unjustly condemned. The right of petitioning remains an important function of regulating legal relations in Muscovy till the mid-16th century when during the reign of Ivan the Terrible metropolitan Phillip (Kolychev) was strangulated for protesting against the cruelty of the tsar.

In the 17-18th centuries the system of social activities of the church regulated and managed by official bodies was extended. From the middle of the 19th century the activities of representatives of the Orthodox Church in the social sphere became much more intense. It included the activity in the sphere of upbringing and education, help to the poor, struggle against alcoholism, care of the sick and the elderly. Church representatives used both traditional and common forms of church service while developing the new ones which required a proper response from church management. It should be noted that representatives of the church community, first of all, the clergy, actively participated practically in all social and charitable initiatives. The most significant forms of the social activity of church representatives became:

- participation in educational activity;
- creation of the system of support for patients, invalids, and the elderly;
- organization of children's shelters;
- creation of sobriety societies;
- communities of sisters of charity;

- parish charities;
- internal mission.

The growth of female activity in church institutions which, in the presence of spiritual incentives, was also a phenomenon of social order became an essentially new phenomenon in Russia in the middle of the 19th century as the rapid growth of female communities in Russia coincided with cardinal social and economic changes in the course of which, unlike the countries of Western Europe, the female work force that emerged was unrequited (Конюченко). The creation of female communities quickly spread in the country (by 1914 there were approximately 70 thousand members in the communities) and became one of the ways of solving the problem. Simultaneously, the orthodox clergy became the first estate in Russia which started to give vocational training to their daughters (Belyakova E, N. 2003).

The growth of the female religious activity was a phenomenon of several levels: a) through church institutions the woman could solve her own gender problems (organizations of lonely, unmarried women, widows, soldiers' wives, and the elderly). Simultaneously, church institutions became a channel for the expansion of participation of women in the public sphere. The question was to what extent the church could include and fit into the traditional church forms the growing female activity (Belyakova E, N. 2002, 2009). The decision to restore the institution of deaconesses was made during the National Council oa the Russian Orthodox Church (Pomestny Sobor) of 1917 when there was no longer any opportunity to realize it. (In reality, the communities of deaconesses already existed, the best known example being the Martha and Mary convent of Mercy).

Church hospitals, shelters, trusteeships, homes for the unemployed and anti-alcoholism centers began to develop in the second half of the 19th century. At the beginning of the industrialization processes in Russia in the second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century in the conditions of the absence of the state system of social insurance, religious institutions took upon themselves the creation of systems of social help. Simultaneously, separate church leaders initiated regular struggles against negative social phenomena (alcoholism, beggary) while organizations of social help created by them were the front lines and used "Western experience". Nevertheless, it is difficult to speak about the institutionalized social activity of the Orthodox Church. The activities of created bodies relied on the authority of separate individuals.

The church public continued the social activity after Bolsheviks coming to power. Brotherhoods which saw mutual aid and support of the pursued clergy as their mission appeared in great numbers. In the Soviet period, deaconesses appeared in some dioceses whose activity was aimed at strengthening the position of the church in the conditions of persecutions. It is possible to say that during the Soviet period an illegal structure of social support of those groups which were doomed to extinction by the government was created in religious associations. The Orthodox Church mainly supported hierarchs, clergy and their families (which belonged to the category of the deprived).

During the post-war period the structure of the Moscow Patriarchy included the pension committee while the support of elderly priests in dioceses and their widows was in-

troduced at the eparchy level. Today the Orthodox Church still cannot manage the system of support of the elderly clergy and their widows.

In late Protestant communities of the USSR in the 1960–1980s, an effective system of mutual help to members of communities was created (it is still operative). Communities of the Council of Churches (evangelical Baptist Christians) where there was a powerful system of support of the families whose members suffered for belief are most indicative in this respect.

The perestroika period was marked by the demonstrative admission of church representatives to all spheres of public life. However, it was more likely to be a means of legitimizing the changes that were taking place (Belyakova N., 2009).

In the 1990s, the social programs of Catholic and late Protestant organizations which already had had experience of similar work in other countries were developed in Russia. However, regional authorities often artificially limit the opportunities for the social activities of religious minorities. Today it is possible to speak about the purposeful policy of ignoring, e.g., Protestant communities which are limited by the local administration in the extent they can offer assistance to children's homes, homes for the elderly, etc.

Religious Social Doctrine

The traditional Christian idea about charity (first of all, about giving alms to the beggar) as a way of personal salvation was widespread in medieval Russia ("giving into the hand of beggars is giving into the hand of Christ"). Mercy was declared a major Christian quality; attention to beggars and the poor and a fair court trial without belonging to any specific estate were seen as valuable qualities of a Christian ruler. Simultaneously, Orthodox thought was always dominated by the idea about the superiority of the spiritual sphere over the material one, about the perishable nature of riches and the idea that it is more difficult for the rich to enter the Kingdom of God. The traditional emphasis of Orthodox Christianity on individual spirituality and search of a personal way of salvation promoted the idea that voluntary poverty for the sake of acquisition of spiritual riches was the ideal of Russian sanctity.

In medieval Rus, the Orthodox social doctrine was presented in the form of separate treatises, lectures (for example, Vasily the Great's homily about the attitude to beggars), essays ("The Domostroy") and was also reflected in codified collections such as "The Pilot Books".

At the beginning of the 20th century the Russian church community actively discussed the issue of church institutions' involvement in solving social problemsand various possibilities for creating centralized social church services and developing various forms of social activity in parishes were presented (Firsov, Belyakova, 2004). Different models for vigorous activity of the church in society offered at the beginning of the 20th century were widely discussed at the National (Pomestny) Council of the Russian Orthodox Church which gathered in 1917–1918. Actually, the biggest part of the Council's decisions could not be carried out because of the radically changed political conditions in the country

though the Council gave a unique impulse for the survival of the church in the conditions of persecutions inside Russia and for the activity of the parts of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad (ROCA). The suggestions and concepts of the Pomestny Council of 1917 are practically unknown and have not received any response in modern Russian church community.

Unlike the Protestant and the Catholic Church in which the position concerning the organization of society and the state was articulated at the level of contemporary ideas, the Orthodox Church today is a conscious or unconscious conductor of archaic ideas and opinions about the system of social relations. The idea of returning to the patristic doctrine about the correct organization of life of a Christian without discussing modern social realities dominates. An example of such a theoretical approach is the monograph of Father Phillip (Simonov), Doctor of Economics, a merited economist of Russia, "Church, Society, Economy".

The reasons for this situation should be looked for in the historical development of the Orthodox Church in Russia, in modern social and political viewpoints of church leaders as well as in the economic realities of modern Russia.

Historically, it so happened in Russia that poverty and a person's difficult situation have been connected not so much with the individual's personal qualities (for example, his unwillingness to work) but rather with the circumstances and specificity of the political system ("no one can be saved from poverty or prison"). Instability is still a dominant of life in Russia. In one of his speeches, Patriarch Kirill called to help the needy because "even the most successful person who is at the top of the social pyramid, who is rich and prosperous, in the twinkling of an eye can become poor, unhappy and homeless… it is very important for successful people to remember that near them there are unsuccessful people and that these unsuccessful people may have been successful earlier but today they are not" (Patriarch Kirill: the crisis can be overcome by a spiritually strong person).

Throughout the 20th century, the Russian church was isolated from the experience of European and American orthodox churches; nor did it have any earlier experience of existence in state formations with other religions that promoted the development of social activities in the parishes. The discussions about the place and role of the church in modern society, the position of women, the principles and ways of catechization, the creation of deaconess bodies passed by the Russian Orthodox consciousness.

A lot has been written about the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. Analysts pointed out a strong conceptual influence of Catholic doctrines on this document and underlined the presence of strongly pronounced fundamentalist ideas about the role of the church in modern society. New to the orthodox tradition was the Concept thesis about the church as a force that renews social life, a force that has a higher status and mission than the state (Kholmogorov).

According to the Concept, life in the church, for which each person is called, is an incessant service to God and people (I. 3). Active participation of the church in social life is caused by its mission (the salvation of the human race), and it is carried out "through good deeds aimed at the improvement of the spiritual, moral and material condition of

the world around" (I.4.). In human life, the State is not a God-given institution but rather a consequence of the sin in the world where the individual and society need protection from dangerous displays of the sin (III. 2.)

The Concept emphasizes the sovereignty of the existence of the church from the State and its independence from political realities in every possible way. Simultaneously, the right of the church to analyze the actions of the State is declared along with the possibility to point at the "inadmissibility of the spreading of belief or actions leading to the establishment of complete control over the life of the individual, his beliefs and relations with other people as well as to the destruction of personal, family or public morals, an insult to religious feelings and damage to the cultural and spiritual originality of the people or to the emergence of the threat to the sacred gift of life". At the same time the church can count on the help and state assistance "in the realization of social, charitable, educational and other socially significant programs" (III. 5).

The church can co-operate with the modern state in affairs beneficial to the church, the person and society" (III. 8.). At the present stage there are the following areas for "co-work" of the church and the state:

a) Peacemaking at the international, interethnic and civil levels, assistance to mutual understanding and cooperation between people, nations and states;

b) Care about preservation of morality in society;

c) Spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic upbringing and education;

d) Charity, development of joint social programs;

e) Protection, restoration and development of historical and cultural heritage, including the protection of artifacts of history and culture;

f) Dialogue with public authorities of any branches and levels on questions essential for the church and society, including those connected with the development of corresponding laws, by-laws, orders and decisions;

g) Care of soldiers and employees of law-enforcement establishments, their spiritual and moral education;

h) Work aimed at the prevention of offences, care of imprisoned persons;

i) Science, including research in the humanities;

j) Public healthcare services;

k) Culture and creative activity;

l) Work of the church and secular mass media;

m) Activities to preserve the environment;

n) Economic activities for the advantage of the church, state and society;

o) Support of the institute of family, motherhood and childhood;

p) Counteraction against the activities of pseudo-religious structures presenting danger to the individual and society.

The chapter "Labor and its fruit" underlines the importance of labor and the necessity of its fair remuneration. It also declares, "The church always speaks in support of the silent and the powerless. Therefore, it calls for society to distribute the products of labor

fairly when the rich support the poor, the healthy support the patient, and the able-bodied support the elderly". The well-being of society is possible only in case of the redistribution of means upon which it becomes possible "to provide for life, health and the minimum well-being of all citizens" (VI. 6). The chapter "Property" emphasizes the perishable nature of riches but admits the inalienability of the property. The Concept also deals with the question of the participation of the church in the health protection systems and expresses the church's concern over the demographic situation in Russia; it suggests creating a commonly accessible system of health care "when each person could realize his right to spiritual, physical, mental health and social well-being at the maximum life expectancy".

Today the position of the ROC management on social problems could be summed up as follows. Patriarch Kirill is convinced that "the modern society is not a religious society, it is a society, which makes Good its main criterion and human individuality the main criterion of truth. If one is to reflect on it, it is a negative challenge of an enormous force". (Interview with Patriarch Kirill for the program "National interest").

"Holy Russia" can resist this challenge if it manifests "the idea of the dominance of the spiritual over the material, the idea of the dominance of a high moral ideal". External circumstances of life should never destroy a person's inner life the basis of which is belief in God and in which the material condition is not important. At this, "the more good we will do for others, the more good the Lord will turn to us". The main task of the Orthodox Church today should be the presentation of Christian values to the godless modern world, which is in a deep spiritual crisis today.

At the Diocesan meeting of the clergy of Moscow in December, 2009 Patriarch Kirill addressed social problematics in connection with the economic crisis and declared that "approximately 20% of our society do not have a possibility to eat adequately, have proper clothes, raise children; there is no access to good education and cultural leisure... The difference between the incomes of 10% of the richest and 10% of the poorest is 20–25 times. People work but do not receive enough money for their work" (the Report of Patriarch Kirill, 2009).

The Russian Orthodox Church has not developed a social doctrine, for example, about the division of powers in the social sphere between the state and society, the church parish and the individual. During the period of the formation of the modern state the church was deprived of the possibility of developing theoretical constructs of the social structure; its management was supposed only to eulogize the advantages of the socialist system. Emphasis on the "spiritual" component – divine service that simultaneously took root in the Orthodox practice sometimes leads to the opposition of social work and spiritual salvation of man.

On the other hand, today the Orthodox Church in Russia aspires, at least at the theoretical level, to take a significant part in society's political life. The church management supports the course of the country aimed at the "modernization" declared by Medvedev, President of Russia, which is possible only "on account of values of national culture and spiritual heritage".

Social Activity of Church Structures

In January, 1991, the Department of church charity and social service was created in the Moscow patriarchy. For a long time the efforts of the Department of church charity had been directed towards achieving interaction with state departments for the purpose of receiving privileges and subsidies for carrying out social activity. Throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, various agreements concerning interaction with various state bodies (at the level of federal and regional ministries) were made. The church management continually expressed its discontent with the lack of regular financial support from the state. In his report in 2004, the head of the Department of church charity said that "systematic and regular allocations from federal or local budgets for the realization of church social projects still remain a dream. The preferential taxation of church charitable establishments, the payment for church social workers, discounts on the payment of utilities are the components the absence of which in daily activities of charitable institutions is a rigid barrier to the stable development of the general church systems of social service" (the Report of Metropolitan Sergiy, 2004). All social projects of the Russian Orthodox Church requiring expenses were carried out with the support of foreign sponsors, for example, the World Council of Churches, the World Lutheran Federation, "Renovabis", the International Orthodox Charitable Organization (IOCC), the Bible Translation Institute, etc.

A considerable proportion of functioning social projects arose and keeps arising spontaneously at the level of separate parishes and monasteries. By 2000, under the aegis of the Orthodox Church there operated various social institutions and programs including children's shelters; schools of sisters of mercy; monastic and parish almshouses; canteens for the poor and homeless people; rehabilitation centers; programs to struggle against alcoholism; various programs to help refugees and forced immigrants (the Report of metropolitan Sergiy of 2000).

Official church statistics do not allow us to evaluate the scope and efficiency of the activity of church charitable bodies in the country. By 2004, a number of dioceses had no common diocese structures, which could be engaged in the organization of charities, and there was no account of diocesan charities (the Report of Metropolitan Sergiy, 2004). At the Council of archbishops in 2004 the head of the department of Russian Orthodox Church could not say, "how many shelters, almshouses, charitable canteens and other similar social establishments the world's largest and most numerous Orthodox Church had". Moreover, today the Russian Orthodox Church has not solved the question of material provision of the parish clergy (it is extremely non-uniform and depends on the degree of the parish's wealth), the elderly priests, the widows of the clergy, and the orphans. Moreover, in practice church organizations, like a considerable amount of private enterprises, in every way evade from observing the norms of labor legislation concerning employed workers and employees.

As in the 19th century, the emergence and efficiency of various social church projects depends only on the degree of t their organizers' activity. The existing social institutions

organized by separate church figures are sometimes archaic and are rigidly oriented confessionally.[5] However, there are quite successful social services, sometimes initiated by the Orthodox believers (for example, the centers for struggle against alcoholism[6] or a shelter for the adaptation of children,[7] children's crisis center[8], etc.). A considerable number of such projects are supported by Western sponsors, and these services are not confessional.

After the election of Patriarch Kirill one can observe the desire to strengthen the social activity of the church at the level of the church management. In March, 2009, the Synod department on mutual relations between the church and society (archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin) and the church and social council on protection from the threat of alcoholism were created (archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov); in March, 2010, the Synod department on prison service (Bishop Irinarch of Krasnogorsk (Grezin) was set up. The status of the Synod department of church charity and social service has been raised as its long-term head archpriest Arkady Shatov has become Bishop Panteleimon.

In October, 2010, the first regional conference on church social service in the Northwest federal district (the New Era of Mercy) setting as one of its goals coordination of efforts of the church and social organizations was held. The conference took place in St Petersburg where a number of successful church social projects (as a rule, interconfessional) had been initiated.

Within the framework of the Council acting between National Councils of the Russian Orthodox Church a commission on the organization of the church social activity and charity was formed. From December 16, 2010 it has been headed by Metropolitan Kliment of Kaluga and Borovsk (Kapalin). On December 16, 2010, the presidium of the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church decided to approve the draft of the document "On the principles of organizing social work in the Russian Orthodox Church" at the first reading and to send it to the dioceses for further completion.

At the diocesan level, attempts to stimulate social activities have been undertaken. For instance, the decision of the diocesan meeting of Moscow in December 2009 based on the speech of Patriarch Kirill recognized the importance of the missionary, catechist and social activities in the parishes to be supervised by the board of trustees of the parish. It also presupposed the introduction of full-time positions for youth missionaries, catechism specialists, and social workers. The decision stated that there was a need for the church to take care of the most vulnerable and the deprived, namely, "the lonely, the sick, and the needy orthodox Christians". At the same time, the parishes were encouraged "to take care of the people who are in nearby hospitals, homes for the aged people, children's shelters and other secular social establishments", "to develop measures of church support of the clerics who are no longer employed because of old age or illnesses, widows and orphans of the clergy" (the decisions of the diocesan meeting of Moscow 2009. Point 13). Similar decisions were adopted in a number of other dioceses. It is not possible to evaluate the degree of productivity of this decision because of the lack of statistics. Research in the field of social church initiatives is problematic because of the reluctance of both the higher church management and local church representatives for a dialogue with the researchers; the lack of adequate

internal church statistics; the unwillingness of representatives of the church community to discuss church affairs and problems as well as the impossibility to receive a blessing for the research from church management.[9]

The changes introduced at the session of the Synod in the parish charter of the Russian Orthodox Church on October 10, 2009[10] (the re-registration of charters in state structures was carried out) led, more likely, to a certain restraint among active workers of orthodox parishes and slowed down the development and registration of parish initiatives. The unequivocal discontent among the regular clergy was also caused by the idea of the inclusion into the staff of the parishes of additional positions that would inevitably lead to the reduction of incomes of the serving clergy.

An attempt to analyze the situation was undertaken in the project "Social Initiatives of Orthodox Community" under the direction of M.A.Tarusin and was focused on the study of orthodox initiative groups.[11] The author of the research optimistically claims that parish Orthodox and Muslim structures form a new type of social initiative and revive the traditions of mercy and charity. However, the report stated that the fieldwork phase was actually incomplete as a result of the unwillingness of the church representatives to inform the researchers about their activities. According to the author, today there are between 6 and 15 thousand orthodox socially initiative groups in the country. Most of them began their activity in the 2000s, and in most cases they are not formed institutionally and have no stable source of financing. They are very rarely supported by the diocesan management. The scope, line of activity and social composition of groups differ greatly; therefore, the research was not able to reveal any tendencies. The interaction of socially active groups with the local mass-media is the worst as "we have practically no independent press". Therefore, the press mainly serves the interests of the authorities. Today the authorities do not show any interest in the propagation of any social initiatives of the orthodox initiative groups and do not really aspire to co-operate with them" (Social initiatives of religious societies).

The discussion, which arose during the presentation of the project, showed that the importance and prospects of the social work of church structures is recognized by everyone. However, the actions of the higher church management and church and bureaucratic bodies show their radical refusal to function openly, to cooperate with public organizations, and to make their budget transparent. According to E. Pamfilova (the Centre for the Research of Civil Society and Non-commercial Sector of the Higher School of Economics), the church management aspires to receive the maximum of preferences from the state and is absolutely not ready to co-operate with "the third sector" (non-commercial public organizations) while, on the contrary, it often opposes itself to it (Social initiatives of religious societies).

It is typical of Russian reality including the church to have a gap between declarations, theoretical ideas and reality. The gap between the financial position of the central and provincial parishes is huge; the clergy of poor parishes has to search for sources for the provision of their own families. Quite often parishes are in no condition to support even their deacons. The church management has declared its readiness to delegate all forms of

social work to parishes. This work should be done at the expense of means and efforts of parishioners. At the same time, in theory, parishes should provide for the clergy, catechism specialists, missionaries and social workers, part-time clergy and their widows; they are also required to make essential material deductions for the support of the diocesan and general church bodies. However, parishioners are deprived of the right to participate in the management of the church. The amendments to the charter registered the powers of the bishop in relation to the clergy in parishes, parish property and parish organizational structures, leaving parishioners only "pious affairs".

Certainly, on the one hand, orthodox parishes are the basis for the organization of communities, emergence of spontaneous forms of various social activities, i.e. the origin of those horizontal cells of civil society the deficit of which is so strongly felt in Russia. On the other hand, as a long-term life observation of the life of Orthodox parishes shows, such social activities often arise not thanks to but rather in spite of the hierarchical structures. They are usually hard to institutionalize and are not stable financially.

Conclusion

Today the Russian Federation has not formed a complex system of social protection, and one can observe a rigid conflict between labor and the state. The refusal of the Russian state to move the protection of human rights to the forefront of its activity has led to the refusal to protect the person's economic freedoms and to help the socially unprotected categories of the population. The Russian state has appeared incapable of carrying out basic functions, characteristic of the modern social state, such as to guarantee safety to each citizen, also by the redistribution of incomes, to create the system of social protection.

The permanent reforming of the education system, public health care services, social insurance and social protection has been going on for the past 5-6 years. It is accompanied by the regular redistribution of powers between departments and their re-structuring. However, till now the general complex program of improving the system of the social protection of the population has not been developed. The negative social phenomena of the transition period have become chronic for the Russian society that has received the name "the society of total risk".

It is possible to name the most significant social problems in the modern Russian society:

• A massive decline in the population because of the rising death rate. Since 1992, the decline of the population in connection with a sharp excess of the death rate over the birth rate has exceeded 12 million people. Death rate indicators for Russia are abnormally high for a country with a high level of economic development that is not involved in large-scale military operations and which has a developed system of public health care services. Russia occupies the 67th place according to the gross national product per capita in the world and only the 115th according to the expected life expectancy; at the same time a low life

expectancy is characteristic of the working population. A high death rate is not connected directly with the degree of poverty as the highest life expectancy is observed in the poorest regions of Russia, such as Ingushetia and Dagestan (the Population of Russia, 2006). The group that has suffered mostly from the death rate crisis in Russia is the most favorable economic group that includes men of the able-bodied age, instead of children, pensioners and women (Halturina, Korotayev). The gap between life expectancy for men and women is 14 years. Moreover, the level of suicides in Russia constantly takes the second place in the world (after Lithuania);

• The spread of alcoholism.[12] The decrease in life expectancy and growth of the death rate of the population of Russia are due, first of all, to the increase in the number of deaths directly connected with alcohol intake (poisoning, traumatism) or with illnesses caused by the abuse of alcohol. Alcohol abuse leads to the premature death of about half a million people annually, having caused about 30% of death of men and 15% of women;

• The crime rate growth. The death rate from murders in Russia is the highest in Europe. This tendency has been observed in Russia since 1980. Russia takes second place in the world (after the USA) according to the percentage of people in prison; thus, each 82nd man is in prison, while the figure for able-bodied men is considerably higher as every fifth man has prison experience;

• Social orphanhood and poor pensioners. According to the state data, Russia takes first place in the world by the quantity of abandoned children. In 2004, each 71st child under 18 years old lived in children's homes and boarding schools while every 78th child was in patronage families and with the trustees; each 38th child did not live with the parents. According to the Ministry of Social Development, in 2007 there were about 750 thousand orphans and children without parental support in the country;

• Poverty of the working population. The growth of poverty as a habitual factor of the existence of the socially-significant group of the population has been observed. The census of 2010 has shown that the incomes of 17–14% of the population in 2009 were below the living standard.[13] Consequences of uncertainty and decrease in the degree of social safety in the post-Soviet society were numerous interrelations between social risks. E.g., the risk of unemployment and the risk of health deterioration became closely interconnected. (National projects With. 142).

The complex of social and economic problems and anomie of the majority of institutes of the Russian society cover the loss of moral values. It is these dysfunctional changes of the Russian society that start the processes of the de-institutionalization of childhood and old age, their destabilization as a social institute. Probably, it is this factor that results in the inefficiency of any program of social and economic transformations. In this context, the activization of the church activity in Russian society could play a salutary role.

Today Russia has no formed social, professional or religious institutions, which could offer an alternative (to the state) system of social protection or, at least, its concept. In practice, the social protection system to some extent exists in religious communities (mutual aid in communities of religious minorities is especially developed).

In the conditions of the destruction of the socialist state model, one of the ideological directions became the thesis about returning to the past, including the sphere of social relations. In this context, the idea of returning to "Holy Russia" promotes the archaization of social relations. The presence of this position is, more likely, a consequence of the exclusion of the Russian Orthodox Church from the social sphere in the 20th century and the absence of the country's own conceptual ideas in this sphere. At the present stage, the church management of the Russian Orthodox Church has declared its desire to turn church parishes into significant factors of social life on location, though exclusively at the expense of their internal resources. Today we are witnessing active processes of the formation of a social infrastructure at the level of parishes and religious communities. Only time will tell whether they can become a stabilizing and improving factor in the social life of Russia.

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Notes

1 According to the data of the Levada Analytical Centre in December, 2009 55% of the interviewed believed that "the state should provide a normal standard of well-being to all citizens", 28% claimed that "the state should provide help to everyone in a difficult situation, for example, those who have lost their work", 13% agreed with the statement that "people should take care of themselves and provide a normal life to themselves without any help of the state".

2 The following categories of individuals have been refused civil rights:
Individuals resorting to wage labor for the purpose of profit extraction;
Individuals living on an unearned income such as the interest rate from the capital, incomes from enterprises, earnings from property;
Private traders, trading and commercial intermediaries;
Monks and spiritual servants of churches and different cults;
Employees and agents of the former police, the special department of gendarmes and security departments, as well as the reigning house in Russia;
Individuals hereunder recognized as insane or mad as well as those under guardianship;

Individuals imprisoned for mercenary or discrediting crimes for the term defined by law or the court sentence". In 1926 the List of lishentsy (the deprived) was expanded by including into it of different level officials of the imperial Russia.

3 Well-reasoned critique of the offered standard it is presented in the open letter from teachers. [Electronic resource]. Access mode: <http://starushkalarina.livejournal>.com/60329.html

4 As a result of an active social protest on February 11, 2011 amendments to the Federal law regulating the setting of a new procedure of payments of maternity and birth benefits and monthly allowances for the child care.

5 A huge scandal broke out in Russia in September, 2009 in connection with the runaway of two pupils from female Bogolyubsky convent in Vladimir region. Publications on this topic can be found on the Orthodox portal about charity and social activity. [Electronic resource]. Access mode: <http://www.miloserdie.ru/index>.php?ss=1&s=7&id=10236>, erstellt 9/30/2009

6 Program "12 steps". The Patriarchal centre of spiritual development for children and youth at Danilov monastery; groups at Novospassky male monastery; the Orthodox centre of help Metanoja. [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://metanoia.msdm.ru>

7 Center "Vdohnovenie" ("Inspiration"), village Nikolskoe-Gagarino, Ruzsky district, Moscow suburbs; the head is priest Ilya Dorogojchenko.

8 St.-Petersburg, the Orthodox Church of St. John the Precursor (Chesmensky), the prior is arch-priest Alex Stepanov. [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://www.besprizornik.spb.ru/ <http://www.besprizornik.spb.ru/>

9 This situation is in detail described in the report of sociologist M.A.Tarusin.

10 In particular, the ruling bishop was named by the supreme body of management of the parish which has the right to change the prior, members of the parish meeting, and to liquidate the parish. The position of the parish council chairman (who has the right to sign bank and other financial documents, hire personnel, and to conclude contracts on behalf of the parish) was assigned to the prior though "in certain cases the ruling bishop has the right to appoint a different person". All the real estate of parishes was assigned to the diocese.

11 Тарусин М.В. Социальные инициативы православного сообщества. Социологическое исследование. М., 2010.

12 According to the official data, in 2005 2 348 567 people were registered in Russia as sick with alcoholism. According to the unofficial data there are more than 5 million such people.

13 The percent of the population fluctuated depending on the quarter. According to the state calculation the minimum living wage was 5000 rubles per month.

Ivan Zabaev

CONCEPT OF "ETHICS" IN MAX WEBER'S BOOK "PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM". Its implication for the analysis of Russian Orthodox Church economic ethics

Abstract

Paper deals with the concept of "ethics", developed in Max Weber's work "The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism". Operationalization of this concept was used for contemporary Russian Orthodox Church ethic analysis. Key findings of empirical research based on Weberian concept are presented in the article. Field part of the study was conducted in eight Russian Orthodox Church monasteries (From Sakhalin to Solovki). Participant observation method was used.

Keywords: M. Weber, "Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism", economic ethics of Russian Orthodox Church, humility, obedience, monastic communities.

Introduction

Using the articles of 1904–1905 that comprised the book "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" M.Weber demonstrated how Protestantism of a certain kind could facilitate the forming of capitalism. He proved that one of the factors of forming a special type of rational Western capitalism was protestant ethic that added an element of rationality to the everyday life of a European while at the same time it strictly ordered the everyday routine. Weber showed that the forming of capitalism happened not so much due to the influence of some economic doctrines of Protestantism but rather due to the introduction into the everyday world of protestants by certain "religious virtuosos" of new concepts and practices which are their direct consequences (recognition and success as a sign of God's kindness) and quite the opposite, namely, the rejection of other conceptions and practices (confession, Holy Communion, etc.). Hence,

economic success has become a means of a salvation for a protestant. Weber used it to show that this world order in a new way correlates with the terminal religious values. It was exactly this connection between "the world" and "the Heaven" in Protestantism rather than the recommendations of priests regarding specific economic problems that served as the basis for the most powerful change of "the world" by adherents of a new religious doctrine. The already established new way of life (Western capitalism) included numerous other spheres and other peoples. Having become so widely spread it moved away from its religious roots and retreated into self-sufficient economic cosmos [Weber 2011]. Weber's hypothesis led to a lot of heated discussions already during his life. Moreover, the arguments continued to appear for more than a century [Sombart 1902, 1994; Brentano. 1916; Die Protestantishe Ethic II. Kritiken und Antikritiken… 1968; Wallace M. Davis 1978; Tawney. 1969]. The hypothesis was rejected, some tried to amend it while others wanted to add something to it. By the beginning of the 1970s almost every point of Weber's arguments had been heavily criticized. [Trevor Roper. 1967. P. 8–5; Robertson. 1933; Samuelson. 1964; Hyma. 1937; Fanfani. 1984; Hill. 1961. P. 15–19; Hill. 1966; Hill. 1969]. However, even though the factual state of affairs probably did not quite correspond to what the German scientist had written the hypothesis itself as well the logic of research structure possessed a great heuristic value. We believe that this logic (and, consequently, the success of his work) was to a great extent defined by the concept of "ethic" introduced by the German scholar along with the strategy of its empirical research. We will concentrate on Weber's variant of the notion "ethic" in this article.

The Concept of Ethic before M. Weber. The Intellectual context

As we rely on Weber's method of the research on the economic ethic of religion we need to have a close look at the understanding of ethic as described in "Protestant Ethic…" Let's look at the notion using the works of those authors whom M. Weber chose when stating the question about the ethic of Protestantism. The semantic core of the notion "ethic" and related definitions agree that ethic (let's not deal with its differences with morale and morality [Гусейнов, Апресян. 1998; Гусейнов. 1995. С. 3–1]) is a doctrine, a theory, a range of questions about the realizable good (more often individual rather than public). It was Aristotle who provided such understanding of ethic distinguishing the good by itself from the good realizable or achievable. In his "Nicomachean Ethics" he wrote, "There is also a difficulty in seeing how a weaver or carpenter will be helped in practicing his skill by knowing this good-in-itself, or how someone who has contemplated the Form itself will be a better doctor or general. For apparently it is not just health that the doctor attends to, but human health, or perhaps rather the health of a particular person, given that he treats each person individually.…" [Aristotle 2004. 1984. P. 10]. It also seems that the distinction between the individual and the public good is important for Aristotle (and means of achieving them accordingly). This is where we find the distinction between ethic and politics as ethic speaks about the individual action while politics means the polis.

[Aristotle 1959, 2004; Доватур. 1984; Кессиди. 1982; Кессиди. 1984]. This differentiation is becoming stronger during the Modernity [Гусейнов. 2001. С. 574] and becomes finalized in the system offered by I. Kant who in turn analyzed ethical questions in relation to a transcendental subject in his essays [Kant 2001, 2002]. One more important step in the development of the notion "ethic" was made by F. Nietzsche whose works showed the social and historical contexts of ethic formation. In other words, he showed that this or that nation (or a large group, upon set limits it is just a group) can form a special type of ethic or morale [Nietzsche]. The ultimate completion of this position is provided in those works of F. Nietzsche which were devoted to Christianity and aspire to reveal its historical nature and the conditionality of the temporary [Nietzsche][1] This thesis introduced by F. Nietzsche represented a significant turn in the history of thought about ethic. Aristotle and Kant aspired (though from different positions) to find the foundation and realization of universal morale. Nietzsche strongly opposed this tradition.[2]

Thus, by the time of Weber's research the concept of ethic was connected with (1) an immanent (2) individual action aimed at this or that (again belonging to the world) thing or situation. Simultaneously this action (3) allowed to reach the ultimate transcendental good or at least to be correlated with it.

The Notion of Ethic in "Protestant Ethic"

Now let's look directly at ethical theses of M. Weber. When developing his argument he relied on the findings of the above mentioned authors [Albrow. 1990; Eden. 1987; Trieber. 1993].[3] But we shall look closely at how he understands both ethic and economic ethic.

Weber states that he will speak about ethic rather than protestant spirit, for example. What does the use in the title of the book "Protestant ethic…" of this particular notion really mean? We believe that it allows Weber to raise the main question which actually defines the possibility of organizing and carrying out the whole research devoted to the emergence of the spirit of capitalism.[4]

In his "Protestant ethic…" Weber uses the term "ethic" quite rarely and does not provide its consistent explication or definition. Only once does Weber concentrate on it in more or less details [Weber 2011. P. 114–115]. At the same time he doesn't identify the difference between ethic and spirit, ethic and morals and ethic and morality (he treats "ethic" and "morality" as synonyms); Weber differentiates between "ethic" and "dogma" and "practice". On the basis of this distinction he describes the dogmatic side of Calvinism when analyzing "Westminster Confession " of 1647 and some connected ideas and plots. Weber closely studies the notion "practice" in the chapters devoted to the setting of the problem when comparing the behavior of Catholics, Jews and Protestants. We can only assume that after explaining the essence of the notion "dogma" Weber addressed the concept "ethic" as he understood it.

Having described the logical consequences of these or those dogmatic positions for a man Weber raises the problem which is a problem of religious Christian ethic, "The key

problem for us, first, is clear: How was this doctrine *tolerated* in an epoch in which the next life was not only more important than all of life's mundane and practical interests, but also, in many respects, more certain? A particular question must arise immediately for every single believer. It forces all such this-worldly interests into the background: Am *I* among the predestined who have been saved? How can I become certain of my status as one of the chosen? ?" [Weber 2011. P. 133].

Thus, the question of ethic for a Weberian protestant is formulated in the following way, "Have I been chosen for salvation?" In a wider sense, this question takes the form of "How can I achieve salvation?" for all Christian denominations. In a more critical sense this question is about the connection between the actions of a human being (practices) with some earthly blessings and virtue and, more specifically, how a person's actions can lead him to the Good [See, for instance; Аристотель. 1984. С. 295–74].

Having described protestant ethic and a specific variation of reformers when answering the question, "How can I achieve salvation?" Weber moves to describe economic ethic of Protestantism. The section "Ascetism and the spirit of capitalism" is almost completely devoted to this issue. [Weber 2011. P. 158–182]. If one is to understand Weber's idea of economic ethic one should read the text of the mentioned section of "Protestant ethic…" in which the author quotes Baxter, "… An unwillingness to work is a sign that one is not among the saved… God's providence reserves a calling for everyone without distinction. It is to be recognized by each person, and each person should work within his calling… this calling is not, as in Lutheranism, a fate to which belivers must submit and reconcile themselves. Rather, it is God's command to each person to act on behalf of His honor. " Baxter finishes this statement in the following way, "And he (the worker with a vocational calling) will perform his work in an orderly fashion while others are stuck in situations of constant confusion; their businesses fail to operate according to time or place. … Therefore a "certain calling" (or "stated calling" in other passages) is best for everyone " [Weber 2011. P. 161–163].

Taking into account the above provided fragments and everything said before we could formulate the main question of economic ethic as follows, "how should I act in economy (wirtschaften) to achieve salvation?" In other words, does the economic action / action in economy (wirtschaften) have any sense for salvation?

Let's us summarize the above said. Weber's works dealing with soteriological religions transform the main problem of ethic (accordingly, the ethic of these religions) into the following questions: 1) the question about the ultimate good (terminal good, ≈ Aristotle's – "good-in-itself") – and principal ability of achieving it (the category of predetermination); 2) the question about the specific form of human action facilitating the achievement of the ultimate good (the category of calling).

Thus, for Christianity, the main question of ethic, namely, how to achieve the principal good through human action gets transformed into such questions as what should a person do to achieve salvation? Does a person's salvation depend on his actions? If it does then what is the share of a person's action in assisting to achieve salvation (in comparison with God's actions)?[5]

Economic Ethic and Economic Ideology

When explicating Weber's concept of "ethic" and the more specific notion "economic ethic" it is necessary to take notice of the difference between economic ethic and "economic ideology", using the language of modern economic sociology, or "economic ideology". In this case economic ideology is understood as the rationally justified system of ideas about economy (See, for instance: [Радаев. 2005. С. 430][6]).

We'd like to remind that one of the main lines of Weber's argumentation criticism in "Protestant ethic…" was identified as follows. Critics stated that the idea of "calling" should not be assigned to Protestantism because the written documents about "economy" (for example, statements of Luther and Calvin about labor and interest rates) contained absolutely different rules if we look at the specific indications as well as the general direction of the documents [Samuelson. 1964; Robertson. 1933; Fanfani. 1984]. Besides, a considerable amount of criticism of M. Weber's thesis introduced in the 20th century was based on the fact that M. Luther and J. Calvin (as well as some other theologians including reformers and Wesley in particular) directly opposed wealth, interest rate, etc. and thus Protestantism could not stipulate the increase in income. However, Weber's point actually showed that the emergence of a specific capitalist ethos was not so much stimulated by direct instructions regarding economic activities but rather by general regulations identifying ways of salvation.

For instance, K. Samuelson was occupied with the question whether there could be any direct impact of Protestantism on capitalism. Hence, he devoted the first chapter of his work to the views of fathers of Protestantism presented in writing. It allowed him to make a conclusion that those views differ greatly from the "economic" approach to life so typical of for Franklin and great pioneers of industry and capitalism of the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century (whose views he also considers). The author shows that they did not only directly receive their ideas about wealth, capitalism, and economy from the works of protestant theologians and preachers, they simply couldn't help doing it as such things as wealth were clearly condemned by fathers of Protestantism [Samuelson 1957: 27–47].

There is a version of this topic based on the fact that the idea of wealth used by representatives of other confessions, in particular, by Catholics is similar to that of Protestants. For example, H. Robertson presents an expanded line of argumentation against Weber's position. The essence of the arguments is that Catholics of continental Europe as well as Jesuits and Jansenists were well acquainted with the works which were wide spread (similar in their essence to the texts of P. Baxter presented by Weber. Let us point out that the German sociologist used these texts to show the connection between puritan asceticism and capitalist spirit shown in the concluding part of "Protestant Ethic…") which could have the same impact on the forming of the type of capitalism described by M. Weber. H. Robertson provides extracts from essays of Catholic preachers. [Robertson. 1933. P. 27–32]. On this basis, one could say, that was a shaky ground to state that it was specifically

Protestant ethic, which affected the spirit of capitalism. However, it should be noted that Robertson's research was severely criticized by Catholics – Jesuits. Criticism was similar to that provided by Robertson in relation to Weber (see: [Brodrick 1934]).

However, the power of Weber's argument was based on his suggestion to analyze the so called "unforeseen consequences".[7] M. Weber formulated a peculiar thesis about the non-intentional manner of the consequence (effect) meaning that the effect, namely, the emergence of capitalism, was not achieved due to some direct economic regulations and it seems that the preachers' texts themselves devoted to the problems in economy played a smaller role in comparison with some common issues of Calvinist doctrine about the "problem" of salvation. In essence, M. Weber's argument was based on the idea to analyze not so much the specifically economic ideology as presented in religious texts about economy but those theologian ideas which were aiming at Christianization (within the frame of certain denominations) of everyday life experience of the believers. M. Weber thought that certain religions due to specific dogmas (as transmitted through preachers' practice[8]) formulated a certain ethic and through it guaranteed the connection between everyday life and principal good described in dogmas. The connection in that case was used to demonstrate that the procedures of how to achieve the principal good ("good-in-itself") through a certain structure of everyday life were described. It was this idea that helped numerous supporters of Weber to deal with the attacks of a multitude of critics for years.

Experience of Using Weber's Thesis in Research of Modern Monastery Communities of ROC (Russian Orthodox Church)

The described understanding of ethic was used to carry out research of main ethic categories used in economic practices of ROC monastery communities (the method of participant observation was used).[9] The research data revealed that these categories provide structure to recommendations in popular preacher literature published in modern Russia to the laypeople (literature publication is approved with the blessing of ROC bishops). For more details see: [Забаев 2005, 2007, 2008]. There were cases registered when it became clear that "monastery" categories are the key categories in texts prepared for the lay people. It became clear that the authors of ROC, monks and priests describe secular life with categories which are used inside the monastery. Thus, we could see the transfer of "internal monastery" categories onto the world.

Let's summarize quickly the results of the research dealing with economic ethic. The main essence of economic ethic actualized in practice is described with the help of the following categories.[10]

Categories of God's will and God's providence are used by orthodox actors to solve principle (fundamental) questions. The category of God's will is actualized in orthodox theology when answering the question about the role of human activity in the deed of his own salvation. The orthodox answer means that a person's freedom including the freedom of action is a real power which can be used for salvation (unlike Protestantism as described

by M. Weber). That's why the main problem of a specific person deals with the mastering of one's own freedom and directing one's own will to the good. In other words, an actor should behave in such a way so that his will and God's will might be co-directed. Then orthodoxy "offers" a number of practices which allow to do that.

The main practice and, accordingly, the category describing this practice is the practice and category of obedience. The main sense of this practice is the idea that if the will of God is always"correct" then the person should entrust himself to this will and do what it tells to do. In this case both wills will be co-directed and salvation will be achieved. In real life the best interpreters of God's will are the people who are spiritually more experienced. Moreover, in general we could consider them all the people who are more experienced in any affair including secular superiors.

The category of "humility" describes the inner condition of a person who could potentially inherit salvation. Humility is achieved through obedience. It is quite difficult to give a specific definition of obedience. Orthodox monks believe that "there should be peace in the soul no matter what happens". Orthodox actors easily recognize a humble person or one who is about to become humble by external empirical characteristics and can differentiate between such a person and a non- humble person. A humble person does not object, does not argue and accepts everything as if it were so, even unfair insults. The person is considered orthodox and, accordingly, one can deal with him if he just "shows" humility. In equal conditions people are more likely to work with a "humble" person rather than with a "less humble " one.

One more important category is the category of blessing which in a number of cases substitutes the category of "obedience" in the profane world (See: [Забаев 2006, Забаев 2007]). "God's blessing" is the Lord's power or God's divine grace which are used to fill in, renew and direct to the good and happiness the life, strength and activities of God's beings". In real life blessing is provided by a priest. By blessing he gives permission to do this or that activity. It is a means of giving permission for this or that activity.


The idea of obedience describes the correlation between human's will and God's will[11] (or, as it is often the same, the correlation between an activity and belief) in order to find a way to reach salvation. However, just like Weber said, this happened in Protestantism with the category of "calling" the category of "obedience" (describing the relation between God's and man's will) received its place in the economic life of religious virtuosos of orthodoxy. This way or another, obedience and labor became if not synonyms then at least correlated notions in monastery charters and practice. Just like in Protestantism success (including that in the monetary form) became a symbol of selectedness, there appeared indicators of obedience in orthodoxy. The main indicator is humility. Humility is a certain condition of a human being and human spirit just like protestant success. Success can be achieved with the help of Beruf (profession/calling) while obedience is used to achieve humility, "Obedience is a total renunciation of our own life, and it shows up clearly in the way we act … Obedience is the burial place of the will and the resurrection of Lowliness (humility – I.Z.)[12]" [St. John Climacus 1982; 91–92]. The Russian language adds complications

here but also points out what character the required category should be. In the German language Beruf means simultaneously a profession and a calling, a reference to God's will and to a worldly operation that denotes a way of realizing the given correlation. In Russian, too, the word "obedience" simultaneously points to the attitude to God's will and the type and kind of action. (E.g., in a Russian monastery a housekeeper or Father Superior gives an "obedience" – obedience – a type of work in monastery[13]; obedience is not a penance»).

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We could say that the observations made in modern monastery communities of the Russian Orthodox Church and conclusions based on the analysis of doctrinal and preacher literature of modern Russian orthodoxy coincide with what is written about practices of the Orthodox Church before the revolution (1917). If modern economic practices differ from those used before the revolution then they still contain the same motivation scheme, namely, the scheme realized in practice and described by ethic.

It would be easier to imagine this scheme comparing it with the scheme described by M. Weber for Calvinist Protestants. The protestant scheme could be presented in the following way. The actor (protestant) is completely torn away from God: God does not hear him, prayer to God is meaningless. Part of the people is initially selected for salvation, and this pre-selection is manifested in earthly life in welfare and success. The simplest yardstick to evaluate welfare is external well-being which is easily expressed in the monetary equivalent. Consequently, whoever is enjoying well-being on earth will be saved. Further Weber wrote that in a situation like this every person would like to check if he has been selected. One can do it through an attempt to earn good living by hard work. If the person is successful he has been selected. So the simplest scheme is that economy is a way to God (salvation).



Pic. 1. Motivation of economic action in Protestantism (as seen by M.Weber)

The scheme of motivation in the religious ethic of Russian Orthodoxy is arranged differently. The actor (an Orthodox Christian) takes his business activity not as a way to please God and achieve salvation; he takes these two things to a certain extent as independent. It is important that God is extremely meaningful. Then the Orthodox Christian asks the question: how is one to take care of economy in a situation when economy and extreme


values are not connected in any way? In this case the Orthodox Christian has two basic variants. The key element for both variants is the idea of obedience.

The first variant is the most consistent and logical. It is joining the monastery. In this case all possessions are eliminated or should be eliminated. The actor does not take care of the household in the sense of "actor's control over resources" (Weber in C.Wittich's and G. Roth's English-speaking edition; in original Weberian text - Ausübung von Verfügungs-gewalt[14]) until, at least, he acquires some leading position in the monastery (such as a housekeeper or an hegumen). Instead upon his initial presence at the monastery the man has to deal with "labor" activities which are actually called "obedience". Obedience (as a principle of labor activity) becomes a means of salvation. The person should join his will with God's will if the person is to achieve salvation. The means of this is being obedient and conform to somebody else who is more spiritually experienced; monastery workers, pilgrims, lay brothers conform to the monk; the hegumen should conform to the bishop, etc. Thus, the exclusion of one's own goal setting is in itself another salvation means. There are circumstances when it is simply impossible to obtain the advice of a more spiritually experienced person. How does the behavior of an orthodox person change, including his economic behavior? It is important to remember that in this case a man's own goal setting is undesirable. When there are no intermediaries who could transmit (being more spiritually experienced) God's will to human beings the man tries to "guess" the latter through some external circumstances. There are two specific practices combined with each other in life that serve as an original "formula" for the orthodox monastery cenobites. The first practice is "the prayer" when God is asked to send "daily bread" while the second is "the household" itself when the prayer is sent to God as well to ensure the successful results of household activities.

The second option of one's path that is actually secular differs from the first due to a higher degree of the actor's "secular responsibility" in his activities including his economic (wirtschaftliche) duties. However, the basic motivational algorithm remains similar to the first variant activities. An active orthodox lay person who has to run his economic does not consider it as a salvation means and pleasing God in the sense that a Weberian protestant sees it. Certainly, sometimes the person brings the fruit of his labor to church or "puts it on the canon" but it has a different sense. The essence of correlation between God and household is that an orthodox Christian asks the Lord for help to make his household to be successful. That is exactly the sense of prayers services (molebens) and religious processions in case of a draught or before the beginning of the season, etc. This idea underlies multiday pilgrimages to the saints. Besides "addressing" God people also ask intermediaries for help starting with confessors and finishing with people higher in position (professional, family or some other kind). Categories of obedience, humility and blessing remain the key notions.

However, the described scheme is not completed yet. We have stated above that there is a lack of attitude to household as one of means of salvation in Russian Orthodox tradition and noted that an orthodox lay man asks God for help in order to succeed in his economic

activities. It should also be mentioned that in everyday life the man does not deal directly with God (or not only with God) but rather he deals with God through Church. If we'd like to be more specific we could say that the man has to go through priests, monks, sacrament and cults and on the one hand, receives an intermediary for his communication with God, while on the other, he gets visible and tangible means. Invocation to God is done through a priest, monk or saint (tangibly presented with holy relics and an icon).



Pic. 2. Motivation of economic action in Orthodox Christianity

Moreover, nowadays the layman can't help but address God through the identified means. At present, for example, the layman should make a confession, receive communion and extreme unction at certain intervals (the time period can't be very extensive). Earlier (during the synodal period) the man had to pay for regular services and molebens. The obligatory character was not so much due to some external compulsion but rather to some internal motivation for certain appropriate activities and conditions. Thus, the orthodox motivation scheme of an economic activity should be presented as follows. An orthodox layman believes that God presented by a priest (church, monk, saint) is an intermediary between a man and a household (economy). The core element of such practices is ethic categories of obedience and humility. These very practices of obedience and humility describe the role of the intermediary (church) in this scheme and an ideal character of communication. The described scheme could not exist without the relations of such kind. Besides, the scheme presupposes a very small range for the household (economy).

Conclusion

In this article we tried to explicate the notion of ethic offered by M. Weber in his work "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism". We believe that the specific structure of this concept at least partially has defined the success of Weber's research. The main question of ethic in M. Weber's formulation consists of two parts: 1) the question about the principle good and principal ability to reach it (the category of the predestined); 2) the question about the specific form of a human activity facilitating the achieving of the prin-

cipal good (the category of calling). Besides such a structure of the notion ethic M.Weber demonstrated the logic of search for the answers by an ordinary protestant and showed how such answers affected other sides of the life of believers (besides the internal life in the church). It was exactly this idea that served as the basis for Weber's idea of unforeseen consequences which was also an inseparable component of Weber's argument about the role of Protestantism in the emergence and development of capitalism. When analyzing the experience of using this concept in the research of modern Russia we described the main categories of economic ethic of contemporary Russian Orthodoxy which, in particular, include "obedience" and "humility". We demonstrated that these categories are widely used not only inside the monastery but also in the secular world thus receiving in the inside secular life a substitute/addition in the form of the category "blessing". This work allows to show that unlike Weber's protestant who had means to check himself whether he was chosen or not an Orthodox person simply does not have such means but rather a spiritually more experienced person is such a means in this reality. We used these conclusions to provide substantiation for the hypothesis how Orthodox ethics could promote the forming of certain social and cultural features of Soviet socialism [See: Zabaev 2008].

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Notes

1 For more details see polemics between F. Nietzsche and M. Sheler (in writing) [Шелер. 1999; Шелер. 1994].

2 There is no doubt that ideas about each people having its own morals were widely spread in the philosophy environment long before Nietzsche. However, before Hegel all these ideas were treated as an imperfection (or exceptions) rather than a natural course of events. In this respect it could be interesting to compare the ethics of Aristotle and Nietzsche (especially in the light of certain Weber categories) done by A. Macintyre [Macintyre. 1981].

3 Without speaking about any specific research about the influence of religion on the economy of different countries. The review of the texts and research traditions could be found in P. Munch's work "Thesis before Weber: archeology" [Munch. 1993].

4 In our opinion, it is exactly this disregard of the ethical aspect of "Protestant Ethic..." that does not allow national authors conduct similar historical and sociological work about Russian orthodoxy; as a result, they either use short references to the vagueness of the orthodox influence on economy or they just altogether ignore Weber's formulation of the questions and the resources offered by him to describe our society.

5 We should make one more comment concerning the strategy of research connected with the notion of ethic. The strategy of such research can't be built in a consistent and deductive manner such as the analysis of the dogma first, then the analysis of what expression these or other

dogma statements find in preacher literature and, finally, the identification of the place of these dogmas in the economicc practices of religious actors. This logic does not justify itself due to the presence of a big number of dogmatic ideas and even a bigger quantity of dogmatic nuances in each confession. It is impossible to see beforehand which dogma fragments will be actualized in economic practices. Consequently, there is a risk to use "wrong" dogma fragments and, as a result, discover their absence in practice or to make a number of analytical substitutions voluntarily comparing and correlating dogmas and practice. That is why in the course of our research we moved backwards from practice to ethics and dogmatic ideas.

6 V. Radaev applies the concept of economic ideology referring to K. Manheim [Манхейм. 1994. C. 37].

7 The term was used to describe indirect (or unintentional) effects which were introduced in sociology and served as a predecessor of various notions such as "latent functions". For more details see [Kalberg 1994].

8 Actually, M. Weber himself did not pay proper attention to the reception of the dogmatic in preacher practice. M. Maccinon pointed to that in his works when providing counter arguments against M. Weber's thesis using the example of Scotland [Maccinon 1988 a, b]. Response to M. Maccinon's criticism could be found in: [Zaret 1992, Zaret 1993].

9 8 male monasteries were selected for analysis in Archangel, Kursk, South Sakhalin, the Kurils, Vladivostok, Primorsk, Krasnoyarsk, Yenisey, Chita, Transbaikal, Tobolsk, Tyumen, Barnaul, and Altay dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church (the stage of field study 2002–2004).

10 Conclusions about the economic ideology of orthodoxy are presented in [Zabaev 2006].

11 See, for example: «... And Samuel said, Hath the LORD as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the LORD? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams (KJV). » (1 Samuel. 15: 22).

12 In the edition (St. John Climacus – The Ladder of Divine Ascent. L.: SPCK, 1982) the term Lowliness is used. Although we use another word – "humility". We can do this – for they have one Greek equivalent. In Greek text of St. John Climacus the term "ταπείνωσις" is used, - and it's Latin translation – "humilitas". See, for example: Johannes Climacus. Scala Paradisi // Patrologia Graeca / J.-P. Migne, ed. 2004. Vol. 88. Col. 631-1163. – The quotation is taken from col. 679–680.

13 In the Russian language Greek concepts ὑπακοὴ (corresponds «obedience» in English) and διακονία («penance», or «work of penance») are expressed by one word - "obedience" (poslushanie – transliteration from Russian). / We would like to thank S.Zaplatnikov for consultation about Greek theological concepts/.

14 "Economic action" (Whirtschaften) is any peaceful exercise of an actor's control over resources which is in its main impulse oriented towards economic ends. [Weber 1978; 63]. „Wirtschaften" soll eine friedliche Ausübung von Verfügungsgewalt heißen, welche primär, „rationales Wirtschaften" eine solche, welche zweckrational, also planvoll, wirtschaftlich orientiert ist. [Weber 1922; 31].

DAILY BREAD OF SOCIETIES

Olga Breskaya

Dear prof. S.G. Mestrovic, knowing your authoritive position as sociologist and your deep interest in the problems of social justice, morality and social cohesion, war crimes and democracy, we would kindly ask you to answer several questions. Do you think that the topic of social ethics is discussed well enough in contemporary sociology in USA and Europe in comparison to the period of birth of sociology? Why?

Stjepan Meštrović

The short answer is that no, social ethics is not a central issue in contemporary sociology as it was in classical sociology. Let me start with my own experience, which is that I was trained and hold graduate degrees in theology, psychology, and sociology. These choices seemed like an accident for me at the time – there was no conscious plan. Now, as I comparemy training with the period of the birth of sociology (the time of Durkheim, Max Weber, William James) it seems that my education was accidentally similar to that time period. A century ago, there were no hard divisions between psychology and sociology, and both fields were saturated with theology. The social sciences used to be taught under the label of moral philosophy. Durkheim was descended from seven generations of rabbis. In his book, the *Division of Labor in Society*, he quotes extensively from the Bible to illustrate his sociology. Max Weber was obsessed with all the world's religions. William James constantly relates pragmatism to his overall concern, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Many of the sociologists at the famous Chicago School were sons of ministers. And so on. So on a personal level, I often tell my students that Durkheim, Weber, James and the

others from that by-gone era are my friends. I feel more in common with them than with most of my living colleagues. I also feel like a remnant from the past, and like a cultural dinosaur.

But times have changed rapidly, even in my lifetime. Social theory and social ethics have become footnotes or afterthoughts in most programs in sociology as well as related fields. To give you a concrete example, consider Jean Piaget's classic book, The Moral Judgment of the Child. Piaget was writing during the classical period, and he builds on the works of Durkheim and Durkheim's follower, Paul Fauconnet. It is a fascinating, far-reaching analysis of how children, adults, and societies create ideas about what is good, and evil, who is responsible, and how they should be punished. At its core, the book is profoundly interdisciplinary. But today, Piaget has been taken over entirely by the psychologists, who amputate his sociological and theological concerns, and seek only to quantify his famous stages of psychological development out of its original context. Sociologists and theologians ignore Piaget completely. What has happened over the course of a century is that disciplines have become compartmentalized, quantitative methodology has triumphed, and the business model has taken over educational institutions such that funding has become more important than curiosity.

Actually, the classical sociologists predicted this current condition: Durkheim with his concept of anomie, Max Weber with the Iron Cage, Veblen with the modern barbarian temperament, and so n. Just look at the past decade. We are in the midst of an economic cataclysm which is called the Great Recession, only because another Great Depression was avoided – for the time being--by rewarding and not punishing the bankers and businessmen who created the mess through greed, deception, and what theologians would have called sin. Thorstein Veblen wrote way back in 1899, in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, about the robber-barons, trickery, and new barbarians (businessmen) who would bring back a new Dark Ages of serfdom for the masses. His prophecy is coming true. But who reads Veblen anymore? Veblen was an economist, but the economists do not read him, and sometimes he is included in sociological theory courses as a relic or a remnant of the past. Yet he is profoundly relevant to contemporary times. To answer your question briefly: contemporary society is showing the climax of lack of ethics that Durkheim, Weber, Veblen and others foreshadowed over a hundred of years ago. The process is accelerating, and it is society-wide, even world-wide, and not specific to sociology. Sociology has lost its role as the conscience of society.

Olga Breskaya

Social ethics, if to deepen into historical contexts, was always connected with the type of society and its values in public space. Ancient moral theories "talked" about virtue, happiness (eudaimonia), and the soul. What happens with the main constituents of contemporary moral theory? Looking at the data provided by census we find that happiness is a rather highly valued principle of life of Western societies, but weather it is still so strongly connected with virtue and soul?

Stjepan Meštrović

I think one word captures my answer to your wonderful, old-fashioned question, and that word is narcissism. Christopher Lasch captured the modern trend with his book, *The Culture of Narcissism*. Narcissists value their personal happiness, but not virtue, and the question of soul is meaningless to them. But it gets worse. In 2010, the American Psychiatric Association officially and formally dropped narcissism as a pathology in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. So, in the relatively short period of time since the 1900s, when Freud introduced the idea of narcissism, to 1970, when Lasch published his seminal book, to the present, narcissism has become so common that it is no longer considered "abnormal." By definition, how can something "normal," which means common or normative, be regarded as deviant or "abnormal?" We are living in an anomic condition in which the abnormal, cultural narcissism, has become the norm. Durkheim referred to this condition as "the rule that is lack of rule." You can see signs of this trend everywhere, including technology. The revolutionary and widespread use of personal computers, cell-phones, i-phones, and other electronic devices basically hook a person into his or her own brain. Baudrillard made this observation not so long ago, and I think he is even more correct today. I ask my students if they use their pc's to google topics I discuss in lecture or to learn about the external world. They look at me blankly. I ask them what they do most of the time on their computers, and the answer is immediate: they are on Facebook, or playing games or watching porn. I could multiply these examples, but would like to keep my answers short.

Olga Breskaya

In USA the principles of social ethics were closely connected to the ideas of public religion (civil religion), individualism, civil engagement and democracy. What happens with ethical principles in a situation when the a) the role of religion is declining in American society and b)associativity is also weakening?

Stjepan Meštrović

Yes, the recent decline of associations, groups, and the public sphere in the USA has been well documented. I would add that even the amount of human contact has been declining. Increasingly, one can do one's banking through an ATM machine, and never speak with a bank teller or pump one's own gas and pay with a credit card and never speak with a human being or even shop for groceries through "self check-out" lines – and so on. It's all part of the new normative narcissism. Why do anything with other people when one can do it through one's pc or some other technology, and by one's self? You ask about civil religion. It is important to note that the originator of this concept in the 1970s, Robert Bellah, formally recanted this concept and dropped it forever. Galileo was forced to recant in order to save his life, but Bellah simply gave into public pressure, because his idea that religion permeates political life offended so many people. Individualism has become the new narcissism. What civil engagement is there? You do not see protests or riots or strikes characteristic of the 1960s and other periods of the 20th century in America. Nowadays, people protest on the pc.

In 1997, I published a book, *Postemotional Society*, to capture what I think is going on: namely, the emotional attachment to historical American virtues is now manipulated by the media and the government. It is a situation worse than Orwell's *1984*, which predicted the simple manipulation of truth by an authoritarian regime. Nowadays, emotional attachments to civic ideals are manipulated by governments which come across as friendly, and most people do not seem to be aware of this fact. In reality, the American Dream is vanishing yet people cling to it emotionally.

Olga Breskaya

Eastern Europe experiences the problems with social ethics in a situation of rapid growth of religious communities, slow growth of associativity of citizens, underdeveloped public space, anomie. Where do you think it is possible to find the roots for social ethics in such conditions?

Stjepan Meštrović

Politics contaminates the purity of your question. Eastern Europe, for the most part, was not allowed to find or develop its own path following the collapse of Communism in the 1990s. Instead, most Eastern European nations have been absorbed or are on the waiting list for absorption into the EU or NATO or both. However, the EU is in real danger of disintegrating due to fiscal crises and racism. Chancellor Merkel declared famously, and ominously, in October of 2010 that multiculturalism is dead in Europe. The EU resents bitterly that it has to bail out financially the troubled economies of Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. In sum, the EU may not exist in the coming years, and the Eastern European nations that are on the waiting list will feel betrayed.

I am not talking about the EU as just a political organization, but as a cultural entity and a source of cultural Imperialism. Eastern Europe is profoundly different from the West. Eastern Europe is still innocent in contrast to the West. Culturally, Eastern Europe is Roman Catholic or some variation of Orthodox religion, which means that it is a Virgin Mary-centered culture. By contrast, as Erich Fromm noted, the West is primarily a Jesus-centered culture. I am not talking about East versus West geographically, but culturally. Thus, Poland has more in common with Mexico than with Canada. I am emphasizing that the qualitative differences between Eastern and Western Europe are more important than the quantitative rise of religious communities. Again, Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism already foreshadowed these qualitative distinctions that I am making. If you read his book carefully, you will see how differently he treats Poland, Russia and Eastern Europe from the West.

It is true that Eastern Europe has its share of corruption, and this might be what you are calling anomie. But again, I believe that Eastern European corruption is qualitatively different from the West. Durkheim defines modern anomie in uniquely Western terms, as a condition of "infinite desires," whereby one is always desiring to consume something and is never happy with what one has. It is clear that Eastern Europe still has not reached

anything close to this Western style of consumerism. In time, Eastern Europe will no doubt be McDonaldized and corrupted. But for now, I would emphasize qualitative differences between Eastern and Western Europe.

Olga Breskaya

Do you think it is possible to transport some Western ideas to describe this situation in Eastern Europe? In what categories it is possible to talk about social ethics in Eastern European region?

Stjepan Meštrović

I am consistently against understanding non-Western cultures from Western perspectives – in the past, that was called ethnocentrism. Your question is too broad for me to answer in a short space, so I will give one specific example. I have been in Sarajevo twice this past Fall. Each time, I was amazed that the Bosnian Muslims do not seek revenge against the Serbs who basically turned Sarajevo into a concentration camp in 1992. Local residents tell me that they know exactly where the Serbs who murdered, raped, and terrorized them live, but no one bothers them. This fact is more than my personal observation. Empirical studies show that Bosniaks were the most tolerant and forgiving people in the former Yugoslavia prior to the war in 1992, and are still the most tolerant and forgiving people. In general, Eastern Europe does not have the high murder rates that one finds in Western countries, especially the USA. So where is this curb on revenge coming from in Eastern Europe versus the drive for revenge that is more often acted out in the West? The answer is no doubt complicated, but clearly a social ethic of some sort is at play in Eastern Europe, and it is different from Western ethics. I believe that Eastern Europe needs to be understood on its own terms.

Again, I am emphasizing the need to seek out a qualitative understanding of what ethics means in a particular culture. It is simply not true that moral judgment or morality are Western, or that Western ideas are universal.

Olga Breskaya

Solidarity and trust are the main mechanisms of social ethics building. What do you think about solidarity as a moral principle in Durkheim theory and solidarity as a main principle of doctrine of Christian social thought? Do these concepts have some interrelation or inter-influence? Is it possible to the sociologist to be a moralist in a modern sociology?

Stjepan Meštrović

Again, the question is too complicated to answer fully here. Actually, you ask several questions, and my short answers are: Yes, social solidarity is the bedrock of Durkheim's theory. No, I do not think that solidarity is the principal doctrine of Christian thought, at least not Protestant thought, which is all about individualism. Solidarity is more important

to Catholic and Orthodox Christian cultures. Where East and West meet, they typically clash. Eastern Europe is now the prize sought by Western cultural Imperialism, just after it emerged from Communist-Soviet political Imperialism. And it is imperative for the contemporary sociologist to be a moralist, but the bedrock for this has been destroyed by postmodernism, positivism, and other social forces.

I would begin by pointing out that Western Christianity (primarily based on Protestantism, if one still takes Max Weber seriously) is qualitatively different from Eastern Christianity, namely, the Catholic and Orthodox religions. Max Weber characterized the Western-leaning religions as "this-worldly," meaning that they tend to focus on the individual's duty to his or her own salvation, and authorize hedonism and living for rewards in the visible, physical, concrete social world. But he characterizes Eastern-leaning religions as "other-worldly," meaning that such religions teach that the world is corrupt and that one should live for the "other," invisible world of heaven. One earns grace for the other world by treating others in one's life kindly, not by accumulating private wealth. Weber wrote separate books on all the world's major religions, and places them on a continuum of this-worldly on one extreme and other-worldly on the other extreme. Thus, Puritanical America would be on one end and Buddhist Cambodia would be on the other. I am merely summarizing Weber here. But his insights have been transformed by contemporary sociology into a narcissistic fascination with the Puritanical type of this-worldly morality, namely, George Ritzer's interpretation of Weber in The McDonaldization of Society. Supposedly, this-worldly morality leads to efficiency, control, and prediction of the environment, and these traits are assumed to be unequivocally good and better than other-worldly cultures, which are seen as "backward." But there is no equivalent to Ritzer's analysis of an Orthodox, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or other cultures on the opposite end of the continuum. Weber was too conflicted and too objective to prefer one type to the other, and in fact, found fault with the Western type as leading to the Iron Cage. I am saying that a century after Weber wrote, his profound insights have still not be investigated fully.

But you raise the question in terms of Durkheim. Durkheim takes up Weberian issues in a most neglected and practically unknown book, The Evolution of Educational Thought. It seems to be a book about education, but it is really about religion and culture. He does not mention Weber, but he pursues a Weberian path in his own way. Durkheim's main point is that Western universities began as Catholic schools for learning theology, mixed with paganism from the Greek and Roman eras. Durkheim most favors the so-called Dark Ages, which in his opinion were least anomic and least aggressive. He takes a negative view of the Renaissance, Reformation, and other developments that sought to make Christianity into a "warrior religion" culturally speaking, to convert other cultures on the basis of a mixture of Greek, Roman, and Christian ideas. Yes, the shocking truth is that Durkheim regarded the Renaissance and Reformation as anomic periods of history, marked by persecution, intolerance, the burning of women as witches, and religious wars. Of course, he is right. But this is not the typical way that Durkheim or the Renaissance are taught in

schools. So, in no way did Durkheim equate his love of social solidarity with Christian religions. His thought is much too complicated for that.

Olga Breskaya
How do you think social ethics can develop in a pluralistic society?

Stjepan Meštrović
Look around you in the current start of the new millennium. Greed and corruption have become institutionalized on Wall Street and the business world. Durkheim predicted this long ago in his neglected book, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, wherein he wrote that "government, instead of being the regulator of economic life, has become its tool and servant." Who can seriously deny that this is what is happening today? But I have found that most of my colleagues and students do not even know that Durkheim wrote this book, and cannot begin to move to his suggestions for developing social ethics. Similarly, Veblen predicted a new barbarian culture of businessmen. He is completely right that the disparity between the rich and poor has grown so much that worldwide, a new feudalism is returning, with business tycoons as the new nobility and the middle class as the new serfs. Sociology has abandoned its most important thinkers and ideas on social ethics. I do not feel optimistic about the future. Durkheim was right to claim that morality is the daily bread of society, the indispensible basic minimum without which society cannot exist. I predict, sadly, that social groups, organizations such as the EU, economic systems, social institutions such as marriage, and other "societies" will collapse in the coming decades because morality is no longer regarded as our daily bread.

Artyom Ulunyan

NEW "MIĘDZYMORZE" – "INTERMARUM" AS A GEOSPATIAL REPROPROJECT WITHIN THE "EUROPE OF REGIONS" CONCEPT: is there geohistorical paradigm of "Flexible Regions" in East-Central Europe?

Abstract

Geopolitical changes in Eurasia in the late 80-es – early 90-es of the previous century have brought about revival of so called retro images in public discourse and assisted its place them into the focus of discussions among politicians and experts. By renewing historically based Polish-Lithuanian geopolitical retro project called during intra-war period as "Intermarum" with broader border perimeter then it had been defined earlier there made vital the idea of Intermarum geopolitical space as distinct geopolitical zone possessing significance for European security architecture in politics, defense and economy, and playing important ideological role in public discourse of the countries situated in the region and became element of European identity. This fact has determined new course in interpreting number of reper points that define maritime part of the construct and finds its display in bringing to light new version of "Intermarum" as the project of "Three Seas" such as 1) Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas: 2) Baltic, Black and Caspian seas and 3) Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas. So called Baltic-Black Sea – Caspian-Mediterranean geoconstruct became combination of several projects considered to consolidate different parts of this wide space.

Keywords: Intermarum, East Central Europe, Geohistorical Paradigma, Flexible Regions

Geopolitical changes in Eurasia that took place in the late 1980s - the beginning of the1990s and manifested themselves in the disintegration of some polyethnic state formations such as Tito's Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR contributed to the revival in the public

discourse of the so-called retroimages, which found their expression in the actualization of this problem in political and expert circles of a number of countries. The peculiarity of the process of designing geoprojects in the context of "the new political geography" was that "a new global geopolitical space was being constructed in which constantly changing key geopolitical images of the world cross, interact and struggle. The most effective of these images generate their own geopolitical contexts, their own image zones of influence as well as buffer geopolitical images" (Zamiyatin 2002).

In the first half of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century several geoconcepts which were critical for the Eurasian space were actualized and modified from the position of new geopolitical realities. These concepts had a certain impact on the public opinion and political development of a number of countries during the period preceding World War I as well as during the interbellum period. Spatial and geographical realities of political transformations facilitated the actualization of the problem of systemic modeling of space, which had remained segmented for quite a long time because of the incompleteness of the social and political development and state building that had started during the period of disintegration of the continental empires, such as Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian. One of the components of this process was the debatability of the geographical attributing of the part of Europe where the disintegration of empires was followed by the emergence of independent states including Pax Sovietica (with the former Soviet territories). Therefore, the role of the so-called geopolitical images (GPI) increased where these GPIs are understood as "the purposeful and accurately structured representations about the geographical space including the brightest and most memorable symbols, signs, images and characteristics of certain territories, countries, and regions, marking them from the political point of view. In this case it has to do with the actual identification of a certain geographical space with a specific policy carried out by someone. It should be noted at once that the key GPIs are characterised by the most purposeful geospatial representations and the most powerful territorial and country symbols and signs" (Zamyatin, 2002).

The discussion of this topic carries both a cultural, historical and distinctly clear political character touching upon the issue of the countries' belonging to the common European space that is now part of the United Europe and of the Euro-Atlantic community. This is important from the point of view of public discourse in the countries of the region located to the east of the borders of "classical" (Western) Europe. The use of the definition Central or East Central (Central Eastern) as well as Middle Europe in the latest political tradition is based on various interpretations of basic factors of the historical development of the region's peoples (Islamov, Freidzon 1992: 119-133; Miller 2001: 75-96; Janowski 2005: 5-58; Mitteleuropa 1994). According to Halecki, a well-known Polish historian and culturologist who worked in the USA and is the author of the term "East Central Europe", Central Europe consists of two geohistorical and geocultural sectors – the German West Central sector with the dominating imperial tradition of the German statehood and the East Central sector where the people live on the territory from Finland to Greece occupying the space

between Scandinavia, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union (Halecki, 1950). However, in addition to this definition of such a geographically extensive region there exist a few others which are conceptually defined as cultural- historical and political constructs. One of such definitions is based on the belief that Central Europe is a region closely connected with the Western civilisation, including German, Austro-Hungarian and Polish-Lithuanian historical heritage. This region also borders on Russia and South East Europe the cultural and historical tradition of which is based on the Ottoman heritage.

In a narrower sense the definition of Central Europe is given within the frame of the geospatial construct based on the conception according to which the region includes the territories of the Habsburg monarchy that left its cultural heritage to the nations that created their own states on the monarchy's territory after its disintegration. The construct of East Central Europe is a response to such interpretation of the region's geospatial positioning. Its main element is the principle of the cultural heritage of the so-called Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth acting as the basis for the territorial definition of the region, which includes modern Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. The politicized character of the discussion about the affiliation of East Central Europe found its most distinct expression in the promotion of two other concepts: the so-called Belarusian-Russian-Ukrainian one that involves Slavic and Orthodox ethnic and confessional component and the South East European one whose supporters intend to expand the geographical borders of Central Eastern Europe to emphasize the belonging of the people of these sectors of the European space to the rest of Europe and the Western cultural tradition (Kłoczowski, 2004: 29-30).

Many of these approaches to the positioning of Central Eastern Europe facilitated the historization of modern sub-regional geoconstructs in relation to certain sectors of the Euro-Asian space. The basis of the process was the concept of uniting vast water and land territories from the north and the south – from the Baltic sea to the Mediterranean and Black sea basin leading to the creation of the so-called the Baltic-Black sea subregion. The process concept contained a historical component while the preconditions had a proved historical ground. This topic was the subject of not only political studies but also of archive research facilitating the historical conceptualization of the idea in the direction corresponding to the social and political discourse (Lebedev, Zhvitashvili 2000). A peculiar fact in this context was the attempt to carry out such a plan at the beginning of the XXth century by building a Baltic-Black sea canal that was proposed by the Russian military department. The obviousness of the special geographical and geostrategic importance of the two regions (the Baltic and the Black seas) for the Russian imperial policy led to the emergence of a concrete project. The project substantiation including the financial and technical part was initially developed in detail in 1900 by the engineer V. von Ruckteschell, a representative of the scientific and technical expert community. In 1891, the Belgian engineer Gustav Defossez addressed the Russian government with a similar idea but did not provide any technical or financial substantiation. Von Ruckteschell's proposal addressed to the minister of war A.N. Kuropatkin was to build an artificial waterway – Riga-Kherson canal.

It pointed out that "all the major rivers of European Russia could be divided mainly into two groups – northern and southern while some northern rivers take their origin near the head of the rivers of the southern system. Thus, after a certain adjustment of water basins it is possible to unite North Western and Southern Russia or, in other words, to unite the Baltic sea with the Black sea." It was estimated that it would take about 16 years to build the canal at a cost of 300 million roubles.[1] Besides its economic function the canal also had one more function as " … from the strategic point of view the construction of such a waterway is of great importance for Russia as then the warships will be able to move from one sea to the other to protect its ports in the shortest time".[2] The route of this huge construction was supposed to be Riga-Friedrichstadt (Jaunelgava)-Dvinsk-Drina-Mogilev-Kiev-Cherkasov-Kremenchug-Ekaterinoslavl (Dnepropetrovsk)-Kherson.

Throughout the first third of the XXth century the transformation construct of the geospace between Russia (the USSR) and Germany had some interpretations containing two common elements: political and strategic (in the sense of its defensive, economic and communication importance). These two elements contributed to the actualisation of the interconnected concepts of the new organisation of the geospace from the Baltic to the Black sea after the end of the Cold War in the form of several world system doctrines formed with the help of geopolitical retroimages. The ideological and political orientation and practical realisation of the geoconstruct began to be formulated at the beginning of the XX century and was formulated by absolutely different authors. One of them was H. Mackinder, a British geographer and political expert at the Paris Peace conference after the end of the First World War, believed that on the one hand the space between Germany and Russia was of crucial importance for world politics but, on the other, it was the most vulnerable sector in the system of international relations that could provoke a new world war: 1) in case of internal political instability in it; 2) in case of its absorption by Russia or Germany and convergence of the borders of the two states (Mackinder 1919). The author of the second conception was J. Pilsudski, a public figure of the Polish national movement, who formulated his idea in the memorandum to the Japanese government in 1904. The document recommended Tokyo to consider and use national liberation movements of the peoples of the Russian empire. From the position of the Polish national movement as it was defined by J. Pilsudski, the above-mentioned memorandum contained the conclusion that "The power and importance of Poland among the parts making up the Russian state enforce us to be even more determined in setting the political goal of splitting the Russian state into major components and liberating the countries which were forcefully included into the empire. We regard it not only as the fulfilment of the cultural aspirations of our country to independent existence but also as a guarantee of such existence because Russia deprived of its gains will be seriously weakened and will cease to be a terrible and dangerous neighbour" (Charaszkiewicz, 56).

After Poland's acquisition of independence and the strengthening of pressure upon it on the part of Soviet Russia, which tried to impose a communist regime on Poland using armed forces, J. Pilsudski initiated the implementation of the "Prometheism" idea to

support the liberation movement of the peoples of the former empire for independence. The concept was named after the Greek mythical hero Prometheus who, contrary to the will of the gods, gave fire to people. It had a geopolitical meaning as its mission was to liberate people from the Soviet regime and to create national statehood for the peoples of the former empire.[3] In the geospatial relation it included a wide strip of land from the Baltic to the Black and Caspian seas as well as separate geographical regions of the Volga region. The realisation of the Baltic-Black Sea project was formulated in the geoconstruct "Intermarum" (which was to include the Baltic and Black seas) proposed by J. Pilsudski (Międzymorze, 1995; Dziewanowski, 1969; Levy, 2007; Okulewicz, 2001). The plan envisaged a confederation of states located both in the Baltic sector of Europe and in the Black sea and Mediterranean sea region such as Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Estonia as well as Belarus, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The idea was supported neither by any of the countries, which were considered to be potential candidates, nor by the majority of political leaders who were emigrants from the countries included in the RSFSR/USSR and related to the project. The countries' negative attitude to the idea of "Intermarum" was due to their unwillingness to renounce their national freedom; they saw a threat to it in the regional domination of Poland. Many European powers also opposed the strengthening of Warsaw. At the same time, the Poles believed that the project was to be supported by France and Belgium becoming the basis of the continental Anti-German union (Belarus – Poland, 2005).[4] Despite the indisputable authorship of J. Pilsudski, the geoconstruct "Intermarum"[5] like each of similar megaprojects possessed "mosaic" features and included subregional constructs as its elements. One of them, and the central one, was the project of the Baltic Union put forward throughout 1917–1920. It assumed the creation of a military political block consisting of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that were to become independent states as a result of the disintegration of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German empires. A variant of such a union could be The Baltic-Scandinavian block. The author of this idea was the Estonian politician Jaan Tőnisson, leader of the Democratic Party (the People's party became its successor in 1919). With the help of this interstate union he wanted to get guarantees of security for the Baltic region and Northern Europe. However, the Scandinavian states did not show much interest because they did not want to get involved in military and political conflicts in the Baltic region (Lubelski 2010: 186-189). Further development of the geospatial concept "Intermarum" found its reflection in the plan to create the so-called "Third Europe". Its author was J. Beck, head of the Polish Foreign Ministry and one of the closest associates of J. Pilsudski. J. Beck continued to play an important role in the formation of the country's foreign policy together with two other associates of J. Pilsudski who died on May 15th, 1935 – President I. Mościcki and General E. Rydz-Śmigły. According to Beck's concept, the countries of "Intermarum" or "Third Europe" located between Germany and the USSR had to include northern countries – Sweden and Finland – in addition to the Baltic countries, Hungary, Transcarpathian Rus, Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Turkey (and under certain circumstances Greece) with the exclusion of Czechoslovakia (Kornat).

The analytical document "Basis of Polish policy in Middle Europe and on the Balkans" compiled in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1930s (unfortunately, the publishers do not provide the exact date of its creation and, most likely, it dates back to the second half of the '30s) defined the goal of Polish foreign policy – "to ensure the country with free space between the Third Reich, on the one hand, Moscow state [the USSR], on the other, for the development of its political, cultural and economic potential. This aim is a categorical imperative of the Polish raison d'etat regarded as a consequence of the problem of spreading and strengthening Europe from sea to sea". The same document emphasizes the existence of the threat from Germany to the Baltic states including Poland, Central European Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and Romania regardless of the fact that the Third Reich may have no common borders with any country as well as the Italian threat to the Balkan countries (Białobłocki 2001: 26). Corresponding geoconcepts introduced by representatives of Ukrainian and Belarusian socio-political thought outside the USSR were quite serious and close to the "classical" geopolitical plan of Intermarum in its geographical profile. Their main distinction in comparison with the original was that the project's authors addressed the role and place of Ukraine and Belarus in this geopolitical construct. The modernization of the Polish-Lithuanian geopolitical retroproject that got an expansive interpretation of the "Intermarum" geoconstruct during the interbellum period was taking place in the conditions of the end of the Cold War, disintegration of the USSR and the creation of independent states on its territory. The actualization of the Intermarum geospace was turning into an initiating moment for the search of a new form of Intermarum (Paznyak; Saltovsky, 1996)). The space was treated as a peculiar geopolitical zone with special significance for the European architecture of security including political, defense and economic elements having an ideological importance for the social and political discourse in the countries of the region on their way to the consolidation of their common European identity (Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia, 2004; Wolański, 1996). Some works of expert and analytical nature written by researchers from the Baltic states, which had been former Soviet republics, took special notice of the historical role of the three nations of the continental Baltics and their statehood, namely, Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians in the formation of the whole Baltic regional geoconstruct. For instance, it was noted that "During the period of Soviet occupation the concept of "the Baltic trio" [Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia] or "the Baltics" was imposed on our conscience very quickly and seemed to be centuries-old. At the same time in the conditions of the new political situation of the 1990s a concept with a shorter history was brought to light. From time to time the discussion whether the Baltic states formed a single (common) geopolitical space started" (Päbo, 2005: 41). The increase in the emerging plans of the realization of the Intermarum project of the number of new geospaces defining the sea component of the construct found its expression in the promotion at the end of the 20th century – the beginning of the 21st century of the following versions of "Intermarum" in the form of the project of "Three Seas": 1) the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas; 2) the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas; 3) the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas. The self-dissolution of the USSR,

the creation on the post-Soviet territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States with former Soviet republics as its members with the exception of three Baltic states, the liquidation of the Eastern block, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, as well as the adoption by the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe of the course towards joining the Euroatlantic community became the major factors that promoted the formulation of new regional geospatial projects dealing with the Post-Soviet part of Eurasia and combining pragmatical reasons with the historical component. The changing system of international relations at the end of the XXth – the beginning of the XXIst century played a considerable role in formulating such projects. One of its peculiar features was the aggravation of the struggle for the influence on the post-Soviet territory, especially between Moscow and Washington. This made it possible to conclude that "now the character of the American-Russian mutual relations is to some extent comparable to the first "cold war" in the second half of the XXth century. This war was a rigid confrontation between the geoideological and geopolitical projects whose supporters (sometimes against their own will) united round the USA and the USSR" (Harutyunyan).

In the new conditions, orientation towards the European model also presupposed a certain "Europeization" acting as a symbol of geopolitical development including several components, the main ones being the changes of the external borders of the United Europe, the development of governing bodies at the level of the European Union, the interpenetration of national and supranational governing levels, the realisation of the political project aimed at creating the united and politically strong Europe (Olsen, 2002: 923, 924). Against this background the social discourse of many post-communist countries as well as the states of the Euroatlantic community saw the intensification of the process of actualization of a number of geopolitical retroprojects that in the past used to be directly related to the positioning of space from the Baltic to the Black sea (Łukasz, 2007).

The main geospatial constructs which to a different degree actualized the XXth century retroprojects included the so-called Black sea concept that found its reflection in the form of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and expanded in its spatial relation beyond the borders of the Black sea region itself; the interstate organization called GU(U)AM which actually ensured communication between three regions, first including Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, then the first two and then transformed into the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development and, finally, the unification of states under the name of the Community of Democratic Choice called upon to ensure the geopolitical connection of the Balkans region, Central East Europe, the Baltic states and the Southern Caucasus. The characteristic feature of the latter was the promotion of the politically motivated unity on the basis of the main goal: exit from the post-soviet and post-communist period of development and definitive transfer to the democratic model of the socio-political structure. Thus, the proposed ideological geospatial concepts of "reformatting" the political map had certain objective laws as they included either "civil or national element and appealed to a certain economic system" (Harutyunyan).

At the beginning of the 1990s after the changes in the system of international relations, the self-dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS, the Black sea subregion turned into an important geospatial project for the states that were directly related to it due to the changed configuration of the distribution of the previous correlation of forces and the emergence of new ones trying to ensure their influence in it. The initiative of Turkey that used its positions in the Euroatlantic community and special relations with the USA found the moment to be appropriate for the realization of its foreign policy aspirations in the Black sea, Caucasian and Central Asian directions. It also took part in the creation of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (see more about the role of Turkey and the importance of the Black sea subregion from the strategic point of view in, e.g., the materials by Navy captain Orhan Babaoglu who worked in the department of planning and political analysis of the Defense Ministry of Turkey, Babaoglu, 2005). The Bosporus Statement was signed in Istanbul at the Istanbul summit of the heads of 11 states on June 25, 1992. It became the legal basis for the BSEC founded on May 1, 199 with the head-quarters in Istanbul.

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

Members	Observers
Azerbaijan	Austria
Armenia	Belarus
Albania	Germany
Bulgaria	Egypt
Greece	Israel
Georgia	Italy
Moldova	Poland
Russia	Slovakia
Rumania	the USA
Serbia and Montenegro (2004)	Tunisia
Turkey	France
Ukraine	Croatia
	Czech Republic

The spatial characteristic of the BSEC transformed it into a multidimensional geoproject with the following components: 1. the concept of "Intermarum" in its new expanded version including the Baltic, Caspian, Black and Mediterranean seas; 2. the idea of unity of Central Eastern Europe, "classical" Europe and the Balkans (South East Europe); 3. the project of expansion of the Euro-Atlantic space along with the strengthening of the positions of New Europe countries (postcommunist states) as well as the simultaneous inclusion in the BSEC of the participants of geoconstructs "Big Middle (Near) East" and the Mediterranean pool[6]. It promoted the emergence of the concept "the Broader Black Sea region".

In the new conditions of the creation of alternative haulways for the delivery of hydrocarbons to the USA and European states, the communication importance of the Black Sea region as well as the defensive strategic importance of the subregion for the Euro-Atlantic community have come into light. At the same time, the geospatial execution of the Black Sea region has a certain peculiarity as it turned out to be "a politically constructed region that was generated more by the risks and its strategic importance than by its identity.[7] Unlike the Balkans and the Baltic Sea region the Black Sea region had not carried out the function of common space with a specific regional identity throughout hundreds of years. This made it vulnerable in defining its identity from the outside or by the dominating operating forces inside or around it. Consequently, the regional definition was used by external forces in connection with other neighboring regional participants" (Grotzky, Isic 2008:5) There is a significant difference between the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions in defining the common historical and cultural heritage when in the first case this fact is underlined by the participants of the Mediterranean informal community, and actually rejected by the members of the Black Sea pool (King, 2004; Lesser, 2007). In the past, the geohistorical image of the Black Sea region did not contain the characteristics of a region. This fact was also emphasized by foreign diplomats pointing it out with the purpose of underlining its formation as a new region.[8] To a certain degree this process found its explanation in the conclusion that "system theorists and political economists usually consider the growth of regions as a function of growth or decline of hegemony or as a response to the pressure of globalisation" (King, 2004). The peculiar fact in this context was the definition of the Black Sea region not only as a bridge in political, cultural and economic relations and between civilisations but also as "a strategic barrier" between competing civilisations (Lesser, 2007: 12). The concept of democratic security declared in the Vienna declaration (October, 1993) based on the statement that the democratic countries will not be at war with each other was one of the important motivators which affected working out the geospatial construct "Wider Black Sea region"; thus, democracy building and its spatial expansion contribute to the strengthening of security (Cornell, Jonsson, Nilsson, Häggström, 2006).

The broad interpretation of the Black Sea space[9] and the historicized concept "Intermarum" applied to the Black and Caspian seas have created the basis for the emergence of a new construct "Wider Black Sea/Caspian Area" [WBSCA]), which underlined the importance of this "intersea" space both as a transport corridor[10], strategic space and "a wide area" due to its multifunctionality (Japaridze, 2007; Minchev). The realisation of the geoconcept "Wider Black Sea Area" to a certain extent was made possible thanks to the actualisation of the Pan-European idea at the beginning of the 1990s that was connected with the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic vector in the socio-political development of the majority of the postcommunist states, aspiring to become members of Europe that was being united, and created preconditions for the formulation of the special concept, namely, the European Neighbourhood. It began to serve as a designation of geospace outside the European Community, first of all, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Southern Caucasus and Black Sea areas as well as Belarus and the Russian Federation. The Policy in this

direction was part of the all-European tactics aimed at the creation of the geospatial construct of the United Europe. It also meant the realisation of a parallel project, the process of stabilisation and association, extended towards the European part of the Euro-Atlantic community members, its candidates from among the postcommunist countries, and Turkey. Thus, the Baltic-Caspain-Black-Mediterranean sea geoconstruct formed on the principles of "Intermarum" turned into a combination of several projects directed at solving the task of consolidating separate sectors of this space. The geoproject (GUAM) was quite natural in this context. Its aim was to unite the Central Asian, South Caucasian, and Black Sea space to carry out the plan of creating alternative transportation and raw materials communications from Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus to Europe. The agreement about the creation of a consultation forum of the interregional interstate organization of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova was reached on October 10th, 1997 in Strasbourg. In the spring of 1999, Uzbekistan joined it but in 2002 it suspended its participation and left it in May, 2005 after the Andijan events with the subsequent denouncement of practically all the main documents on December 29th of the same year. The Yalta Charter, which became the manifesto of GUAM, was signed on June 7th, 2001. The signing of a series of documents in 1999–2001 transformed GUAM into an organization focused not only on solving the transportation and raw materials problem, but also political ones, especially the problems of frozen ethnoterritorial conflicts and security problems. The GUAM member-states summit (excluding President I. Karimov of Uzbekistan) held on April 22nd, 2005 in Kishinev accurately defined the geopolitical character of the project that was confirmed both by the presence as observers of Presidents of Romania T.Băsesku, of Lithuania V.Adamkus and S.Mann, US special envoy at the negotiations on Nagorny-Karabakh and conflicts in Eurasia and by the adopted documents such as the declaration "In the Name of Democracy, Stability and Development" and the joint statement "Creating Democracy from the Baltic to the Black Sea". Such approach to designing the new geopolitical space showed a steady and historically determined character of the natural process of creating a modern version of "Intermarum" – the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas, already in the conditions of the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community with the United Europe being one of its elements. The new geoprojection, the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), created on December 2nd, 2005, included the Baltic states, Central Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the USA as well as the regional organisations such as the European Union and OSCE.

The newest geoconstruct of "Intermarum" turned out to be completed due to the creation of a continuous geopolitical line from the Baltic sea to the Black and Caspian seas. This space was identified as the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea Region at the Tbilisi 2006 conference with the participation of the CDC parliamentarians in 2006. In this context the space was treated as part of "the common European and Euro-Atlantic space" where it was supposed to be integrated in the interest of "strengthening democracy, stability and economic well-being in the whole of Europe".[11] At the same time, it differed from the historical version of the 1920s where Belarus was an important element along with Ukraine. The

character of the relationships inside the CIS was of special importance for the formation of the CDC as the problem crucial for the political and social development of the member countries of the Community was clearly indicated, its essence being that "hardly any other event in the region had such a significant impact on the post-Soviet regimes as electoral revolutions. These regimes treated electoral revolutions as a deadly threat to their power and were considered to be the main enemy that had to be fought against and destroyed by all possible means" (Kechaqmadze: The Fourth Wave of Democracy, 2002).

Community of Democratic Choice

Members	Observers
Georgia	Azerbaijan
Latvia	Bulgaria
Lithuania	Hungary
Macedonia	The European Union
Moldova	OSCE
Romania	Poland
Slovenia	The USA
	Czechia
	Estonia

The conceptualization of geoconstructs allowing to form new regions with the help of uniting traditional European spaces with the account of the retroprojects existing in the 20th century focused on the creation of megaregions that are of significant importance for Europe from the point of view of its strategic interests in several regions. Different plans of "Intermarum" reflected the main vector of development of geospatial constructs among European politicians. The necessity to consolidate the European terrain was reflected in the concept of "Europe of the regions", which could be grounded not so much on the state and territorial base but rather on the regional and district base not including the whole territory of specific states into the realization of the geospatial program. Its basis was defined at the beginning of the 2000s and included several geographical regions such as Central Europe – the Adriatic Sea – the Danube – South Eastern European space. The program of the Central, Adriatic, Danubian and South-Eastern Space (CADSES) served as an instrument to form a new big European region, which included not only whole states but also regions lying within the borders of the national and territorial sovereignty of the neighboring countries, which are parts of the regions identified in the program. Out of 18 CADSES members 7 states are not members of the European Union while a few states are represented in the program by their regions (Italy and Ukraine).

In the forming conditions of growing competition of geospatial constructs of "Big" Near/Middle East, Central Asia, the Mediterranean Region and the Baltic-Black-Caspian sea project as well as the geoconcepts of Turkic mutuality and Farci-speaking unity, the

CADSES plan revealed its special feature. Its essence is that the formation of a new geopolitical terrain was taking place in the conditions of a rigid regional approach without including into it specific states completely but only those regions which were directly related to the constructed space, thus creating the foundation for the formulation of a genuinely regional geoconcept without the formal changing of the state borders or such plans in future.

The formulation of geopolitical subregional geoconcepts of the Eurasian projection in political and expert circles of the Euro-Atlantic community countries as well as a number of post-Soviet states was a reflection of the general tendency revealed in the public discourse after the end of the Cold War. The geospatial construction of new regional communities with the dominating political content was caused by the objective process of the search for political identity and the necessity to guarantee its preservation with the account of the situation in the system of international relations. The latter showed the growing conflict between the democratic and the conditionally called neo-Soviet (anti-democratic) model of social development.

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Notes

1 The archive of the policy of the Russian Empire. F.165. Op.1. D.655. L.2. 2 (ob.) A short note to the project of the engineer V. von Ruckteschell about the construction of the canal for low seated ships connecting the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. 1900.

2 Ibid. L.4. Later this topic was developed by Latvian engineer A. Pabst in 1909 and by Bruno von Gernet in 1914. Foreign financiers and engineers tried to realize the project in different years before the First World War. They tried to organize a special banking pool. However, because of the changed international situation the project remained unfulfilled.

3 The plan "Prometheus" was a component of Poland's foreign policy. The interpretation of the liberation movement of the peoples of the USSR against the communist regime even after its destruction continues to be based on Soviet evaluations, and attempts are being made to create ideologically and politically motivated analogies. See, for instance, Sotskov l.F. Neizvestnyj separatism. Na sluzhbe SD i Abvera: Iz sekretnyh dos'e razvedki. M., 2003. S. 131–141.

4 The Soviet authorities considered the "Intermarum"plan a threat to the expansionist plans of the USSR in the Baltic Sea and the southern Black sea areas. The liquidation of the Polish statehood by the joint action of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 was the final stage on the way to the liquidation of the threat of the coordinated activities of the small countries of the region.

5 A large-scale plan for the creation of the interstate unification of the Baltic states, the countries of Central Eastern Europe, and the Balkans in the form of a confederation was proposed by the well-known political leader general W. Sikorski when he was Prime Minister of Poland (16.12.1922 – 26.4.1923). The geospace of that union where Poland was supposed to play the role of "the kernel" was limited by the Baltic Sea in the north and by the Aegean Sea in the south.

6 Due to Turkey's refusal to agree to the joining of the BSEC by the Republic of Cyprus Greece blocked the application of Montenegro which became independent after the liquidation of the joint state with Serbia. See: Kurt S. Montenegro Denied BSEC Membership Because of Turkish-Greek Rift // Today's Zaman, 6.11.2006.

7 The historiographic tradition of political geography uses several approaches in the defining of a number of areas treated as both regions and subregions. Both definitions are frequently applied towards Montenegro.

8 Ambassador's remarks and Public Events. Democracy and Security in the Black Sea American Ambassador Ross Wilson ARI Movement's 8th Annual Security Conference. Istanbul, June 29, 2006 / [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://turkey.usembassy.gov/amb_062906.html.

9 In accordance with the geographical definition of the Black sea region given by the European Commission this region includes states located in the west (Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Romania), in the north (Russia and Ukraine), in the east (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) and in the south (Turkey).

10 Ambassador's remarks and Public Events.

11 Sodejstvie demokratii: usilenie roli parlamentskoj demokratii. Sovmestnoe kommyunike. Tbilisi, 1 dekabrya 2006 goda. Tbilisi konferentsija, 2006 g. // [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://www.cdc.parliament.ge/files/78_22_421342_Communique_R.doc. The evaluation of the concept of Intermarum during that period varied from an extremely negative one to the moderately critical assessment. See, for example: Nemenskij O. IV Rech Pospolitaja: vzglyad na

Vostok. 19.1.2006. *АПН.РУ*. /./ [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://www.apn.ru/opinions/article9544.htm; Lurije S. Rech Pospolitaya, imperiya-lovushka. Istoricheskaya politika: sluchaj Pol'shi. *Russkij Zhurnal*. 31.08.09 / [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: – http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Rech-Pospolitaya-imperiya-lovushka. this position was discussed and noted by Ukrainian politologists and publicists: Karajchentsev P. Litva i Pol'sha speshat na pomoshch. Popytki reanimatsii Baltijsko-Chernomorskogo sojuza. *Dialog.ua*, 15.06. 2004 / [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://dialogs.org.ua/issue_full.php?m_id=1255. At the same time Belarusian publicists and experts believe that this project could be quite beneficial for Russia. The fact was even acknowledged by a conservative Russian informational and analytical portal (Geopolitika). Geopolitika postmoderna: Sivitsky A. Balto-Chernomorskyj koridor razvitija kak modifikatsija "Vostochnogo partnyorstva. Geopolitika. 24.12.2009. / [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://geopolitica.tv/index.php

Tatiana Zhurzhenko

GEOPOLITICS OF MEMORY: RETHINKING WORLD WAR II AND THE FIGHT FOR HEGEMONY IN THE BALTIC-BLACK SEA REGION[1]

Abstract

The article addresses dilemmas of memory politics in the Baltic-Black Sea region in the context of the EU and NATO enlargements to the East and the changing role of Russia on the European continent. Focusing on the uses of World War II memories in (inter)national and European politics, it seeks to explain how history as a resource has been mobilized and how national identities have been renegotiated in response to the new geopolitical situation. The article shows that alternative interpretations of WWII in the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region are used as political arguments in the fight for hegemony on the European continent and reveal competing claims for a European identity. The first section briefly discusses the role of World War II in contemporary debates on European memory and identity. The second section deals with the conflicts between Russia and the Baltic States in the context of their accession to the EU and NATO, while the third one addresses the role of World War II memories in EU-Russian relations. Finally, the last section considers the role of historical memory in the Russia's relations with Ukraine, a country with a still uncertain geopolitical future.

Keywords: World War II, historical memory, memory politics, communities of suffering, coping with the past, restitution, reconciliation.

For the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region World War II was a formative event marked by various occupation regimes, the loss of state independence and major border changes. It was also the most traumatic event of the XXth century, as the Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine and Belarus, along with western Russia, belong to what Timothy Snyder calls "Bloodlands"[2]. In this "Molotov-Ribbentrop Eu-

rope", the brutalities of the war itself can hardly be separated from the crimes of Hitler's and Stalin's regimes. Apart from huge military losses, around 14 million civilians, according to Snyder, were murdered on these territories over the course of only twelve years: during the consolidation of National Socialism and Stalinism (1933–1938), the joint German-Soviet occupation of Poland (1939–1941) and the German-Soviet war (1941–1945).[3] At the same time, it was this region, which since the end of the 1980's has experienced most radical geopolitical changes. The "Solidarity" movement and the crisis of the communist regime in Poland, the national democratic movements in the Baltic States and in Western Ukraine undermined the Soviet block and led to the dissolution of the USSR. While Poland and the Baltic states entered the EU and NATO in 2004, thus completing their "return to Europe", Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova still face an uncertain geopolitical future.

This paper addresses the role of World War II memories in European politics and in EU-Russian relations in the context of two geopolitical challenges of the new century: the EU enlargement to the East and the recovery of Russia as a powerful international player, first of all in the "near abroad". The strained Russian-Baltic relations, Moscow's confrontation with the Kaczynski government in Poland, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the on-going crisis of Lukashenka's regime account for instability on the European Union's eastern border and reveal the on-going competition between Russia and the EU in the Baltic-Black Sea region. In this context, the competing narratives of World War II, the political debates on collective guilt and historical responsibility, on resistance and collaboration reflect the fight for political hegemony on the European continent. Here, claims for a European identity, alternative definitions of "Europe" and its "other" and diverse visions of European values, principles and political boundaries oppose to and compete with each other.

The contemporary academic literature on politics of memory pays growing attention to the role of apology, restitution and reconciliation in international relations.[4] Some authors reject the conventional wisdom of *realpolitik* and suggest a concept of a new moral international order based on the re-negotiation of historical injustices between victims and perpetrators.[5] Theories of transitional justice assume that the success of democratic reforms depends on reckoning with a painful past including both retribution against wrongdoings and reparation to victims.[6] Principles of transitional justice have been increasingly introduced into international relations, as some states take responsibility for the crimes committed by the antecedent regime against neighbours or populations of former colonies or occupied territories. At the same time, the military victory over an aggressor and the liberation of other nations from occupation or oppressive regimes, as well as a nation's "victim status" serve as important instruments of foreign policy and resources for political legitimization. While the former is actively used by the Russian elites, the latter is popular among politicians from the Baltic States, from Poland, and, in the last decade, from Ukraine. Politics of memory appeals to moral values and principles of transitional justice, but at the same time it is often driven by pragmatic interests. Moreover, historical and moral arguments are sometimes combined with traditional power politics.

It is not the intention of this paper to present a systematic overview of conflicting memory politics in this region. Rather, focusing on the uses of World War II memories in (inter)national and European politics, I will try to demonstrate how history as a resource has been mobilized and how historical identities have been renegotiated in response to the new geopolitical situation. The first part of the paper briefly discusses the role of World War II in contemporary debates on common European memory and identity. The second part deals with the conflicts between Russia and the Baltic States in the context of their accession to the EU and NATO. Part three addresses the role of World War II memories in EU-Russian relations. Finally, the last section considers Russia's relations with Ukraine, a country with a still uncertain geopolitical future.

1. Memories of World War II in post-Cold War Europe

World War II was the major pan-European trauma of the XXth century, a tragic experience shared by virtually all European nations. But it is also true that nothing divides Europe more than the memory of this war, which ended almost seventy years ago. The plurality of memories is easy to explain: in interwar Europe some nations tried to preserve the status quo and avoid aggressions, while others saw the approaching war as a chance to expand their boundaries, get back lost territories or finally gain state independence. Besides, the policies of the occupation regimes, the role of collaboration and resistance, and the scale of destruction and of military and civic losses varied significantly across the countries in Europe. But even more important for shaping the national memories of World War II was the Cold War that followed it. One of the outcomes of Hitler's defeat was a new geopolitical order: a new system of European borders and the division of the European continent into two political blocs. The post-war European order and stability of national borders were ensured not only by the balance of military power and nuclear weapons, but also by commemorative politics and "selective amnesia" (Tony Judt) – both in the West and in the East. While in the East unwanted memories were repressed, or, in the words of Timothy Snyder, "cleansed"[7], in the West it was selective forgetting, "an exclusion and a quarantine of the dead", which served to suppress traumas and "pull all energies into reconstruction".[8] Such "selective amnesia" was helpful in building a liberal order and was instrumental for preventing the re-emergence of old hostilities within and between nations as well as securing the stability of borders. "Memories of the war were themselves instantly caught up in the political constraints and incentives imposed by the Cold War, but also by the projects of constructing socialist societies in the East and European unity in the West".[9] Creating and celebrating myths of resistance in the West and of an antifascist Communist underground in the East, on the one hand, and being silent about expulsions, mass collaboration with the Nazis, Stalinist repressions, on the other, served to maintain the Cold War geopolitical order.[10]

From its very beginning, the European integration project has been closely connected with the idea of "remembering" not just as a moral duty but also as a guarantee for peace.

The origins of the European Union go back to the lessons of World War II – "Never again war!" – and to the success story of the German-French reconciliation. In the post-war decades "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" (reckoning with the past) has established itself as a norm of European politics. The uniqueness of the Holocaust as the ultimate crime has become a common denominator of World War II memories in Western Europe. In the 1970–1980's the Holocaust became Europe's negative founding myth.[11]

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the post-war Soviet Union also based its legitimacy on the outcomes of World War II, namely on the victory over Nazi Germany and on the role of the Soviet Army in the liberation of Europe. Using this symbolic capital, the Soviet Union presented itself as the main guarantor of peace and stability on the European continent and in the world. The military victory over Nazism served to prove the democratic and progressive nature of the Soviet system, and the Yalta treaty, Stalin's greatest geopolitical triumph, became his entrance ticket to the club of Western powers.

Inside the country, the official memory of the "Great Patriotic War" had several functions: 1) re-establishing the legitimacy of the Soviet regime; 2) suppressing memories of Gulag and Stalinist repressions, and 3) consolidating collective identity and shaping the supranational community of the "Soviet people".[12] The myth of the "common victory" played a crucial role in consolidating the Slavic core of the USSR and in integrating the newly acquired western regions of Ukraine and Belarus.[13] In the Baltic republics the history of World War II as "liberation" became an instrument of mass Sovietization and of ideological control over politically unreliable local elites.[14] Finally, in Eastern Europe the official narrative of the liberation from Nazi occupation by the Soviet Army helped to legitimize Moscow's control over the communist satellite states. Communist regimes in Eastern Europe supported by Moscow presented themselves as the true successors of antifascist resistance, at the same time admitting the decisive role of the Soviet Army in the final defeat of the Nazi regime in Europe. The Warsaw Pact thus united the former victims of the Nazi aggression liberated by the Soviet Army and remaining under Moscow's protection.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later brought a "thaw of memories" in Eastern Europe. "Re-conquering the past" has become a form of emancipation from imposed communist ideology and Soviet hegemony. Understandably, the time of World War II and the post-war Stalinist decade were in the centre of these processes. This "recovery of national memory" gave voice to the suppressed individual and collective traumas thus creating new "communities of suffering".[15] The change of the dominant "memory regime" was especially radical in those countries where partisan fights and inner civil conflicts did not end with the defeat of Nazi Germany and were followed by repressions against anti-Soviet resistance and by mass deportations, as in the Baltic States. With the EU enlargement to the East, it has become more than evident that the comfortable post-war consensus on memory among Western European societies has been thrown into question: for some of the new EU members, "Yalta" is not a symbol of the Allies' victory over Nazism, but of the partition of Europe, in which half the continent

was abandoned to four decades of repression. The end of World War II brought just another oppressive regime that some consider as "equally criminal".[16] For these countries, the crimes of GULAG and Stalinist repressions, also qualified as "genocide", should be ranked at least as high as the Holocaust.

As for Russia, open debates about World War II started with the Perestroika and continued in the 1990's, destroying many ideological taboos. But the collapse of the Soviet empire, which lost the Cold war, radically changed Russia's geopolitical status and led to a legitimacy crisis of the new state. The subsequent claims of the former satellites and Soviet republics for a "victim status" left Russia practically alone with the historical responsibility for the crimes of world communism – a burden too heavy for the post-Soviet Russian elites. As Dina Khapaeva recently wrote, Russian liberals and democrats in the late 80's in fact considered the Soviet past a "black hole" and preferred to forget about it, sacrificing "the work of memory" for the sake of modernist and pro-Western illusions.[17] While Boris Yeltsyn denounced communism he actually left untouched and even strengthened the myth of the Great Patriotic War as the only unquestionable achievement and positive symbol of Russia's XXth century history. In this way, he accomplished what Brezhnev had started before.[18] Under Putin the depolitization and "normalization" of the communist past has become official policy. Soviet history has meanwhile been rewritten in order to underline the continuity with the Russian imperial past. Today's official politics of history fits the revived ideology of statism as a traditional source of Russian identity. In the early 2000's, this attitude to the Soviet past was built into the newly designed ideological paradigm of "sovereign democracy", which denies the universality of the Western normative model of democracy and legitimizes Russia's "own way". With Russia's recovery after the "decade of humiliation", Putin's regime has instrumentalized the myth of the "Great Patriotic War" for re-establishing Russia's positions in Europe and for re-gaining control in the "near abroad".

2. The Baltic-Russian "memory wars"

The new national narratives of the Baltic States deny the old Soviet "liberation" myth and instead focus on such aspects of World War II as Soviet occupation and annexation in 1940, Nazi occupation and Soviet re-occupation in 1944, loss of national independence, Soviet repressions against the local population and struggle of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians for the restoration of their respective states.[19] From this perspective the post-war Soviet regime in the Baltic States appears as a continuation of the previous occupation ending only with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In the centre of such interpretations of World War II is the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the subsequent division of Europe between Hitler and Stalin. Narratives of a "voluntary association" of the Baltic republics with the USSR and their "liberation" from the Nazi occupation, which were in the core of official Soviet propaganda, contradicted the collective memory of the majority of the population. In the late 1980's demands to reveal the truth about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had a

tremendous mobilizing effect in the Baltic States. On August 23, 1989, a human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius formed by about two million people became a powerful manifestation of the will to national independence. Denouncing the Soviet totalitarian regime and Stalin's foreign policy was an important legitimization strategy of the national elites in the Baltic states and an instrument of regaining state independence. At the same time, according to Dovile Dudryte, since the end of the 1980's national "communities of suffering" have emerged in the Baltic States. [20] "Genocide" became a common term for Soviet repressions and mass deportations,[21] and Soviet symbols were officially banned. Anti-Soviet resistance movements and military formations that fought against the Soviets on Hitler's side have been rehabilitated and their leaders honoured as national heroes. The thesis of the "equal criminality" of Communism and Nazism is promoted today by politicians on the international level. The Museums of Occupation in Riga and Tallinn, and the Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius present the Baltic States as collective victims of the Soviet occupation from 1940 to 1991 (interrupted only by the three years of the Nazi regime).

For the last two decades, the relations of Russia with the Baltic countries have experienced ups and downs, but issues of historical memory and irreconcilable interpretations of World War II remain the main source of conflicts. All three states have been seeking for political acknowledgment of the fact of forceful annexation, which Russia refuses to recognize. Besides, Lithuania and Latvia have been raising the issue of material compensation for Soviet occupation. In 2000, the Lithuanian parliament passed a law on seeking reparations for damages suffered during the occupation. A Lithuanian government-appointed commission estimated the damage at 23 billion Euros. A similar commission was established in 2005 in Latvia.

In 1989, at the peak of destalinization in the Soviet Union, the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow passed a declaration denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; the contents of the secret protocols was made public. However, Moscow has never officially recognized the fact of forceful annexation and occupation. The position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been that this "closed page" of history should not burden interstate relations. According to the Russian MFA, the Baltic States joined the Soviet Union in 1940 voluntarily; it also underlines that the Baltic coast was part of the Russian Empire prior to 1917. Consequently, Russia refuses to discuss the issues of material compensation for Soviet occupation and restitution for the victims of forced deportations. In response to the claims of Latvia and Estonia, Russia as the legal successor to the Soviet Union claimed compensation for assets that were left on the territories of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.[22] Just recently, in October 2011, the chairman of the Presidential Committee for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, Mikhail Mitiukov, ruled out the possibility of offering financial compensation to the Baltic States for the Soviet occupation. He stressed that Russia fell victim to political repression just as other USSR republics and therefore cannot be held responsible for political repression inflicted by leaders of the former Soviet Union. Moscow's only obligation is to declassify all information about this crime.[23]

The accession of the Baltic States to the EU in 2004, which provided them with strong guarantees of state independence and security, raised hopes for an improvement of Baltic-Russian relations. Instead, they remained overloaded with disagreements and conflicts on a number of issues (the project of the Russian-German North Stream pipeline, Russia's withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Russian-Georgian war).[24] In May 2005, the Estonian and Lithuanian presidents refused to attend the official celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory in World War II in Moscow. The Latvian president accepted the invitation, but "skilfully used the occasion to draw international attention to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and Russia's refusal to denounce its Soviet past".[25] In spring 2007, protests of the local Russians against the decision of the Estonian authorities to relocate the "Bronze Soldier" (the Soviet "Monument to the Liberator of Tallinn") turned into violent riots. Tensions around these events escalated into a major crisis in Estonian-Russian relations.

In the Baltic States "memory wars" with Russia have also an internal dimension because of their considerable Russian speaking minorities (first of all in Latvia and Estonia). They often disagree with the official narrative about the "Soviet occupation" and are treated by the local nationalists as a "fifth column" of Moscow. The legitimacy of their political rights in the Baltic countries depends on the historical interpretation of the World War II events. The Soviet occupation narrative and the principle of legal continuity are reflected in the issue of citizenship. In Latvia and Estonia the initial citizenship laws limited the rights of those who had moved to these republics after the war. In this way, Russians and Russian speakers of other nationalities have been excluded from the national "communities of suffering" or even associated with the oppressors. Russians as a group indeed have different memories of the World War II. Many of them, particularly in the older generation, identify with the Soviet regime and see the Soviet Army as a "liberator from German fascism". For them, the anti-Soviet resistance fighters are not national heroes but collaborators with the Nazis. The Russian-speaking youth, on their part, uses Soviet symbols to express social protest. At the same time, as the events around the Bronze Soldier demonstrated, local Russians' distinct memory of the war serves as a consolidating factor of the new minority and as a link with the "ethnic homeland" that Moscow consciously cultivates.[26]

In the wake of the EU accession the Baltic States came under growing international pressure in the issues of coping with their problematic past, citizenship and social integration of the Russian minorities. This moral and political pressure was coming not only from EU institutions, but also from European media and public opinion, particularly concerning the responsibility for the Holocaust and the lack of critical reflection in the issue of collaboration with the Nazis. Revealing in this respect was the conflict around the Lihula monument to the Estonian freedom fighters. It was erected in 2004 in the small Western Estonian town Lihula on the initiative of Estonian nationalists and Wehrmacht veterans. A stone plaque dedicated to 'Estonian men who fought in 1940–1945 against Bolshevism and for the restoration of Estonian independence' depicted soldiers

in German uniform with Waffen-SS symbols. The monument was strongly criticised by the European Union, by the Russian government and Jewish organizations.[27] Under international pressure the Estonian government had to remove it against the will of the local community.

In Europe, the debates of the late 1990's led to the universalization and institutionalization of the Holocaust memory. Following a debate on the collaboration of Swedish business circles with the Nazis, the Swedish governmental initiated a "Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research" in 1997. The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000 helped to promote the international consensus on the universal status of the Holocaust as the ultimate crime against humanity. This consensus has become the moral fundament of European integration. In regard to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, critical engagement in the issue of collaboration with the Nazis and complicity in the mass murder of the Jewish population became implicit criteria for EU accession.[28] Facing this challenge, in 1998 all three Baltic States established an international historical commissions for investigating Nazi and Soviet crimes. Their political mission was to reconcile the national memories of the Stalinist crimes with the European memory of the Holocaust and thus "to pave the way out of possible international isolation".[29]

At the same time, the Baltic States have been using EU institutions and their status as EU members to strengthen their position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, representatives of the Baltic States have been trying to change the dominant "memory regime" in Europe by bringing Stalinism and communist crimes to the focus of European politics. As it will be shown below, they have been actively lobbying in the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and in other organizations for political condemnation of Stalinism (communism) as equally criminal as Nazism. Russia, on its part, has been instrumentalizing the memory of the Holocaust in order to present Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians as willing collaborators of the Nazis and to compromise the Baltic States in the eyes of the USA and Western Europe.

In conclusion, memories of World War II have been used in the Russian-Baltic relations as an instrument of political pressure. In these "memory wars", both sides have been referring to "Europe" as a moral authority and a bearer of universal human values. But "Europe" does not mean the same thing for the Russian and the Baltic political elites. Russia's "Europe" is a Europe liberated from the Nazis by the Allies, a Europe whose heroes, victims and perpetrators were once and forever defined by the Nuremberg trial. The "Europe" of the Baltic States is a Europe re-united after 1989 and still waiting for its trial over communism. As Viatcheslav Morozov noted, the "current political situation in the Baltic Sea region is to a great extent based upon a constant struggle to define 'Europe' (...). The Baltic story is about the Baltic Europe being abducted by an outside, non-European force, embodied in the Russian empire, the Soviet Union and – potentially at least in the Russian Federation. In Russia, the same story is often interpreted in positive terms, with Russia acting as mighty Zeus saving Europe from an outside threat".[30]

3. The memory of the Second World War in EU-Russian relations

In the middle of 2000's the accession of the East and Central European countries to the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and Russia's economic recovery and self-assertive politics under president Putin, on the other, led to a chilling of Russia's relations with the West. The main object of this first geopolitical confrontation in Europe since the end of the Cold War became the Baltic-Black Sea region. The "Colour Revolutions", particularly in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), were actively supported by the US government and welcomed by the EU as an instrument of democratization of the post-Soviet countries and their emancipation from Russian influence. Needless to say, that Moscow saw these activities as a direct threat to its geopolitical interests in the "near abroad". Particularly the Orange Revolution in Ukraine became "Russia's September 11" (Krastev), a huge shock for the Russian political elites, which since have been determined to make no further concessions to the West. The governments of the new EU members, the Baltic States and Poland in particular, solidarized with the pro-Western political forces in the post-Soviet countries and supported the Colour Revolutions. The Russian-Polish relations, burdened with the unsolved Katyn issue, further deteriorated with the political victory of the uncompromised right wing brothers Kaczynski. To Moscow's irritation, Lech Kaczynski and Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus came to Kyiv with a mediating mission during the Orange Revolution; and both of them came to Tbilisi to demonstrate solidarity with Michail Saakashvili after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. However, these efforts did not lead to an anti-Russian coalition of the Baltic-Black Sea region, first of all due to the failure of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the "reset" in US-Russian relations.

The instrumentalization of historical memory, in particular of World War II, has become an important dimension of the new geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. On May 9, 2005, the official celebration of the 60th anniversary of World War II victory took place in Moscow. By inviting the leaders of European countries and of the US president Putin used this event as an opportunity to reassert Russia's geopolitical status after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Baltic States, in Poland and Ukraine Putin's invitation provoked hot political debates about the appropriate way of celebrating this date. As a gesture of considerable symbolic weight, US president George W. Bush on his way to Moscow made a stop in Riga to repudiate the Yalta treaty as „one of the greatest wrongs of history" which traded the freedom of small nations for the goal of stability in Europe. The 60th anniversary of the end of WWII thus started a new round in a symbolic struggle for the right to re-interpret the geopolitical consequences and the historical lessons of World War II. The EU enlargement to the east strengthened the position of Moscow's opponents, who now became EU members, and also elevated the discussions about history to a new pan-European level.

On May 12, 2005, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on the end of the Second World War, noting that "for some nations the end of World War II meant renewed

tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union" and reminding of "the magnitude of the suffering, injustice and long-term social, political and economic degradation endured by the captive nations located on the eastern side of what was to become the Iron Curtain".[31] In June 2005 the right-centre European People's Party (EPP), the largest political group in the European Parliament, adopted a special resolution condemning the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. This happened on request of Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian member of the European Parliament. The resolution stated that as a result of Soviet occupation Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania lost their statehood and were unlawfully incorporated into the Soviet Union. It also mentioned Russia's violations of post-World War I peace treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The EPP invited Russia, as successor to the Soviet Union, to admit the historic truth as the best path toward a reconciliation and normalization of relations with the Baltic States.[32] In June 2005 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a similar resolution, including amendments suggested by the Baltic representatives, which demanded from Russia to pay compensations for the citizens of the Baltic republics who suffered deportation during the Soviet occupation. In January 2006, in another resolution PACE stressed that "the fall of totalitarian communist regimes in central and eastern Europe has not been followed in all cases by an international investigation of the crimes committed by them. Moreover, the authors of these crimes have not been brought to trial by the international community, as was the case with the horrible crimes committed by National Socialism (Nazism)".[33]

The growing international attention to the controversial memories of World War II and communism in the middle of the 2000's has certainly to do with EU enlargement: East European "subalterns" (Mälksoo) actively used European institutions to promote and institutionalize their counter-hegemonic narrative. Thus, "The Union for a Europe of the Nations", a conservative political group in the EP with quite some Baltic and Polish representatives, has sponsored the production of the documentary "The Soviet Story" (2008). The film tells about the crimes of Soviet Communism and Soviet-German collaboration before 1941 and underlines the close ideological, political and organizational connections between the Nazi and the Soviet systems. On June 3, 2008, the Conference on Conscience of Europe and Communism, held in Prague in the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in the wake of Czech EU presidency, adopted the "Prague Declaration" denouncing communist atrocities and demanding national parliaments of Europe to recognize communist crimes against humanity as equal to the Nazi ones. In continuation of this initiative "The Platform of European Memory and Conscience", a consortium of state and non-governmental educational and research organizations dealing with the totalitarian past was established in October 2011. The Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are its founding members.

In 2009, the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the communist regimes in East Central Europe provided European politicians with another opportunity for commemorative initiatives. On March 18, 2009, hearings on "European Conscience and Crimes of Totalitarian

Communism: 20 Years after" took place in the European Parliament. In the beginning of April, after heated debates, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism.[34] The resolution was inevitably a political compromise, denouncing all totalitarian ideologies and all forms of dictatorship and confirming the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, it was clearly meant to balance Western European historical memory with the collective memories of the Central and Eastern European countries, which had experienced both Communism and Nazism. The resolution suggested August 23 (the date of signature of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) as a Europe wide day of remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. The thesis of "equal criminality" was also confirmed by the OSCE resolution "Divided Europe reunited" adopted in Vilnius in July 2009. However, one of the recent initiatives aimed at the institutionalization of this approach on the European level has failed. In December 2010 the European commission rejected an appeal coming from some Eastern European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic) to introduce a so-called "double genocide law" that would criminalize the denial of crimes perpetrated by the communist regimes in the same way many EU countries ban the denial of the Holocaust.[35]

These political initiatives on the level of European institutions coming from the Baltic States and other post-communist countries have several purposes. The first one is to challenge the Western European consensus on recent European history, to acknowledge the historical experience of the post-communist countries as a legitimate and equal part of European identity, and to require equal recognition for other "communities of suffering". As Maria Mälksoo puts it, Poland and the Baltic States attempt "to enlarge the mnemonic vision of 'the united Europe' by placing their 'subaltern pasts' in contest with the conventionally Western European-bent understanding of the consequences of World War II in Europe".[36]

By doing so, "Eastern European subalterns" seek not only symbolic recognition, but also political profit. The second aim of this policy is strengthening the historical legitimacy of the new states, counteracting the accusations of Nazi collaboration and reinforcing the European identity of the Baltic nations. Finally, the third aim is to get leverage over Russia and contain its geopolitical ambitions. One of the implications of the idea of an "equal criminality" of Nazism and Communism is that Russia as a successor state of the USSR should acknowledge its historical responsibility for the communist crimes in East Central Europe in the same way post-War Germany did for the Nazi crimes. In the European mainstream discourse the lack of democracy and of respect for human rights in contemporary Russia is related to the lack of political will to cope with the communist past. A more radical political discourse relates Putin's authoritarianism with what many observers see as the official rehabilitation of Stalinism, or even "re-Stalinization of Russia". Presenting contemporary Russia as a neo-Stalinist state is a strategy of "othering Russia" as a non-European actor. In any case, anti-communist commemorative initiatives have not only a moral, but also a geopolitical dimension: a Russia which still clings uncritically to the Soviet (military) glory, is dangerous for European security as it continues to act as an imperial power.

The powerful myth of the "Great Patriotic War" remains the core of Russia's memory politics, and the narrative of the liberation of Europe from Nazism is still used for legitimizing its geopolitical status on the European continent. Therefore, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the occupation of the Baltic countries and of Eastern Poland and the Katyn massacre belong to the most controversial aspects of World War II history. Russian political leadership is not interested in "joining" Europe, but in being treated by the EU as an equal and respected partner. "Sovereign democracy" is also understood as "sovereignty over the past" – the right of a great country to judge about its own history and not be taught by the West. Little wonder that the European debates about the "equal criminality of Nazism and Communism" as well as the Baltic and Polish commemorative initiatives have been seen in Moscow as a hostile policy. The Russian Duma denounced the 2009 OSCE resolution and accused the West of imposing a false feeling of historical guilt on Russia. Some Russian politicians such as the historian and Member of Parliament Natalia Narochitskaya and the Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey Shoigu suggested to introduce criminal responsibility for denying the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany. While visiting Ukraine in summer 2009, Patriarch Cyrill also spoke against equating Nazism and Stalinism pointing to the fact that Western allies joined Stalin against Hitler and not vice versa. The same year president Medvedev created a special commission for fighting "falsifications" of history. This decision was criticized by some historians and the liberal public as an attempt to limit academic freedom and put historical research under state control. In May 2009, in the wake of the Victory Day, the pro-presidential party "United Russia" drafted a law that is supposed to protect the Soviet version of the World War II from revisionist interpretations. The authors referred to the Nuremberg Tribunal as an absolute truth ignoring its historical and political context.[37] The aim of fighting revisionist interpretations of Soviet history is also proclaimed by the Historical Memory Foundation[38] recently founded by Alexander Dyukov and evidently enjoying the full support of the Kremlin.[39] Books published by the foundation address collaboration of local nationalists with the Nazis and the Holocaust in the Baltic States and Western Ukraine and defend the Soviet version of the World War II.

Counteracting the revisionism of World War II history was the main aim of Prime Minister Putin's official visit to Gdansk, where on September 1, 2009, the European leaders met to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland and the beginning of World War II. In a long and well–argued article published by *Gazeta Wyborcza* Putin admitted that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was morally unacceptable but hardly avoidable in that situation and tried to relativize it by pointing to the Munich agreement one year before. He shifted the focus from the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition which he called "the turning point of the XXth century, one of the most significant events of the last century".[40] According to Putin, the experience of the inter-war period proved that it is not possible to create an effective system of collective security while excluding Russia.

4. Politics of memory in the Russian-Ukrainian relations

While in the Baltic States anti-communist forces were able to establish their political hegemony during the transition and to impose their interpretation of the Soviet past, in Ukraine an informal alliance between national-democrats and the "centrists" (the former Communist nomenklatura) favoured an unstable ideological compromise. At the same time, the irreconcilable ideological differences between the two main protagonists on the battleground of historical memory – the nationalists and the unreformed Communists – made a "pact of forgetting" according to the Spanish model impossible.[41] Therefore, state memory politics under Leonid Kuchma was pragmatic rather than ideological as he tried to avoid controversial issues and downplay incompatible narratives of the past. Making concessions to both the nationalists and the Communists, Kuchma supported the institutionalization of the Holodomor (Famine) memory, but opposed the rehabilitation of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Transitional justice in post-Soviet Ukraine has been very limited, the most significant measure being the Law on rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions in Ukraine, adopted as early as 1991. As in Russia, the KGB archives in Ukraine were never detracted from the control of the secret services and lustration has never been seriously discussed. Official memory politics (such as the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty in 2004) favoured the narrative of a "common history" shared by Russia and Ukraine. Many elements of Soviet commemorative culture (and first of all, the "Great Patriotic War") were incorporated in the new memory regime.

In post-Soviet Ukraine, memory of World War II has been particularly controversial and heavily politicized. As Ukrainian historian Vladyslav Hrynevych noted, Ukraine's role in the war was ambivalent: "it was a victim of both Stalinist and Hitlerite occupation; a land of resistance to two totalitarian regimes; both a collaborationist and a victor that cofounded the UN; as well as a country which lost a second battle for independence and national statehood".[42] Contradictions are built into the very "founding myth" of Ukraine as it emerged in its current borders after World War II thus profiting from the geopolitical triumph of Stalin. It was the Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland in 1939 that made the "reunification of Ukrainian lands" possible. Denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, national democrats and nationalists never questioned the legitimacy of the "re-unification".[43] Alternative narratives of World War II contribute to the notorious polarization between the East and the West of the country. While Western Ukraine shares a commemorative culture with the Baltic States based on the hero cult of anti-Soviet nationalist freedom fighters, in other regions of Ukraine their popularity is low. Soviet rituals and symbols in commemoration of the war still persist in most parts of the country. The narrative of the "Great Patriotic war" perpetuates the view that Ukrainians and Russians belong to one East Slavic or Orthodox "civilization" and thus has been supported by Moscow.

The Orange Revolution marked a watershed in Ukraine's newest history, as the victory of the national democratic candidate re-shaped the traditional configuration of political

forces. Ukraine seemed to emancipate from Russia's dominance and presented itself as the next candidate for the EU and NATO membership. The memory politics of president Yushchenko, apart from its domestic political aims, was supposed to legitimize Ukraine's pro-Western geopolitical choice. Supported by the pro-Western part of the Ukrainian elites, he tried to introduce a "memory regime" similar to those already established in the Baltic States. Yushchenko saw Ukraine as a postcolonial nation, struggling to emancipate from Russia's political and cultural influences. He sought to rehabilitate Ukrainian nationalism, for a long time seen through the hostile Russian and Soviet lens. Establishing a Museum of Soviet Occupation, the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor and its legal qualification as a "genocide of the Ukrainian people", and the post-mortem awarding of the UPA leaders Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera with the official "Hero of Ukraine" title were his most resonant and controversial initiatives in this field. Yushchenko tried to institutionalize state memory politics by creating the Institute of National Remembrance and assigning the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) additional functions such as controlling archives, conducting historical research, and popularizing the new official approach to the Soviet past. However, active transitional justice politics and engagement with the communist legacy was hardly possible due to weak democratic institutions, the absence of a rule of law and the political manipulations of historical memory by all parties. Public discontent with the "nationalization of memory", especially in Eastern Ukraine, was instrumentalized by the Party of Regions, which turned into a fierce opponent of Yushchenko's memory politics and thus assumed the role the Communists had played in the ideological battles of the 1990's. Debates on historical memory in Ukraine polarized the public opinion and deepened divisions in Ukrainian society. As it turned out, it was rather difficult to consolidate the nation as a "community of suffering", partly because, unlike in the Baltic States, ethnic boundaries between Ukrainians and Russians are blurred. Moreover, Ukraine is a multi-ethnic society, and its various groups (Jews, Poles, Crimean Tatars, and others) have their own narratives of suffering, which challenge the monopoly of the ethnic Ukrainians as a collective victim.

Re-inventing Ukraine as a collective victim of the communist regime also had implications for its foreign policy. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned with the task of gaining international recognition of the Holodomor as genocide. More than twenty countries, among them the Baltic States, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the countries of East Central Europe officially recognized the Holodomor as genocide. However, this issue has become one of the main stumbling blocks in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Officially Kyiv asserted that it considers Stalin and the former Communist regime responsible for the "genocide" and refuses to accuse any particular nation. However, other Ukrainian politicians, intellectuals, and journalists often referred to the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR in this context. They argued that the Russian government should take responsibility for the crimes of the Communist regime and officially apologize for the misdeeds of its predecessors. Speculations about a material compensation have also emerged. No wonder that Moscow, which had already faced genocide accusations and

requests for retribution from the Baltic States, saw the new Ukrainian memory politics as a threat. The Russian leadership considers the famine a "common tragedy" and rejects its definition as a genocide of a certain national group. This position is shared by most Russian historians and intellectuals (e.g. late Alexander Solzhenitsyn). When Ukraine in 2007 launched a large-scale campaign to achieve worldwide recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, the "memory wars" between Kyiv and Moscow continued in the UN, the OSCE, and other international organizations. In April 2008, when Ukraine's membership was discussed at the Bucharest NATO Summit, the Russian parliament adopted a resolution strongly rejecting the Ukrainian interpretation of the Famine.[44] In November 2008, President Medvedev in an open letter rejected the official invitation of his Ukrainian colleague to the commemorative events devoted to the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor. Medvedev justified his decision with his principal disagreement with the genocide thesis.

Apart from the Holodomor Yushchenko's politics of rehabilitation of the UPA became another point of conflict in Ukrainian-Russian relations. As in the case of the Baltic States, Moscow instrumentalized the issue of collaboration and the Holocaust in Ukraine to compromise Kyiv's politics in the eyes of the West. Expressing criticism about Yushchenko's decision to award Bandera with the "Hero of Ukraine" title, Putin said that the Orange Revolution "spitted in the face of the Western sponsors".[45] Yushchenko's step was also criticized by Jewish organizations and by Poland, where the UPA is held responsible for the massacre of the Poles in Volyn' in 1943.

Conclusion

The "ceasefire" in the memory wars on the European continent during the last two years can be explained by the stabilisation of the new geopolitical order resulting from the "reset" in the US-Russian relations and the internal crisis of the European Union. As the EU is preoccupied with internal consolidation, constitutional reform and economic crisis, and Obama's government has shifted its geopolitical priorities from Eastern Europe, Ukraine's EU and NATO memberships seem to be out of agenda at the moment. Russia's pressure, the political failure of the Orange leadership and the internal split of the Ukrainian elites on central issues of identity and collective memory thwarted the Ukrainian government's efforts to gain international recognition for the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian nation. In April 2010, after president Yanukovych had articulated a new official Ukrainian position on the Holodomor, which was close to the Russian one, PACE declined the amendments on the Holodomor as a genocide. The UPA issue spoiled Ukraine's relations with Poland, its most enthusiastic advocate in the EU. Disappointed with political developments in Ukraine Europe solidarized with the Polish (and Russian) criticism of Yushchenko's politics of glorifying the UPA. In February 2010 the European Parliament adopted a resolution denouncing his decree on Stepan Bandera.

The warming of Russian-Polish relations, which had started even before the tragic death of president Kaczynski in an air crash near Smolensk, was to a significant extent

due to the long-awaited progress in the Katyn case. In spring 2010 *Rosarchiv* declassified and published documents on the Katyn massacre, while President Medvedev voiced the official recognition of the Soviet leadership's responsibility for this crime. In April 2011 the Council for Development of Civil Society and Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation made a proposal to establish a nationwide program "On perpetuating the memory of victims of the totalitarian regime and on national reconciliation". In addition to internal purposes, namely the "modernization of the consciousness of Russian society", the program is clearly aimed at strengthening the international position and prestige of Russia in Eastern Europe by supporting "the awareness of the shared tragic past".[46] It is emphasized that the Program "must be initiated by Russia as the country that suffered most from totalitarianism".[47] Declaring Russia the main victim of the communist regime could become a new, more successful strategy for Moscow in the Baltic-Black Sea region. It has been already used to deny claims for the moral and material compensation for the Soviet occupation and the "genocide". The memory of the "Great Patriotic War" and of Russia's role in the victory over Nazi Germany will, of course, keep its legitimizing function in the future. But the "victim narrative" can provide Russia with an additional instrument for counteracting political strategies of its western neighbours meant to stigmatize it as a neo-totalitarian state and limit its geopolitical influence.

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Oleg Bresky

INTERMARUM. PROLEGOMENA TO SPATIAL POLICY IN THE REGION

Abstract

The article examines the issues of regionalization of space between the Baltic and Black seas and their interrelation with the general European processes in a broad historical and theoretical context. The range of problems is defined, which actualizes the regional practices and contribute to the transformation of the space and social knowledge in the region. Particularly, the transit from the state-centric paradigm, in which the territory and region were external political factors and resource to a regional paradigm, characterized by the processes of "space construction" in which the regions acquire the properties of actors, is analyzed. The unsuccessful attempts of regionalization in the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarum in the past, in which the nation-state has played the leading role don't cause the mandatory failures in emerging of regional structures in Intermarum at the present time, taking in account common regional challenges for the societies in the economic, demographic, security, and cultural spheres. The article raises a number of questions about the state of regional space and the most important points of its development, indicating the possibilities of spatial policy in the region: the standardization of citizenship policy, cross-border interactions, practices in the sphere of human rights and constitutionalism.

Keywords: Intermarum, region, decentralization, federalism, Eastern Partnership, integration, Baltic sea, development, territory, construction, space.

Problem Statement

When we began thinking about organizing the conference "New Region of Europe: Paradigms of Regional Development in Baltic-Black Sea Intermarum"[1], we were mainly interested in those social and political processes in which the European Humanities University is a part and which cannot be described precisely and completely if one is to remain within the borders of the national state or within the disciplinary borders of a certain science. For example, we can be connected with Belarus but when we start to understand it we address a wider space such as an educational and scientific space, social, legal and economic processes. It is even more true for specialized branches containing a number of research and practical problems connected with the necessity of the reception of knowledge about social processes not directly under the control of the national state power and in no way caused by "national" interests. Questions of science and education, migration and ecology, safety and human rights, an economic or regional development expand the national space, fragment it, split it up and present it in an absolutely new quality. This is how the horizons of social and humanitarian knowledge change and obviously the language and the approach to the studying of such processes should change.

It should be noted that changes both in the social space and in the comprehension of its separate aspects do not occur simultaneously. The science often only fixes the occurred changes and is not able to project and direct transformations.

This could be explained by the fact that the development of social and humanitarian science and policy in the XIX and XX centuries was subordinated to the logics of modernization processes. The Modern began with geographical discoveries and the geography revision, and on the whole with the revision of the space concept. The disintegrated multiplane space of the Middle Ages was replaced with the unified space of the State defined by the concepts of sovereignty, jurisdiction and borders created by the lawyers and intellectuals in the XV-XVI centuries. The nationalist patriotism of the XIX-XX centuries could be presented as a process of a geographical map sacralization. At that time the attention of social thought was concentrated on separate institutes and phenomena connected with the national state. A state and a nation became the key actors of social and international processes. At the same time social science generates such concepts as "society", "state", "economy", "people" which still in many respects define the course of humanitarian and social thought. Similar designs offer a practical and scientific simplification, namely, the segmentation and transformation of social structures and the reduction of the research object to universal and general structures. The situation when the attention is drawn to "people", "state" or "economy" and on the other hand, to "mentality" or "physiology" of the individual could be considered universal. The average level has not received any attention for a long time as it is the level of a daily life, family, customs, social norms, and self-management. The change in the research context was needed in order for the interest in the problems of the interaction between the regional and the national and in the problems of "the average level" to appear. The average level forces to change the concept of the whole which until now has been the national state and "society".

The transformation of knowledge and ideas about the social space itself began in a Free World and in a slightly reduced form in the socialist countries in the second half of the XX century. For example, the 70-80s of the XX century were the time of a turning point in sociology. Giddens's (Giddens, 1990) and Kastels's (Kastels, 2000) theories based on the recognition of social diversity and the non-substantiality of the social were developed during the same time period. The idea of "society" is replaced with the concept of the organization of social life in time and space. This is how the question about the converting abilities of human activity including its most routine forms is raised. The question also deals with the idea that all kinds of compulsion and restriction existing in society are at the same time opportunities and a means of activity authorization. A. Giddens also deliberates what is actually more important from the point of view of the social processes course and ponders over local and regional structures which are not simple elements of the national. "The concept of a place of action (locality) means the use of space for the purpose of maintaining the environment of the interaction course required to define its contexualiaty." (Giddens 2007:185) Henri Lefebvre's "The Production of Space" (Lefebvre, 1974) belongs to the same time period. It very precisely defines the direction of the transformation of ideas about space emerging through the activity of independent private and legal bodies not being simple agents of the state but elements of a more complex system.

Saskia Sassen notes that in the 80s of the XX century the position of the national state due to the privatization, the termination of regulation, the opening of national economies for foreign firms and a more and more active participation of national subjects in the world market sharply changes. (Sassen 1996). At that time alarmists started talking about the decline and death of the state. But, all the same, we are facing a change of scale of strategic territories which form a new spatial system. In these conditions there appear preconditions for the emergence of other spatial units, scales or formations. Thus, the problem of the social space integration is seen differently as it is united not only by means of the state but also in other ways and with the participation of other actors. Such a transition represents scale changes in the political and social organization of the modern world. The societies which do not use the regional development, obviously, cannot form effective structures of social space. Today this tendency finds its reflection in the emergence of markers of new state formations such as "failed states", "defective states" and "quasi-states".

The introduction of federalism into the political practices of Europe on both the national and on the subnational levels along with wide processes of devolution and decentralization at the national level took place in the second half of the XX century. The Council of Europe, the United Nations, the World Bank, and various international establishments emphasize the existing need to delegate and transfer the power to local communities which can operate both as private corporations or individuals. These processes are also made extremely important by the abilities of the regions to make wealth and provide an economic growth, along with their need to be a financially viable and self-confident power as well as their ability to develop good administration. The change in the regions' positions leads to the creation of a new set of ideas about the desirable relations between

the state governments and local authorities, including the idea about the local autonomy, the idea about the differentiation of powers between national and local levels as well as the degree of flexibility which should exist for one level of power to adapt to another. It is a paradox but it is exactly the emergence of subnational regions that to an extreme extent facilitates integration processes in the modern world.

Many of the legal changes accompanying a new global vision of regional and local legal bodies only start to be visible. The activity of the United Nations special agency aimed at the acceptance of the World Charter about the local government has already introduced the obligatory international legal document. Regional treatises and international agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) began to affect the regions and norms created by local authorities stimulating them to turn into global subjects of development while the consent of the states and local authorities to the orientation to international standards is slow and incomplete. Nevertheless, one could probably predict the results of this transition as well as to analyse the substantiation of its standard bases.

These tendencies could be identified with the help of the term "new regionalization". Since the 80s of the XX century there has been a splash in the creation of regional projects essentially different from how the space was organised earlier, in the 50s and the 60s. This qualitatively different phenomenon was observed by scientists in the sphere of international affairs and world economy. It also coincided with the end of the Cold War and with the period of the increase in the global economic integrity, i.e. exactly with the birth of a new configuration in Eastern and Central Europe. A new division into districts led to the emergence of regional organisations which were more open in the sphere of trade and politics than those formed during the previous era.

The degree of a regional political activity and business activity grew with the setting up of such regional organisations as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the middle of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. These regional processes increased an academic interest in the sphere of regionalism which led to the conclusion about the appearing of its new forms which were different from the type spread immediately after the Second World War. The experts identified several contours of a new regionalization that was seen within the context of a political and economic world structure. A new regionalization was characterised by several dual features:

A) **unity – variety**

Firstly, this new form of regionalization appeared after the end of the Cold War; the bipolar world context disappeared and the world became more and more diversified. This change of balance of forces probably provided the existence of a stimulus for the increase in the number of regional organizations and their membership. Besides, the regional organizations formed during the earlier context of the Cold War were developed at the crossing

of interests of dominating superpowers, mainly, by means of political means and force. In a new context regionalist projects were being more and more formed "from below" by interests of actors such as the internal civil society acquiring the character of a global actor.

B) **state protectionism – freedom of trade**

The old form of regionalism strove for protectionist economic blocks where the trade between member states was encouraged but where external trading barriers interfered with trade with the countries not belonging to the block. On the contrary, a new regionalism had a more open form where privileges for regions and their actors presented by the states also turned to be accessible to regions outside the national territory[2]. It is also stated within the same context that this open form introduces the region into a global competition and together with other means of support provides them with strategically necessary stimuli to compete in the global market. Thus, it is quite paradoxical but instead of creating obstacles for the global integration these new regionalist projects help to reach this goal.

C) **narrow purposes of regionalization – scale programs of regional development**

A new territorial division also gave rise to regional organisations which have got a comprehensive set of the established basic planned goals and problems. Taking into account that the previous forms of regional projects concerned economy or security policies the policy developed by regional establishments, formed or transformed at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s covered ecology and social policy as well as the policy of encouragement of transparency and responsibility in the governance. When one considers regional projects begun by poor countries, such as SADC in the southern part of the African continent these regional organizations include wide goals connected with the development outside of the trade and currency policy considering the concept of development as a multidimensional process. Regionalist organizations carry out the policy in the field of public health services, education, war against poverty, and provision of gender equality.

D) **isolationism – globalization**

At last, a new territorial division is the process which not only promotes but also cooperates with globalization processes. Unlike the old regionalism more guided by interactions between the states a new regionalization includes a set of state and non-state actors involved in the process of the world structure transformation. Thus, the social globalization processes affect the forming of a new regionalization that, in turn, influences the forming of the globalization process. Globalization forces affect the re-structuring of social, political, and economic components of the regions while the states and societies have adapted to these influences, promoting, changing or completely transforming the effects of globalization through processes of regionalization. Therefore, a new regionalization with its wider openness to world economy and global political forces, is a process with the help of which the states promote their own presentation in the existing world structure. While the regional arrangement formed during the period of the old regionalization turned out to be nonviable new regional establishments are becoming the main aspect of the modern and future world structure.

E) **nationalism – federalism and constitutionalism**

The old regionalization was closely connected with the national projects of the social space unification and homogenization of its political and economic components. A new regionalization gives much more importance to the guarantees of the status of actors and instruments of its participation in public and economic processes. This program is described in the language of federalism and constitutionalism which provide necessary means for the fixing of this difficult reality. Thus, the new regionalism is connected with the activity of universal functional and imperious structures. These structures contain meanings for a separate human being, a family and local communities. This perspective allows us to find the reasons for the reception of knowledge about the limits of power and additional properties of public space. It seems that this area contains answers to important questions of norm making as well as the problems of practical ethics and observance of specific freedoms, realization of new political ideas and the solution of the problem of the public relations subject.

Between the Black and Baltic Seas

The space between the Baltic and Black seas is very disintegrated, with strong nationalism that experienced the most powerful industrialization and extremely painful political, cultural, ethical and economic transformations in the XX century. These changes are fixed in different branches of knowledge and are connected with the impossibility to ignore the challenges consisting in the strengthening of diversity and complication of social space. However, one can both use this variety or ignore its opportunities; the variety can have both positive and very negative influence on the development processes. The use of this variety does not occur automatically as it requires the subject to make very important decisions.

History, law, sociology and political science give us profiles of the studied region. However, these profiles can hardly be put together into an overall picture. In order to understand what we see we need not so much the branch knowledge but rather we need to know what spatial contexts the development of this knowledge takes place, and how constructs this space.

In their perception of an external world politicians, representatives of mass media and the public as well as historians or political scientists applying the comparative approach actually the region Intermarum is shown as a historical area created not so much between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas but between the East and the West seen as a buffer zone presented by this or that structure of the states. Today we frequently see a conflict or deficiency of a language connected with the fact that it is quite difficult to name this space. It is identified as post-Soviet, post-socialist, transitive, Eastern Europe, and sometimes Western Eurasia. Quite often this space is not addressed by any particular name addressing only the states located between the Baltic and Black seas. Michel Houellebecq writes, "ridiculous countries formed after the collapse of the Eastern block". (Houellebecq, 2006)

It is an important symptom as the absence of the name often means the absence of the object or the subject. So we tried to call the space in which these processes emerge Mezhdumorie or Intermarum, a new region of Europe. We are reminded about the existence of this region by numerous attempts to somehow identify this space by calling it post-Soviet, or using the concept "Eastern Europe" and the concept of Central Europe. Another fine example is Jerzy Giedroyc's activity with his well-known "Culture". Also there exist extensive human communications, interest and ambitions of development which require a wide space for themselves.

We look at the history of the region, first of all, as the history of independent states and people as well as associations. Part of it is also the special policy of the empires realized in relation to the region though the empires were not able to consider the region's specificity. A certain subject creating space always experiences a need to provide the region with a name. Such subjects included empires, the USSR, the USA, the EU which offered and are still offering their own models of spatial integration. These processes were external in relation to the region and its subjects. But there are traditions and ideas connected with the forming of the region by those subjects and forces which are an inseparable part of the region. Often those were unsuccessful attempts.

The idea about the Intermarum was for the first time introduced by prince A. Czartoryski[3] during the Modern epoch. In his book "Essai sur la diplomatie" (Essay about Diplomacy) completed in 1827 but published only in 1830 Czartoryski wrote that, having expanded its influence in the south and the west and being by the nature of things invulnerable from the east and the north Russia becomes a source of a constant threat to Europe. He claimed that the country would achieve a greater success by bringing up "friends instead of slaves". He also identified the future threat coming from Prussia and convinced the reader of the necessity to unite East Prussia in the revived Poland. (Czartoryski, 2011)

Czartoryski aspired, first of all, to recreate together with the French, British and Turkish support the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, unite it with Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians and all Southern Slavs**.** He believed that Poland was capable of easing conflicts between Hungary and Slavs as well as between Hungary and Romania. The plan seemed achievable during the period of national revolutions in 1848-4 but failed because of the lack of Western support against the Hungarian irreconcilability to Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians as well as the growth of German nationalism. At the same time, the works of the prince represent a transfer of experience between Jagellonsky federation of the XVI century and Joseph Pilsudski with his Intermarum program, and, moreover, between the federalist ideas of the fathers of the American constitution and the present of Eastern Europe.

Pilsudski inherited the ideas of the prince and also thought in a geopolitical context treating *Intermarum* as a counterbalance to Russian communism and German nationalism considering it to be the Third force and one more democratic Empire in Europe. Simultaneously Pilsudski's ideas contain the federal beginnings of Intermarum. His plan was never systematized. According to the British historian George Sanford already during

the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 Pilsudski admitted that the plan was impracticable. In 2007 Jonathan Levy published the book "*Intermarium: Wilson, Madison and Eastern-Central European Federalism*" in which he very thouroughly analyzed the origin of the idea of Intermarum and its prospects. Levy believes that Pilsudski's plan was simultaneously attacked from four sides by very terrible enemies:

1. **The Soviets** which sphere of influence Intermarum directly threatened and which worked to intervene with the agenda of *Intermarum*. Allies forces believed that Bolshevism was only a temporary threat; they did not want to notice the plans of the important (from the point of view of the balance of forces) traditional ally in the name of Poland. They were indignant at Pilsudski's refusal to help their White allies and treated Pilsudski with suspicion finding his plans unrealistic. They managed to convince Poland to be limited to areas with a clear Polish ethnic belonging.

2. **Nationalism** that like no other force in Eastern Europe interfered with the federation. Lithuanians who restored their independence in 1918, did not wish to join; Ukrainians in their search for the independence similarly were afraid that Poland could enslave them while Belarusians who did not have a developed national consciousness were not interested in the union offers. Possibilities for the realization of Pilsudski's schemes were even more weakened by a number of local wars which took place already after the First World War (the Polish-Soviet war, the Polish-Lithuanian war, the Polish-Ukrainian war) and the border conflicts between Poland and its neighbours on disputable territories (for example, the conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia).

3. Pilsudski's idea also met with the resistance **in Poland isolationism** where the leader democratic Roman Dmovski provided arguments in favor of an ethnically purer Poland where the minority would be polonized. Many Polish politicians opposed the idea of the federation related to different cultures preferring to move instead towards a unitary Polish ethnic state. The policy of Pilsudski after 1926 was also concentrated on the polonization of the Eastern Slavic minority and power centralisation.

4. **Democracy** which demanded the distribution of participation and distribution of standards and guarantees of variety throughout the whole space. Democracy frightened Pilsudski who became more and more disappointed with democracy when observing it in Poland. He organised a coup in 1926 and accepted dictatorial powers.

Pilsudski thought in geopolitical categories. It is a paradox but the person who claimed that "there cannot be any independent Poland without independent Ukraine" was more interested in the separating of Ukraine from Russia than the well-being of Ukrainians or the status of their state. He did not experience any discomfort using armies for the sake of the expansion of the border of Poland in Galicia and Volhynia as well as stopping the Ukrainian attempt of self-determination on disputable territories to the east from the Western Bug.

When thinking about the future borders of Poland, Pilsudski said that everything that we (Poland) can receive in the West depends on a friendly agreement between the states

to the degree to which it can limit Germany while in the East there are doors which open and close and everything depends on the one who compels to open the doors and how far to open them. After the Polish-Soviet war (1919-21) Pilsudski's idea about the federation of Central and Eastern Europe countries based on the Polish-Ukrainian axis lost all chances to be realized.

Then Pilsudski considered the possibility of a federation or union with the Baltic States and the Balkan States. This plan presupposed a Central European Union including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Scandinavia, the Baltic States, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece, thus, focusing this union not only on the East and the West and not only on the space from the Baltic to the Black sea, but, mainly, between the North and the South and from the Arctic ocean to the Mediterranean sea. This project also failed as Czechoslovakia and Lithuania did not trust Poland, and while Poland had rather good relations with other countries, these countries had intense relations with their neighbours making it impossible to create a big block in Central Europe. Eventually, instead of a big federation, only the Polish-Romanian alliance was formed in 1921.

In 1935 Pilsudski died. A later version of his idea belongs to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Beck who during the period between the wars and closer to the end of the 1930s wrote and spoke about "the Third Europe" represented by the union of Poland, Romania and Hungary. However, this idea did not receive any significant development before the beginning of the Second World War.

The concept of the "Central European Union" as a triangular geopolitical formation located between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic or Aegean seas was restored during the Second World War by Sikorsky's Polish Government in exile. The first step in its implementation was the negotiating in 1942 between Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia concerning the proposed Greek-Yugoslavian and Polish-Czechoslovak federations, though it failed. The reason for that was the Soviet opposition which forced Czechoslovakia to hesitate and made the West indecisive or even hostile in its attitude to these issues. Other forms of this idea were revived at the end of the XX and the beginning of the XXI centuries including the ideas about regional security.[4]

The neighbours of Poland, however, continued to treat this idea as an imperialistic one. After the Warsaw Pact collapsed Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the NATO in 1999 while Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia expressed their interest in joining in 2004. So did Ukraine. Since 2004 Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and the Baltic States have become members of the European Union.

These external regional associations offered what the region states could not create independently or by uniting their efforts, namely, a functional association without the national leadership, without destroying the state itself and making essential demands to the internal structure of the states. The basis of the association was not so much the political but the normative power. Today federalistic ideas operate at the level of all European and Atlantic space creating prospects for Intermarum space as a compound regional structure of the general European and Atlantic space.

At the same time, it is obvious that the existing political borders in Eastern Europe create the situation of the region dividedness. Today Intermarum countries are found in different blocks. However, the entering of these states into modern integration models does not remove any regional problem and the problems of the decision to build a common regional space from the agenda.

The EU project "Eastern Partnership" was introduced in 2009. It is a regional project that treats the space between the Baltic and Black seas as a uniform region and considers it as a whole but not only as an aggregate of states. It extends its activities to the whole social and political space. It is extremely important for the region as it allows to carry out an extensive construction of its own space with a comprehensive program ranging from the transformation of an internal state policy to integration projects, from social programs and questions about the status of the person to the institutional structures of states. There is a number of associations in the region which push the region states to change the concept of integration of their own national and regional space. At the same time, the Eastern Partnership project is external and it is not created by the forces and initiatives of the states and regional societies thus making it be subject to the prospects restriction.

Region as a Principle of the Organization and Space Integration

A Hungarian-English satirist George Mikes wrote, "When people say "England" they sometimes mean Great Britain, sometimes the United Kingdom, sometimes the British Isles but never England". A similar eluding of the sense can be observed in relation to the space we are interested in. When we say a "region" we can mean a structural part of the state, we can understand it as any natural region, with natural borders, we can use it to identify any segment of the territory uniting countries. But, in fact, when using the term "region" we problematize the space we enter as we offer a certain new way of seeing it and a model of its integration.

On the one hand, Intermarum is a rather relative symbol of the space occupied by the countries located between the three European seas. In reality, we use this word not for the sake of some mechanical and random association of separate states into a certain group. Probably, such an approach could be seen as thoughtless and would be similar to a superficial geopolitical game. In this particular case we deal with the question of the change of optics and of the scales of space consideration. Such a region is formed not so much due to the arrangement and environment factor though, of course, it depends on these factors as well but rather due to the subjects which form the region.

Irrespective of what region we discuss, be it a modern macroregion of Europe located between the Baltic and Black seas, or a microregion, such as Vilenshchina, for example, in Lithuania or Polesye in Ukraine and Belarus, we still speak about similar structures. The foundation of the structures is not so much a political or administrative power but social processes. The localization and regionalization of space along with the normative power

allowing difficult decentralized structures to exist take place within the borders of these processes.

The region is always a part of something bigger. Such a bigger structure is not some other space but the subject that produces the regionalization of space and creates this space. The EU could be such a subject creating the initiative "Eastern Partnership" and offering the principles of such partnership which stimulate the inclusion into it of various actors and not only the state. A state could be such a bigger structure carrying out the decentralization of management. A territorial community could be such an actor as well.

It is essential for the region in this case to choose the way of its status interpretation that will prevent the region from being transformed into an object that can be manipulated and deprived of the connection with the internal problems of the region and its subjects. The imperial politics in relation to the region is the policy based on the interests of the whole, of the empire capable of ignoring the subjectness of the region and its actors. Intermarum societies have undergone this complete experience. It is not surprising that such writers as Kafka or Gombrovich were born in that region. V.Gombrovich could write his novels in the context of Eastern Europe reality. The topics of his works are concentrated on the problem of an invidividual who finds himself under the constant pressure of being perceived by others and who perceives himself through this perception by others. Gombrovich's novel "Ferdydurke" describes exactly such self-perception possible only as a reflexion of oneself in the interpreting consciousness of the other. What does such a protagonist represent? How is it possible? How can he learn to live in such a condition and how can the protagonist receive freedom? When meeting yourself in the other's perception you co-operate with this perception as if with yourself and you find yourself in this reflexion. Something similar, more specifically, manipulative absurdity, could be found in Kafka's novels where a regular daily existence appears impossible, strange and alien connected neither with the will, nor with the mind of the subject himself. The existence in that case is reduced to accidental events which carry away the protagonist in the current which it is impossible not only to struggle with but also to co-operate with as the existence of the subject is unobvious at all.

Similar practices of defining the region from the outside close and isolate the space while in the end they weaken it. Perhaps, that is why there are three phenomena in Eastern Europe such as nationalism, authoritarianism and localism preventing the regionalization and aspiring to the utmost unification and homogenization of space.

Thus, the main questions concerning the region are the questions about who forms this region and whether the actors located between the Black and Baltic seas are capable of generating such space of the region. Another question is whether they are included exclusively into more complex structures and submit entirely to the logic of these structures development. Raymond William (Williams 1958) noted that the construction of states and regions, at any level, is an operation typical of the ruling class. We can fix the processes of disclosing the potential of this space controlled by the elite along with the protofederalist vision of this space and the local and isolationist outlook that has not access to the sea

from the early modern period to the threshold of the XXI century. The latter variant is the agreement of these societies to subdue to provincialism and the refusal to set and solve global problems.

Historical examples demonstrate failures such as overwhelming fiascos of integration projects within the limits of Eastern Europe, e.g., Intermarum projects when Intermarum was thought of not as a region but as an independent structure of the imperial order. Those historical examples when attempts were made to build *Intermarum* with the help of political means provide us with the pictures of a crash and unrealizable expectations which were unrealizable already upon their birth. These are the great ideas of the great people of the XX century including Pilsudski and Masarik. The region is a product of human imagination and activity knowing what the whole is. It is essential to remember that Intermarum cannot be treated as such an integrity acting as a structural part of Europe or the Atlantic world**.** Intermarum causes the change in the opinion about the region that traditionally was considered to be located between the East and the West. In fact, modern regional processes mainly represent a set of social processes with the participation of the subjects and which are deprived of the expressed geographical profile.

Consequently, there is nothing accidental in the name of this space. Such questions do not concern the existence of some abstract object which can easily be studied from the outside. The possibilities of this space designing are open only to the one who occupies the position of one of its elements. Umberto Eco writes in one of his books that the view from the hills on the icons is open only to those who stand on these hills and they see the borders of the space in a peculiar way. We are a part of these processes, and in many respects they appear to be what we think of them or such as we allow them to follow their own ways irresponsibly excluding them from our consciousness.

The existence of the region today is a challenge to modern integration processes and challenges to the possible subjectness of societies living in the space between the Black and Baltic seas along with all kinds of organizations in the region. Each people and each state in Intermarum need such space that would strengthen their own position.

The crash of the regimes in Eastern Europe in the 90s revealed the limits of state transformations. There where the state is not transformed and where the new model of integration and space construction is not created we can observe considerable difficulties connected with the use of the possibility to create modern space. This space is aimed at the transborder and regional level of the subjectness with which possibilities of modern development and realization of European values are connected. There are too many areas today which the national state does not regulate and control. The national trend does not continue without the changes at the global, regional or individual levels. Besides, the change of space and spatial policy also demands a change in research approaches.

Normative Power and New Regionalization

Thus, regionalization is shown both outside and inside the modern national space; not only states unite in the region. States represent a certain and necessary model of space integration. It is useless to speak about the region and regionalization without the existence of the state. The region is formed by other experts in relation to which the state carries out an important but still a subsidiary function. The state needs a microregion with the help of which its interal space is organized as well as a macroregion with the help of which the state organizes its external space today.

The region points to the variety and lack of integrity, or more specifically, to the non-substantionality of social space. This space does not possess only physical characteristics, it is more complicated as it has got characteristics of culture, law, language, education, science, politics, and economy. The notion that space is constructed, or to be more exact, is created, developed in the 70s. *Intermarum* is a segment of new space in which its discreteness has as much importance as its indissolubility while fragmentariness is as important as its integrity.

When transiting from the national level to the global or regional level one should probably change the optics of observation and research as well as the instruments of management as the former ones are no longer suitable. The tendencies which we observe at the national level do not move on to the global level. We also face different problems at the regional level. Here we have to deal with a paradoxical situation when you can be in the space which arises together with its simultaneous understanding and its simultaneous creation. Such questions as:

• What are the relations between a man and space and what are the possibilities of influencing it?

• What space are you in?

• What are you in this space?

• What can you do in this space?

• What can the space do in relation to you?

demonstrate the formation of the subject that carries out the regionalization. The subject smaller than a state is in no condition to do that whether we speak about transnational regions or subnational regions.

However, the regionalization effect consists in the emergence of a region which being a part of the whole is at the same time bigger than an ordinary part of the whole. The region allows to find structures of a different nature, not that of the national nature identified by E. Giddens as contextualization structures. We discover the existence of structures which are much wider than the national state through the regions. When leaving the borders of the national state today we find ourselves not in another national state but in an absolutely different dimension providing other opportunities.

Even though some states from this region have entered into the EU big project while others are participants of other projects such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus or

the Customs Union or the Eurasian Economic Community, this does not exclude the necessity of forming sub-European regional associations and what is even more important the necessity of studying, forming and teaching how to manage such processes connected with safety, law, human measurement of space and development.

New projects and initiatives such as Eastern Partnership or projects of transborder cooperation represent attempts to form today the regional space between the Black and Baltic seas. This region's characteristics include plurality, fragmentariness and variability. These factors can be both positive and negative for the forming of the region but they are inseparable from the project of constructing a uniform European space giving a chance to the region societies to develop constitutionalism and form federal beginnings, the decentralization and concentration of power. It is specifically the solving of regional problems which can create for the societies located between the Black and Baltic seas a prospect for convergence. However, these changes cannot be carried out without the participation of the subjects inside the region including the academic and expert community.

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Notes

1 November 23-24, 2010, Vilnius, Lithuania. The international scientific conference "New Region of Europe: Paradigms of Regional Development in Baltic-Black Sea Intermarum". The founders of the conference included the European Humanities University (Vilnius, Lithuania), Conrad Adenauer's Fund, Vitautas the Great University (Kaunas, Lithuania), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic.

2 The latest bright example of that is the simultaneous introduction of the Russian Federation into the WTO planned for the end of 2011 and the forming by Russia of the Eurasian economic space with the states, non- members of the WTO (Belarus).

3 In his youth Czartoryski fought against Russia, at first during the war of 1792 and then during Kostyushko's revolt in 1794. However, in 1795 he and his younger brother joined the Russian army, and Catherine the Great was so impressed by them that she gave them back a part of their confiscated manors. Adam Czartoryski subsequently served the Tsars Pavel and Alexander I

as a diplomat and the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as a trustee of Vilensky educational district and Vilensky university. But in November, 1830 Czartoryski became one of the Polish Revolt leaders and after its suppression was sentenced to death though finally he received permission to live in exile in France. In Paris the statesman and former friend, the authorized representative and the actual Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tsar Alexander acted as "a non-crowned king and non-recognised Minister of Foreign Affairs" of non-existent Poland.

4 So, for example, on May 12, 2011, the states of the Visegrad Group entered into the agreement to form a united military group by 2016. The command in the group will belong to Poland. The group is created outside of the NATO structures and if this really takes place it will mean a final redistribution of forces in Eastern Europe, the construction of a many-storeyed architecture of European security guaranteed not only by the global structures of the NATO but also by the regional military alliances. This decision is also important for the destiny of Eastern European nationalisms and the development of federalism.

Donatas Vainalavičius

PERSPECTIVE OF A POST-MODERN EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER IN BALTIC-BLACK SEA INTERMARUM AND BEYOND

Abstract

This article argues that the area between Baltic and Black seas is divided between post-modern, where rules and cooperation between states take place of absolute sovereignty and force, and modern, where strong states emphasize their sovereignty and do not hesitate to use force, parts of international system. Elements of both perceptions can still be found at the meeting point, because some states continue to pursue their interests on the basis of sovereignty and balance-of-power, while others attempt to pursue the post-modern approach. Therefore the article is focused on security implications arising from interaction of post-modern and modern actors of international system in the area.

Keywords: European Security Order, foreign policy, EU and NATO membership, Baltic-Black sea Intermarum, Russia.

Yalta's world order determined the end of attempts to establish independent entity stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea (*the area of the called Intermarum*) in 1945. A new momentum for regional cooperation emerged with geopolitical changes following the end of the Cold War. The processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration provided the area with a chance to re-enter the European Family, dwelling in peace, safety and freedom[1], as an organized entity. It is possible to debate until the cows come home about the perspectives of the area to become an independent subject of European security order. Differences between the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions outweigh similarities.[2] Therefore, the existence of clear post-modern order in the area of Intermarum remains to be questionable due to the persistence of widely diverging nature and interests of the relevant states.

This article argues that the area between the Baltic and Black seas is divided between the post-modern, where rules and cooperation between states take place of absolute sovereignty and force, and the modern, where strong states emphasize their sovereignty and do not hesitate to use force and parts of the international system. Elements of both perceptions can still be found at the meeting point, because some states continue to pursue their interests on the basis of sovereignty and balance-of-power, while others attempt to pursue the post-modern approach. Therefore the article is focused on security implications arising from the interaction of post-modern and modern actors of international system in the area.

Contemporary security is complex and the situation in the area constitutes an indispensable part of European and international security system. As it was acknowledged by Nicole Gnesotto, the world has become more multipolar and could evolve into more conflict between states, become anarchical or develop into a system regulated through international institutions, norms and rules.[3] Therefore a question like *quo vadis the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States (US), Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and to some extent South Caucasus?,* remains more than relevant discussing the perspectives of post-modern European security order in the area between the Baltic and Black Sea.

Several processes are shaping the security situation in the area: Firstly, the enlargement of the EU and NATO; Secondly Russia's foreign policy, including its economic and energy aspects in relations with neighboring states, the EU, NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States; Thirdly persistent fears of security risks and threats based on the historical experience of some states; Fourthly deepening globalization and multilateral cooperation; and Finally, national interests pursued by individual states to attain more power and influence in the area.

Diverging security vectors, post-modern and modern elements of the world existing side by side in the area provide the states enjoying the EU and NATO membership and those seeking eventual membership with some kind of post-modern *mélange* of European Security order. The sustainability of such order depends on the policies of the EU, NATO and developments in individual countries.

Post-modern transformation of international system in Europe

The modern international system was enabled by Westphalian international order launched after the signing the number of peace treaties in Osnabruck and Munster in 1648. At that time nation states emphasized a concept of sovereignty codified by non-interference in domestic affairs of other states, recognition that only states were able to exercise political control and state's internal exclusive power over the population within its territory, including the legitimate monopoly of force. After the First World War, the multilateral balance of power was introduced in order to prevent further conflicts. Year 1945 represented a turning point from the old multilateral balance of power in Europe into a bilateral balance of power based on the strategy of containment.

The shift from a containment to a superpower cooperation happened at the end of the Cold War, when George W. Bush senior met with Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta Conference in 1989. Questions of the new world order were on agenda: arms control, regional disputes and great power cooperation in security and economic areas. The leaders have also went through the new implications for NATO, the Warsaw Pact and European integration. The meeting created a potential framework for post-modern order.

The post-modernism encompassing the notions of post-Westphalian order, emphasizes a pronounced and voluntary cooperation with other states, interested in taking part in the process of integration and openness of its domestic jurisdiction, all with a market acceptance of jointly agreed rules of behavior.[4] The momentum for a development of an embryonic post-modern European security order came with the demolition of the Berlin wall and the fall of the Soviet Union.

It is said that the post-modern area starts where ideas of "shared sovereignty" are emerging, while loyalty to nation states and national patriotism is disappearing.[5] In difference from the Westphalian system the post-modern sovereignty is not attained by war and is not attached to a nation state. In post-modern times, sovereignty might flow into another state, international organization or non-state actor.[6] Therefore the security, stability and prosperity in neighboring areas became the crucial elements for every international actor. Georgia's president Mikhail Saakashvili has called for a Baltic-Black Sea axis to promote a new wave of democratic changes in the former Soviet-space.[7] In order to mitigate the risks for their own national security the EU and NATO member states have engaged in searching for a greater institutional attention and accession for their neighbors or political allies. Russia did the same, trying to limit the impact of those organizations and maintain the influence in former Soviet states by creating the CIS.

The role of NATO

At that time the NATO strategic concept (1991) stipulated "the need to transform the Alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in Europe due to profound political changes in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment".[8] Subsequently NATO has transformed from a military Alliance to a political-military forum for the consultation, negotiation and defence. Although the Alliance acknowledges that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of NATO, security interests could be affected by mutual risks, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, international terrorism and sabotage. The new security environment gradually opened opportunities for NATO to exercise its strategy beyond the territory of its member states.

Although some of the elements that dominated the modern world were transmitted into a post-modern international system, the second part of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century represented more substantial changes in the European order. NATO doors were opened to states with functioning democratic political systems

based on the market economy, fair treatment of minority populations, commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations, and commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures. The accession of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (in 1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (in 2004) and Albania and Croatia (in 2008), confirmed the place of those states in European security order.

The wide circle of NATO partnerships represented the Alliance's outreach for a dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues. The Alliance has committed itself to promote peaceful and friendly international relations and to support democratic institutions. Interest to provide an indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force, a marked emergence of a new European order.

A group of experts gathered to analyze and drew recommendations for a new strategic concept for NATO in 2010. It states that without NATO in the 1990s the newly-freed states of Central and East Europe would have lacked a powerful incentive to embrace democracy internally and to mend fences with external rivals, Euro-Atlantic states would have lacked an effective community forum for responding to traditional threats and without NATO in the future, the prospects for international stability and peace would have been far more uncertain then they are now.[9]

The role of the EU

The emerging post-modern approach to European security was also reflected by the creation of the European identity in security and defense that underlines the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and reinforcing transatlantic solidarity. The Maastricht Treaty gave a new impetus for spill over of domestic and foreign policy, rejection of force in disputes, growing relevance of national borders and supranational governance. All these developments contributed to the emergence of post-modern order of international relations, at least in the Western and Central part of Europe.

The EU countries recognized that they could not meet the challenges facing Europe in the 21st century individually: globalization, demographic and climate changes need for sustainable energy sources and new security threats. With signing of the Lisbon treaty in 2007 they recognized that borders count very little and new rules are necessary in order to deliver results and respond to the public concerns. It is believed that the treaty provides the Union with the legal framework and tools necessary to meet future challenges and to respond to citizens' demands. With this, Europe became more democratic, efficient, transparent, based on core rights, values, freedom, solidarity and increased security.[10]

Furthermore, today the EU is ready to assume more responsibility and play as equal to the US, Russia and NATO on the international stage. The ambition to see Europe as an actor on the global stage[11] hints at the assumption that the EU adapted to the requirements of contemporary post-modern international system. The EU members became interdependent, domestic and foreign affairs lost their distinction, the force as a measure to resolve disputes was rejected, borders became irrelevant due to a technological advancement of military technology. The EU security was now based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability. Thus, currently it is the overarching EU area that comprises the largest amount of post-modern actors in international relations.

The territory of NATO and the EU member states has been free from armed conflicts or military confrontation through the last decade of twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century. Tensions appeared in the areas where post-modern values and principles were challenged by states acting in Westphalian or similar manner. In 2003 Joshua M. Marshall, has noted, that liberal democracy is challenged by other models, pursued by rising powers like China and Russia.[12] Lately US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has recognized the competing nature of modern and post-modern worlds by admitting that the US is "in a race between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration".[13] The existence of modern zones poses threats, because they do not reject force as an instrument of policy and operate by the principles of an empire, with strong attachment to sovereignty and supremacy of national interests. Post-modern actors promote open democratic institutions, open market economies, and open multilateral or transnational diplomacy. Therefore perspectives for a post-modern European security order in the East Europe could be limited by the modern part of international system persisting in the area.

Post-modern characteristics in Baltic-Black sea intermarum

Post-modernists follow three basic principles: 1) national states are loosing their importance; 2) authority is viewed as oppressive; and 3) territory is only a part of human identity, which could be changed by other circumstances. Bearing in mind the development of the European order, Robert Cooper emphasized five basic characteristics of the post-modern world: Firstly breaking down the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs; Secondly mutual interference in domestic affairs and mutual surveillance; Thirdly the rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behavior; Fourthly growing irrelevance of borders and the changing role of the state, and Fifthly security based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.[14]

Values and distinction between domestic and foreign affairs

With election of Barack Obama the US turned into a post-modern world of multilateralism, cooperation and avoidance of confrontation. The US administration em-

phasizes democracy, human rights and development as their values. Presenting the National Security Strategy, H. Clinton hinted at post-modernist values by indicating that the defense (*traditionally domestic issue*), diplomacy (*traditionally external issue*), and developments were not separate entities.[15] She has also underlined that the new Strategy integrates the US strengths at home and foreign policy. The US is a post-modern actor that calls for partners ("We are looking to turn a multi-polar world into a multi-partner world"[16]) to tackle shared problems, like terrorism, proliferation, climate change, cyber security, energy security. The Secretary of State has proclaimed that the US is deepening engagement with key countries like Russia in order to attain better understanding and best relationships on a broader framework than just the usual hotspot, crisis and emergency.[17]

The EU does not rely on separation of domestic and foreign affairs or emphasize on sovereignty. The attempts to capture the position of global actor require that the EU acts in a unified manner. Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty pave a road towards the EU as a singular actor in the international politics. The Union is based on core values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights.[18] Under the treaty, the EU member states are now required to consult the other members *before* undertaking a international action and have to ensure that their decisions are in line with the EU interests.

The EU attempts to engage countries in the area of intermarum, including Russia through various outreach instruments of the EU Eastern Partnership programme. Russia dislikes the initiative, because it fosters closer political and economic ties with six former Soviet republics. This is seen as a plot designed to substitute the Moscow-centered CIS with a Brussels-centered alternative. Through technical aid instruments the EU has attempted to stimulate an interregional cooperation and to become "the main tool for Russia's modernization".[19] Russia defended its sovereignty – proclaimed in the *Mid-Term Strategy* and considered the EU's step to introduce the Neighborhood policy in 2004 as an attempt to increase an asymmetry between the actors and decrease the special status of Russia.[20] Russia removed itself from the Neighborhood policy from its outset because it considers itself as a strategic partner, which deals with the EU from a position of equality.[21]

Russia has clearly demonstrated an anti-European bend, trying to justify the use of its vast natural resources to suit its own national interests rather than common European values, considered Boris Mezhuev from Moscow State University.[22] Russia's poor records of human rights protection, democratic elections[23] property rights[24] and development of civil society strengthens the consideration. Russia strongly believes that it has the right to build a political system according to its own national tradition rather than according to universal democratic principles.[25] As long as Russia considers postmodern European values to be unfit for its status as a superpower there will be little hope for a postmodernist nation.[26] The current development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with CIS states is the "priority of Russia's foreign policy".[27]

Mutual interference in domestic affairs and mutual surveillance

Russia opposes any type of external interference and adaptation of external or international rules in its domestic or foreign policies.[28] Therefore Russia can not accept standing in a queue at NATO doors, remains strongly attached to a reciprocity with the EU. Furthermore, the Russian government uses its superior role in an energy resources sector as a political tool against other states. Cut-offs of gas supply to Ukraine and Belarus and draining an oil pipe to Lithuania serve as examples. As long as Russia's national security strategy is energy security centered it is difficult to believe that the general mindset will change in a near future.[29]

Russia behaves like a traditional power of the XIX century. By enlarging eastward, Europe acquired the old Eastern problem, the centuries-old contest between Russia and its near neighbors. Russia now pushes back using traditional levers of power: embargo on trade with Georgia; suspension of rail traffic and a cyber-attack against Estonia in a dispute over a Soviet war memorial. Furthermore, Russia supports separatist movements in Georgia and denies violation of host nation consent while keeping its armed forces on Georgian territory and in Moldova.[30]

Russia is claiming its adherence to the principles of sovereignty.[31] This could also be a reason why Russia prefers to deal with individual states bilaterally instead of using existing multilateral frameworks. Such approach is adopted to discuss strategic issues with regard to developments in the High North, arms control area, construction of gas pipelines linking Russia and Germany or recent military cooperation with France on "Mistral" assault warship. Russia's national security strategy emphasizes Moscow's aim to establish an "equal and fully-fledged strategic partnership with the US based on coinciding interests. Those interests encompass strategic arms reduction, strengthening confidence building measures and enhancing counter-terrorist cooperation. Regardless of consultations with the US Russia continues to consider the US and NATO missile defence systems cautiously and demand direct involvement – "We would like our intellectual and expert potential to be taken into account as well, and we have something to contribute"[32].

NATO provides durable indivisibility of security for their member states. A consensus based decision-making promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defence and security issues to build trust and prevent conflicts. NATO Partnerships encompass all relevant states in the area of intermarum, fostering exchange of views on current political and security-related issues. In this regard Partnership for Peace could provide a contribution to greater regional security. NATO has provided a framework within which the post-modern values might deliver fruits throughout various instruments of membership, partnership or cooperation.

Russia persistently claims that NATO lacks transparency and predictability but at the same time Russia prefers to keep some of its own doors shut. The characteristic example of this is a suspension of implementation of the Treaty on Conventional forces in Europe and some related bilateral confidence and security building measures in mid 2007. Some

researchers used the CFE creation in 1990 as an example of post-modernization of relations between Russia and the NATO. In February 2010 President Dmitri Medvedev signed Russia's new Military Doctrine and "The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020" but the latter has not yet been made public. At the same time Russian officials and public are enjoying NATO transparency regarding the new strategic concept and the US Nuclear Posture Review. The death of former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko, spy rows at NATO in 2009 and US in 2010 should also be taken into account discussing the transparency issues. These are expressions of different logics of a modern and a post-modern state.[33]

Russia, Ukraine and Georgia are states from the intermarum or adjacent area that enjoy more institutionalized relations with the Alliance through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (NRC), NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC). The NRC is a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action in which the individual NATO member states and Russia are committed to work as equal partners. Nevertheless, Russia continuously opposes NATO enlargement Eastwards towards the 'near abroad'.[34] The basic principle of Russia's participation in any international regime calls for involvement in decision-making of organization as deeply as possible, simultaneously avoiding any requirements that could interfere in Russian domestic or foreign policy.[35] At the same time NATO Secretary General signals the Alliance's interest to move forward on Joint Review of 21st Century Security Challenges, cooperation on Afghanistan, fighting terrorism or piracy and finally to start cooperation towards territorial missile defense.[36]

Rejection of force for resolving disputes

Being a NATO partner Russia is not hesitant to threaten[37] or use force for resolving disputes in the territory of other NATO state or partner, without justification of the UN Security Council. The war with Georgia in 2008 has clearly shown the modern track of security that Russia is heading towards. The unilateral use of force, violation of international border, invasion into sovereign Georgia and attempts to "legalize" the status of captured territories were explained by Russian minister of foreign affairs Mr. Sergei Lavrov in a public discourse: "*we only thought about how to stop the killing of our citizens and the citizens of South Ossetia. We were ready on the day hostilities ended to continue discussions on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The discussion on status had failed and Tbilisi had started making revanchist claims that the war was not over. That is why by the end of August, it was decided that there was no other way to ensure the security and survival of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians other than to recognize their independence*".[38] Some parallels might also be found with Russia's role in Moldova, Chechnya and Nagorno Karabach region.

EU contributes to international efforts to resolve conflicts and bring about international understanding by the use of diplomacy, backed when necessary by trade, aid and peacekeepers. Moscow's ambition to dominate in the "near abroad" prescribed in the Rus-

sian National Security Strategy until 2020 makes it difficult for the EU to proliferate its ideas and *mode d'employ*. In August 2008, the EU brokered a ceasefire to end fighting between Georgia and Russia and deployed observers to monitor the situation, but the persistence of different attitudes inside the Union contributed to regionalization and diversification inside the EU. Coincidentally, at the height of the crisis in the South Caucasus, the EU signed a deal with Moscow to provide Russian helicopters for the EU-led mission in Chad.

Growing irrelevance of borders and interdependence

On 16 December 2009 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed the relaunch of the NATO-Russian partnership that was suspended as a reaction to Russia's actions in Georgia in August 2008. Despite the Secretary General and Russian Prime minister Vladimir Putin underlined personal responsibility for developing the partnership between the Alliance and Russia, Russia has canceled two subsequent NRC meetings in 2010 (at the same time, meetings of the NUC and NGC took place). With this the opportunities to move forward in cooperation on fight against terrorism, development in Afghanistan or similar issues of mutual interest were missed. The Russian side claimed that NATO is hesitant to move forward with discussions on a Euro-Atlantic security treaty proposed by president Dmitry Medvedev. Professor Dmitri Danilov from Europe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences explained that: "[…] the supporters of the initiative include heavyweights like France and Germany, and the opponents, new NATO members like Poland and the Baltic".[39] Sometimes it might look that Russia attempts to test cohesiveness of NATO and the EU, deliberately trying to impose contentious issues into the common agenda.

Due to those diverging lines in attitude *vis-à-vis* Russian stances on the international arena, the EU can not always pursue a post-modernist approach addressing Russia's demands of reciprocity. On numerous occasions R. Cooper has stated that when the post-modern order meets the modern order they both would have to act in terms of the "law of the jungle". However in the post-modern world military power is not what it used to be, the situation in the vicinity of intermarum is different. The status quo of unresolved conflicts in Nagorno Karabach, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia is constructed by arms. R. Cooper rightly noticed that there is no wish for the powers to return to conflict.[40] Russia and Europe have to learn how to live and cooperate without understanding each other.[41]

The EU-Russia summit in Rostov in 2010 emphasized that relations between Moscow and Brussels have a strategic character. However concrete steps are still limping, especially with regard to visa-free regime and the Partnership for Modernization[42], which requires setting the principles of trade regimes that heavily depend on the terms of Russia's membership in World Trade Organization.[43] Diverging attitudes with regard to the Russian issue are noticed between the old and new EU, including Poland, the Baltic states, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria that are countries from the area of intermarum. Although reforms since the Amsterdam Treaty encompassed a concept of enhanced in-

tegration, ideas of differentiated integration or Europe of many speeds have been raised numerous times. Some conditions and challenges in "old and new Europe" are increasingly diverse.[44] The EU has still to develop its unified European approach and political tools in order to defend its interests and norms to deal effectively with a multipolar world.[45] R. Cooper has acknowledged that "West suffers from intellectual arrogance, both in terms of its *naïve* view that its model of governance has won-out and in the way it imposes this model on others"[46], and stated that in a globalised world the EU needs to continue sharing and pooling power between states.[47]

The Lisbon Treaty shifts power in defense, security, foreign affairs and criminal justice away from nation-states towards Brussels. This would bring Europe much closer to protected and integrated the EU than the free-trading, intergovernmental Europe.[48] Some actors in Washington might see this as a potential damage to the US interests in Europe because the aforementioned areas traditionally were the ones US was more interested to deal with on a bilateral basis. Giving the EU the ability to supersede the autonomy of its member states in areas of foreign policy will seriously impair the ability of America's allies in Europe to stand alongside the US where and when they choose to do so.[49]

Public perceptions

The results of Russian public opinion research indicate a decrease of respondents who understand the order as a political and economic stability, end of power struggle and plunder of the country (from 34 to 25%), strict observance of laws (from 35 to 24%) and involvement of defense and law enforcement agencies in combating crime (from 13 to 7%). Some of the changes could be interpreted as a slight change towards the post-modern attitude within Russia's society, but respondents more often considered democracy to be "empty words" (from 5 to 11%). Furthermore, the perspectives for the post-modern approach remain somehow gloomy, because the majority of Russians are sure that in Russia order is more important than democracy (72% vs. 16%).[50] Angus Reid Global Monitor survey conducted in 2008 indicates that 33% of Russian adults believe that the US is hostile to Russia, while 31% feel the same way about Georgia. Ukraine is next on the list of unfriendly nations with 17.9%, followed by Latvia with 17.7%, Estonia with 13.3&, Lithuania with 10.4%.[51] 35.3 % of respondents regarded Belarus as Russia's friend and ally. 12.7 % of respondents named Armenia and the US (4.4 %) among friendly nations.

The Survey of public opinion in Ukraine estimated that political stability was decreasing (89%) in 2008. Relations with Russia (69%), and respect for human rights by national authorities (61%) were evaluated as deteriorating. Russia is regarded as a potential aggressor by 40% of respondents. Nevertheless the majority of population (57%) would vote against Ukraine's membership in NATO, but majority (41%) would be in favor of country's membership in the EU. The economic development, democracy, political stability and freedom of movement and closer relations with the EU member states are the motivating factors for the EU membership.[52] Till year 2001 Ukrainian citizens gave priority to

broadening contacts with Russia and CIS countries, including Belarus. The country has maintained a stable orientation (13%) towards the West during the year 2000-2001, but the majority (72%-62%) of respondents supported the option of "active and constructive in all directions". Interest in the creation of a Baltic-Black Sea Union was very small (up to 1%) from 1991.[53]

19.8% of Belarusians believe, the military threat is real for their country. Among the sources of military threat they mostly mentioned NATO (6%), the USA (6.6%), the West in general (1.4%) and Russia (0.4%). 22% of the population believe that Belarus should develop its relations with NATO and 10.6% - would eventually support Belarus joining the Alliance. 43.4% of the respondents see NATO as a source of military threat if asked a close-ended question. 25.2% of the respondents are convinced that Belarus should leave the existing blocs. It should be noted that "Don't know/No answer" is quite high - approximately 27%.[54]

Approximately 40% of Moldova's population are somewhat dissatisfied about the way of democratic development. Worrisome finding is that half of the respondents consider that the majority or many are afraid to openly express political views in Moldova. 15% of the population are afraid of war, 8% – political instability and 6% of civil war. That current state of relations with Romania is "good" considering 69% of the population. 67% of respondents enjoy relations with the EU, 53% with US and 51% with Russia. 27% of respondents consider the relation with Russia as "bad". Only 10% think that the relations between Ukraine and the US are bad. About the same situation is with regard to the relations with Ukraine. The survey shows that the EU is regarded as the most important Moldova's partner (66%), but Russia is the second (64%). At the same time, the biggest amount of respondents (26%) named Russia as increasing threat. The EU is the least threat (11%). Moldova's future in the EU is seen by majority of the population, while options of independent neutral state and remaining CIS country are supported by a considerable part of the society. The least amount of population would prefer Moldova's membership in NATO.[55]

Concluding remarks

Post-modernism draws some new lines of conducting relations but does not change the essence – states have always concurred, cooperated and stayed neutral. The Baltic-Black sea intermarum from one side is dominated by interests of the post-modern EU, NATO, their individual member states and the US; and from another side - modern Russia. Those actors are shaping the security order in the area. Other states like Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and to some extend Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia attempt to maximize their interests of foreign and security policy within the given environment.

The perspective of post-modern European security order in the area between the Baltic and Black Sea remains gloomy due to the division of the area in modern and post-modern areas. In order to consolidate the order it is necessary to make the post-modern principles accepted and trusted in a broader area than it is now. States using modern world rules will continue to pose risks for the countries in the post-modern world. The right mo-

dalities must be found to diminish this risk and control the process of post-modernization of the world, in order to avoid a potential destabilization.

Nature of the new European order is at stake. Exposed differences in the EU cannot serve as examples for the states located eastwards from its borders. Ukraine turned back from an active engagement with NATO and the EU because its population did not trust those organizations. Trust could be provided only with guarantees that the policies of the organizations are durable and applicable to all actors. Russia, being the biggest power in the region should not enjoy double standards tolerated by other international actors when the matters relate to human rights or national security.

The EU and NATO member states bordering the modernist state pursue particularly cautious security policy. This makes the post-modern European Security order blended on the Eastern side. The increased security of the states in the area of intermarum would significantly contribute to the establishment of the European security order. Therefore, the EU and NATO should attempt to pursue a coherent policy and refrain from unilateral actions that might have a potential negative impact on the security situation of individual member states in the area. Drawing lessons learned from relations with Russia, could serve the EU and NATO policy planners.

The Bilateral engagement in close cooperation with Russia might draw it into the post-modern European system and prevent retreating to the modern system of security. However it equally contributes to diverging gaps that already exist within the EU and NATO. Bilateral engagements also lead to some kind of re-nationalization of the foreign policy in some EU member states. This is applicable both to states that traditionally are in favour of intensified engagement with Russia and those that would remain more cautious.

Russia's hesitance to engage western partners reciprocally in a post-modern spirit might bring the European security order to shallow waters because it is not addressing the feelings of insecurity of a number of states in the area of intermarum. As a sovereign state Russia has a right to independently choose its patterns of security policy and defense in the framework of international law. The same right is applicable to other international actors.

Notes

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Svitlana Babenko

COMPARING SOCIAL COST OF POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION OF EASTERN EUROPE BORDERLAND (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova)[1]

Abstract

The post-Soviet transformation divides social, cultural, economic, and political space of the former USSR society; it changes geopolitical orientations as well as ideological and value orientations; it leads to the emergence of new borders and bridges in a social and cultural discourse. A new explanation for such developments is presented in the article, based on the theoretical ground of sociology and meeting the "methodological nationalism" challenge. The author uses the alternative to the "methodological nationalism" approach and proposes to study social processes not bounded to the society as a "nation-state", but to the groups of societies overcoming the transformation path with common outcomes. The hypothesis is that if a group of countries that founded itself in the borderland between Europe and Russia (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), has the same institutional, socio-cultural and macro-societal characteristics it could be identified as "Eastern European Borderland" in social terms within the sociological methodology. To explain the social consequences of the post-Soviet transformation in terms of the outcomes of the transformation path in comparison with the types of the post-USSR societies, the concept of social cost is developed. In order to argue for this approach we use a set of indexes of societal development measured by international statistics and sociological surveys. The data proved that the core borderland line is between the EU societies and non-EU societies; three countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) have more variety in their socio-cultural, institutional, political and economic development measured within the social cost of the post-Soviet transformation rather than similarities among them and that makes them differ not crucially from Russia. Thus, we can't prove the

existence of the special common social space of "Eastern Europe Borderland" (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) from the social background of the post-Soviet transformation path.

Keywords: "methodological nationalism", social cost, "Eastern Europe Borderland" (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), Post-Soviet transformation, index of transformation.

Transformation processes in the post-Soviet countries are multidirectional and inconsistent. They are caused by both *internal* mechanisms and features of the social system of the Soviet society's type, the local ethnic and cultural specifics of the historical development, and by *global* challenges, processes, and tendencies. The disintegration of the USSR started a radical transformation of the social system of former soviet republics and socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s; it dramatically changed the space of geopolitical coordinates and orientations of these countries, value and ideology systems, social and economic living conditions. The post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Baltic States are developing a political, economic and legal strategy of European integration, having united the transforming activity of the elite and mass society under the slogan "back to Europe". Another case is Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, they turned out to be a boundary space in two projections. Firstly, the transformation space is a borderland between, *on the one hand*, the European Union as a social model of quality of life and in this sense a social reference point of transformation. *On the other hand*, it is a set of "the opportunities corridor" parameters for changes caused by the continuity of structures, cultural forms and institutes of the Soviet type society identified as a "path dependency"[2]. Secondly, these countries are internally divided both socially and culturally. They are divided between the necessity to construct their own national identity within the frame of the nation-state development (that in itself is an internally inconsistent and non-coordinated process), and powerful external geopolitical centers pressure, where Russia became a self-sufficient centre and an agent of influence on the strategies and tactics of the elite's transformation efforts.

The broad range of transformation processes research in post-Soviet societies typically has two focuses. In most cases they are focused on an applied empirical description of a problem, phenomenon, or process "in the conditions of transformation" or, the other typical research focus remains at the level of a macrosociological theorization. The complete description of the transformation process itself, and not as a condition of some social phenomenon but as a systemic change of the Soviet society's type which has got its own logic and special features of social consequences, becomes an obvious rationale after twenty years of the fragmentary and irregular comparative research of the public opinion on the post-Soviet space. Moreover, research findings demonstrate social divisions within mass society public opinion and orientations of the elites of Eastern Europe Borderland to the integration into the EU including the European social space. So the actual social challenge for sociological theory and practice is to gather the theoretical description of post-Soviet transformation processes with the *results* of radical social changes in the regions of the Borderland and their empirical evaluation.

The borderland nature of transformation processes spaces in the three societies of the new Eastern Europe is conditioned historically, socially and culturally as well as territorially, not only on the geographical but also on the conceptual map of Europe. The authors introducing the concept "borderland" in social and humanitarian disciplines of the post-Soviet space, appeal, first of all, to the post-positivist metaphorical attributing of border construction; that consequently creates the reflection and description of a certain spatial configuration: "metaphors cannot become a concepts but are transformed into specific spatial images" (Antanovich, 2005:16).

In their work "From Transitology to the Borderland Theory" Bresky and Breskaya suggest redefining the space of post-communist transformation processes in Eastern Europe by means of an interdisciplinary conceptual tool of "borderland research" identified as "border-boundary studies". They named it as "2B model of the Borderland". The authors identify two kinds of "Borderland theories": (1) analytical models working with geographical space and (2) "theories considering "a-territorial" borders whether they are imagined, social, or cultural; *to study such borders within the limits of a certain discipline is impossible*" (Bresky, Breskaya, 2008:44) *(italicized by me S.B.)*. Without challenging the heuristic capability of the interdisciplinary approach to the borderland analysis, I will dare to disagree with the mentioned authors over the point that within the limits of *one* discipline *it is impossible* to study "imagined, social, cultural" borders. The argument here is that in disciplinary frameworks of sociology it is exactly the social, cultural or imagined boarders are in the research focus, not so much of geographical divisions, distinctions, splits, which could be seen as accomplishing. For example, for the description of the position between social statuses in the conditions of "transitivity" of social positions sociology uses the concept "marginality" while the situation of being between two value systems is described with the concept of "anomia". Both are not related to the geographical or territorial roots, but reflect the situation of "the borderland" of the social and cultural perceived as essential within the limits of socially designed borders of social groups (in case of marginality) or culturally designed borders of value systems (in the situation of anomie). The given concepts describe social and cultural phenomena, especially actual in the conditions of transformation of the post-Soviet society when a rapid and radical change of the social system leads to the "mobility" of the most stable constructions of public order including social structures and institutes.

Continuing to argue in favor of logic of the sociological analysis of the borders and borderland issues this work offers a sociological description of the transformation space of the post-Soviet society's type of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as Borderland. Thus, the sociological focus of the "Borderland" description is the determination of the transformation process by *time* vectors (the past (the Soviet society) and the future (strategic orientation, goals of a social system transformation) and *space* or geopolitical centers of gravity (the West (EU) and \ or Russia). Simultaneously, within the framework of the post-positivist sociology, the "borderland" is the subject of social *construction* that is implemented in the orientation of different subjects (political, academic, mass-media) to

formulate the discourses of self-description and positioning themselves as a new Eastern Europe or Eastern Europe Borderland, while in certain cases it is an attempt to avoid such entitling and positioning. As an example we could use the case of the Baltic States where self-descriptions have excluded such terminology as "post-Soviet", "post-communist" and where the discourse "borderland" was not developed, while the appeal to the Europeanness and state-territorial locality (for example, "the Baltic states" instead of the designation "Pribaltika" traditionally accepted in the Soviet discourse) (*Nation* 1998) serve as the basis for forming the identity and strategy of positioning.

There is one more argument in favor of the sociological analysis of "Borderland" from the position of the first type theories rooted in the territorial conceptualization of the borders. The post-classical redefining of the subject of sociology analysis proposed an attempt of some authors to overcome the borders of society traditionally understood as "the nation-state". This shift is proposed as an answer to challenge of globalization and strengthening of mutual influence and interdependence of social processes among societies. For instance, Ulrich Beck offers to re-orient the principles of construction of sociological knowledge from the perception of society within the boarders of the nation-state (identified as the "methodological nationalism") to the methodological cosmopolitism and development of cosmopolitan sociology. U. Beck believes that this methodological turn is essential as global problems of risks move beyond the competence and possibilities of influence of national governments, societies, systems of social interaction, and requires more general cosmopolitan options of interactions, decisions, influences. When identifying the distinction between "cosmopolitism" as a philosophical, ideologically loaded normative concept, U. Beck (Beck, 2006) offers to use the analytical category "cosmopolitization" to identify the interdependence of the world, the globalization of core challenges and risks faced societies. Beyond the common control they are turning into disasters, so it is necessary and can be prevented by joint efforts. U. Beck's argues that the basis of the cosmopolitan sociology development are rooted in the new epistemological situation of reflexivity of the second modernity, cosmopolitization of everyday life; processes of a new level of complexity arise and they need to be studied by developing other mechanisms of research within the frame of social sciences. In such cases the unit of analysis and data gathering is not some society within the borders of its nation-state but rather a global cosmopolitan society (mankind), the subject matter of which are global risks and processes while the analytical space of the sociological research includes the knowledge of the other disciplines both social (economics, political sciences, cultural studies, ethnography etc.) and natural (biology, geography, physics etc.).

Polemicizing with U. Beck, Nicolay Genov (Genov, 2010) offers to move from methodological societalism used as the basis of society analysis by classical sociology (where the unit of analysis and explanation is a society as a complete system; this corresponds to U. Beck's concept of "methodological nationalism") to study the regional features of society development and influences of global trends on the special features of development of certain processes in these societies. N. Genov argues that it is more adequate to identify it as

methodological globalism because the object and unit of analysis are global processes and their impact to phenomena and the dynamics of social development in different localities.

Thus, the theoretical challenge of our research of "Borderland" is an attempt to overcome methodological nationalism[3] faced by globalization of risks, societies and social sciences. Within the frame of this polemics, we offer the third way to overcome methodological nationalism or societalism: it is focusing on the study of the features of regional development of social space where an unit of analysis is a certain type of a societal system undergoing post-Soviet transformation. *Social* indicators of the results of change will serve as parameters of measuring similarity or difference in typological characteristics of social space. Thus, within the framework of the research of the post-Soviet transformation of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as spaces of Eastern Europe Borderland we should test empirically the possibility of overcoming methodological nationalism \ societalism by defining and analyzing regional features of the transformation process of post-Soviet societies. In order to do that it is necessary to reveal the presence (or absence) of the commonality of the social cost of the transformation parameters, which are caused not only by economic, political, and social specificity of the post-Soviet development within each of these three societies, but also by the similarity of the borderland position of all three societies in the social, cultural and geopolitical space of Europe.

Within the framework of these methodological positions the description of the results of reforms and societal changes in three societies after the two decades of the post-Soviet social space development is turned to the problem of the evaluation of social results of transformation processes, the defining of comparison criteria of the transformation phases in the post-Soviet society along with the orientation of its trajectory in dramatically changing conditions of the current global challenges in the context of the analysis of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as Eastern Europe Borderland.

The modern theoretical discussion about the process and mechanisms of transformation of the post-Soviet social space is present in leading sociological publications as well as at numerous scientific forums. T. Zaslavskaya's theoretical model of the societal transformation of society(Zaslavskaya, 2004), D. Stark and L. Bruszt's concept of the dependent post-Soviet development or path dependency (Stark, Bruszt, 1998), P. Sztompka's theory of transformation as social and cultural trauma (Sztompka, 2003), D. Lane's theory of chaotic capitalism (Lane, 1996, 1999), and O. Kutsenko's concept of transformation phases (Kutsenko, 2004) made a significant contribution to understanding and explanation of the essence of the process and transformation mechanisms. These concepts outline the area of sociological research of transformation processes in the post-communist space, defining basic components of the theoretical and empirical analysis. This research is based on the methodological framework of a structure and agency approach to studying and explaining the social cost of the transformation process in post-communist societies with the help of indicators of dynamics of social inequalities and social health of society. This approach is based on P. Sztompka's ideas, i.e. transformation processes as a social and cultural trauma, the concept of trust shortage as an explanatory mechanism of the crisis of transformation

of social institutions and social solidarity; as well as the concept of the transformation structure of society of T. Zaslavskaya that serves as the framework that outlines the horizon of processes of societal changes of the post-Soviet type societies.

The continuity and change of social structures, cultural bases, and an economic and social organization, as well as the composition of daily practices serve as the core object of research and explanation of societal development in social sciences. The post-Soviet society gains a particular interest in this respect. This society has been closed for the external influences of globalization in the sphere of culture and daily practices for more than 70 years of the Soviet state existence. The Soviet society was developed as an alternative version of the Modernity. It developed industrialization without ownership and the market; the democracy without pluralism and voice ("glasnost"), the mass society without consumerism culture and values of an individual success in life; strong interpersonal social communications and a low level of societal integration. This list could be easily extended. We should also keep in mind that the cultural development of Soviet society was not only rigidly structured ideologically and isolated from the global consumerism and system of inequalities, but, most importantly, it was designed around the idea of the exclusiveness and right way of life as an alternative to the global (Western or American) way of life and consumer society. H. Kellner and H.-G. Soeffner say that "Agitprop (ideological bombardment) as a feature of the communism has generated a strange culture, which combined natural to the whole world aspiration to material benefits with their romanticized negation" (Kellner, Soeffner, 2004). It was much more typical for Soviet Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova than for East Germany (implied in cited above) because the cultural isolation was much less transparent. For example, lack of access to foreign (international) mass media in combination with a high level of control and censorship of the centralized domestic mass media, the closure of opportunities for tourism abroad for mass social classes (including both the restriction for travels to the USSR for foreigners and the absence of possibilities of foreign tourism for the country's own citizens), closure for external emigration, and the impossibility for the return migration etc. The phenomena of "the double consciousness" and "the double standard" became the leading characteristics of the Soviet mass culture which spread widely by the end of the 1980s. It is quite difficult to agree that this "natural to the whole world[4] aspiration to material benefits" is indeed natural aspiration shared through all around the world, however, this aspiration, certainly, is cultivated by the economy of mass consumption and is legitimized by a certain (American or Western) culture, which is not the whole world, but it is the one spread massively through global technologies and mass media. At the same time, that is definitely this aspiration that becomes one of the central values of global culture that challenged post-communist[5] societies of consumer deficiency at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This led to a fast spreading of the consumer society, a deepening and diversifying inequalities in private and public spaces from the prestigious elite demonstrative consumption of "new Russians", individualized styles of consumption within forming new middle classes up to a mass second-hand consumption of unavailable for mass soviet people before foreign goods entitled

as "import" within the frame of the globalization process. This specific aspiration redefines the specificity of social inequalities of post-Soviet societies and notions about social equality, justice; it leads to the re-evaluation of values, sharp differentiation and deepening of the systems of social inequalities in societies of the Eastern Europe Borderland (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova).

The interaction of three types of factors produces the space of social inequalities' reproduction and dynamics. The first type of factors is socio-structural one, it includes the factors of the distribution of resources and positions of the socio-group structure of society, the redistribution of public goods, and mechanisms of the access to them. The second type of factors is an institutional one, it represents sets of systems of rules and interactions concerning the consolidation, change and redefining of social inequalities. Finally, the third type of factors consists of social and cultural factors, such as value orientations of social groups, the ambivalence of mass perception and legitimating of various inequalities, the attitudes toward social justice. The change of internal and value background of social inequalities during radical social transformation of a post-Soviet society leads to the deepening of inequalities and differentiation of social space, the emergence of new mass social groups (the unemployed, businessmen, tourists and labor migrants abroad etc.) as well as the redefining of the social order.

On the one hand, the post-Soviet social and cultural space is used to value justice of social equality that was ideologically supported by the Soviet type of social system. Simultaneously, mass people was dissatisfied with the ways of how this social equality was provided in the Soviet society of developed socialism of 1980th that were strengthened by the policy of "glasnost"" during the Perestroika period. In fact, these attitudes lead to a dramatic discrepancy in expectations of quick improvement of living conditions after the disintegration of the USSR and the change of the Soviet type of social order. The expectations to fast improvenemts were faced by the opposite consequences: an essential decline in the level and quality of life at the time of the radical post-Soviet transformation at the beginning of the 1990s. It leads to mass anomie including the attitudes toward social inequality and how it should be regulated.

On the other hand, the necessity of stratification and social differentiation in the access to public goods creates the inequality of life chances and motivates people to achieve better positions. It is forming agency, an active approach of achievement in life, which is central for the legitimizing of the competitive environment of market economy. Thus, social inequality is a functionally important feature of the global capitalism order while in this respect the major question of social justice deals with the provision of equality opportunities to achievement. At the same time, the necessity to restrict or reduce social inequality is still one of the factors and a moving force of social changes in modern societies. It takes various forms from reforms and improvement of the EU social policy to a series of "color" revolutions on the post-Soviet space and revolutions of 2010–2011 in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia etc.

The research methods of transformation process studying were developed during the last decade. They measure such parameters of the social system change as the institutes of market and democracy, the specific features of political regimes dynamics and the quality of management, as well as other similar macrosocial indicators of public changes of the societal level. Since 2006 German researchers have been measuring Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) developed by Bertelsmann's Fund (Bertelsmann Stiftung) and the Munich Centre for Applied Policy Research (CAP). BTI is calculated from the data of qualitative evaluations in 128 countries of the world. The total index is based on 17 criteria of the measurement of the political transformation to democracy, the economic transformation to market economy and management transformation (see picture 1). These 17 criteria are measured from 52 indicators by comparing average values. They are measured on the scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is the lowest level and 10 is the highest level of the transformation condition of transitive societies. Thus, the general transformation indicator in these societies is calculated on the basis of the survey of experts from 128 countries regarding the condition of democratic institutions, the management of society and the functioning of market economy institutes. This result allows to compare and typologize these countries according to the level of macrosocial and economic changes. The BTI research was conducted four times, in 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 and covers the condition of post-communist societies during the stabilization phase[6]. The research also allows to analyze the period of the society transformation dynamics in the conditions of the world financial crisis of 2008 (table 1).




Figure 1. Scheme of transformation measurement – system of criteria used to make Bertelsmann Transformation Index7

Table 1. **Comparison of macrostructural changes of post-communist societies 2003-2010, Bertelsmann Transformation Index**[8]

Index of **Management**					Index of **State** of Democracy and Market Economy			
2010	2008	2006	2003		2003	2006	2008	2010
7.33	7.43	7.29	7.9	*Estonia*	9.5	9.29	9.42	9.34
7.03	7.20	7.32	7.4	Slovakia	9.6	9.06	9.14	9.14
6.55	6.83	7.41	7.0	Slovenia	9.6	9.45	9.49	9.52
6.95	6.62	6.95	6.7	Czechia	9.6	9.23	9.56	9.65
6.51	6.67	6.81	6.7	Hungary	9.7	9.16	9.18	9.00
6.91	6.70	7.00	7.7	*Lithuania*	9.6	9.02	9.16	9.04
6.68	6.86	6.78	6.3	*Latvia*	8.7	8.20	8.60	8.51
6.52	5.27	6.36	6.6	Poland	9.4	8.90	8.76	8.86
6.67	6.73	6.51	6.4	Bulgaria	7.7	7.98	8.44	8.36
6.27	6.49	6.33	5.7	Romania	7.3	7.89	8.31	8.23
4.92	***5.21***	***4.69***	***5.1***	***Ukraine***	***5.9***	***6.96***	***6.93***	***6.55***
5.68	6.36	5.91	2.3	*Georgia*	4.1	5.73	6.60	6.03
4.36	5.14	5.08	5.1	*Armenia*	5.7	6.26	6.41	5.75
4.70	4.69	4.13	3.3	*Kazakhstan*	5.1	5.48	5.53	5.24
4.49	***4.48***	***3.50***	***3.3***	***Moldova***	***4.1***	***5.06***	***5.93***	***5.79***
3.41	**3.84**	**3.84**	**5.5**	**Russia**	**6.0**	**6.14**	**5.94**	**5.70**
3.26	***2.89***	***2.74***	***2.2***	***Belarus***	***3.9***	***4.47***	***4.47***	***4.52***
4.05	3.83	3.50	3.2	*Azerbaijan*	4.4	4.51	4.51	4.85

Seven years of observation are not sufficient for a detailed analysis of dynamics and the description of transformation trends of Central Eastern European (CEE) and the former USSR countries. However, four waves of research provide qualitative comparative information about the condition of transformation processes on the post-communist space of the last decade. The indicators of results of the institutional transformation in the countries of CEE (including the Baltic States) and the former USSR differ greatly. Partially, that can be explained by different starting positions and the conditions of economy at the beginning of transformation processes, the degree of integration into the centralized political and economic system of the USSR, as well as a strategic oriented reforming of the institutional system of these countries, namely by those parameters measured after by the BTI within the frame of the EU association program. The Baltic States transformation indicators at the end of 2000s allowed to classify these countries as stable developed market economies and functioning democracies (the index indicator is from 8 to 10), with an efficient management in Estonia (the index is in the range between 7 and 10) and an effective management with some drawbacks in Lithuania and Latvia (the index indicator ranges from 5,6 to 7). Out of all other countries of the former USSR only Georgia demonstrates similar manage-

ment efficiency indicators due to a significant decrease in the level of corruption as a result of M. Saakashvili's reforms and the civil society consolidation after "the revolution of roses". The countries of the former USSR differ in all indicators of the institutional transformation of the political system. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia (the index is from 6 to 8) are classified as defective democracies, Russia, Kirghizia, Kazakhstan (the index ranges from 4 to 6) are considered to be moderate autocracies while Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (with the index less than 4) are identified as autocracies (Table 2).

Table 2. **State of Democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010**[9]

Democracies		Defective Democracies		Highly Defective Democracies	Autocracies
10-9	<9-8	<8-7	<7-6	<6	<4
Slovenia Czechia Estonia (9.6) Hungary Lithuania (9.3) Slovakia	Croatia Poland Latvia (8.85) Bulgaria (8.75) Romania	Macedonia Serbia Albania **Ukraine (7.0)**	Bosnia and Herzegovina **Moldova (6.65)** Georgia (6.05)	***Russia (5.25)*** Armenia (5.0)	Kirghizia (4.4) Kazakhstan (4.17) **Belarus (4.08)** Azerbaijan (3.92 Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan

According to the state of the political system transformation (measured by criteria of functional democracy development) the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland find themselves in different clusters of countries. On the one hand, we can find a gradual development of democratic institutes in Ukraine (the democracy index in 2008 was 6.5 while in 2010 it was 7.0) and Moldova (6.85 and 6.65); on the other hand, we can see the consolidation of autocratic regimes in Belarus (3.93 and 4.08) as well as in Russia (5.35 and 5.25) throughout the 2000s.

Indicators of the market economy development of the former USSR countries also show a gap between the economic development of the Baltic States and the other former USSR countries. The Baltic States in the 2000s were characterized by a sustainable development of the institutes of market economy and social security system, having joined the category of the developed market economies of Central and Eastern Europe countries. The countries of the former USSR mainly were put in a category of market economies with essential functional drawbacks while Belarus and Moldova are characterized as the countries with adverse conditions of the market economy development (Table 3). Throughout 2006-2010 the majority of indicators show that the economies of Belarus and Moldova remain in the same categories with almost invariable index indicators despite the world

financial crisis which essentially affected only the indicators of Ukraine's economic development (it was 6.82 in 2006, 6.5 in 2008 and 6.11 in 2010).

Table 3. **Condition of market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The countries are presented according to the decrease of Bertelsmann market economy transformation index 2010**[10]

Developed Market Economy		Viable \ Functional Market Economy	Market Economy with Functional Flaws	Adverse Conditions of Market Economy
10-9	<9-8	<8-7	<7-5	<5
Czechia (9.5) Slovenia (9.29) Estonia (9.07)	Slovakia (8.93) Lithuania (8.79) Hungary (8.75) Poland (8.71) Latvia (8.18) Croatia	Macedonia Bulgaria (7.96) Romania (7.96)	Serbia Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Armenia (6.5) Kazakhstan (6.32) ***Russia (6,14)*** **Ukraine (6.11)** Georgia (6.0) Azerbaijan (5.79)	**Belarus (4.96)** **Moldova (4.93)**

So, the comparison of complex indicators of the institutional transformation of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova with other countries of the post-communist space do not give any reason to speak about the presence of a special institutional Eastern Europe Borderland. The research findings demonstrate rather the variability of the institutional development of the countries of the former USSR. This data prove the dependence on the passed way (path dependency) of the Soviet societal type which draws the border of transformation dynamics between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which entered the EU (including the Baltic States) and the countries of the former USSR (except for the Baltic States).

The transformation measured with abovementioned indicators of the institutional development of the post-communist space are in favor of the arguments of methodological nationalism (or societalism) in the analysis of macrosocial transformation processes. Within the framework of methodological nationalism these processes were described with the help of the concept of "the national style of the transformation process" (Zaslavskaya, Yadov 2010) at the theoretical level of post-Soviet sociology. The concept "national style of transformation" was introduced by Russian sociologists T.I. Zaslavskaya and V.A. Yadov to analyze and explain the variation of the results of the post-Soviet society transformation in different post-USSR countries. Using the example of Russia's societal transformations the authors show the link between the dependence of dynamics of the twenty year post-Soviet society development on the specificity of the national "interpretation" of the imposed rules of democracy and market economy, that are general

for the globalized world system rules for democracy and market. This determines the national specificity of embedding into society of those "operations and grammars" (in terms of "social rule systems" by T. Burns and E. Flam (Burns, Flam 1987)). These features of the "national style of transformation" are produced by the specificity of "institutional matrixes" of economy and control systems (Bessonova 2008), (Kirdina 2001) as well as the reproduction of social and cultural legitimations of a certain type, the social attitudes of social practices and social interactions of social actors (both individual and group, from a mass average people to elites of a society).

The "national style of transformation" is a concept developed for the description of the Russian specifics of the post-USSR transformation processes. This concept can work quite well for the description of differences in social and cultural systems of post-Soviet societies, the specificity of their institutional design; and it is a matter for an empirical testing. However, our research question deals not so much with the identification of specific features (which are obvious as well from the empirical indicators of Bertelsmann Transformation Index) but with the detection of similarity of social development types. We are to look for the empirical argument pro or contra in overcoming methodological nationalism using as an example the Eastern Europe Borderland (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). The analysis of theoretical arguments suggests searching the solution in the analysis of social and cultural indicators of the social cost of the post-Soviet transformation.

The review of sociological publications focused on the post-Soviet transformation processes in the last two decades demonstrates lack of the complex measurement of the social context and quality of life, people's social health and physical health, the self-evaluation of life chances dynamics along with the subjective indicators of social inequality *as a result of* the post-Soviet society *transformation*. These indicators of the similarity in the perception of the transformation and its results by public opinion can be formed by the influence of the social and cultural borderland situation. Namely, it could be caused by the location between Soviet ideals, attitudes, value systems and orientations, on the one hand – orientations to social models of the European quality of life, the division of societies between the geopolitical orientations to Russia and the EU on the other hand, and, accordingly, the ambivalence of attitudes towards social inequality. It also includes the vision of the future of the country or countries as a common borderland space. We could make an assumption that such a social and cultural borderland location should be expressed in a similar social cost of the transformation process in the post-Soviet societal type and show either a similarity or a difference of a formed Eastern Europe Borderland as a type of the post-Soviet society in comparison with Russia and other countries of the former USSR. The comparison of features of the social and cultural perception of the transformation and its social cost in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova should be used to check this assumption within the further analysis.

One of the major criteria of success of the society transformation is its social cost measured with the indicators of the societies social health or the quality of their human potential. The concept "social cost" of the Eastern Europe Borderland transformation does

not possess a measuring character but is rather seen as a concept resulting in an interdisciplinary comparative empirically grounded analysis of the societies of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova through the prism of the social result of complex social changes of the last two decades. The integrated concept "social cost" includes the indicators of the demographic development (dynamics of life expectancy, suicide, health), of the economic development (GNP per capita at par purchasing capacity, the Gini index of inequality of incomes), complex indexes of human development of the United Nations as well as the indicators of society's social health (social optimism, trust, quality of life, etc.) measured within the frameworks of the sociological surveys.

The profiles of the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland presented a set of objective indicators of societal development in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova for 2009. They set the framework for the analysis of social and cultural changes (see the table 4).

Table 4. **Key Development Indicators for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia as of 2009**[11]

Indicators	Ukraine	Belarus	Moldova	Russia
Population, millions	46,5	9,7	3.7	142,1
Growth of population, %	-0,6	-0,3	-1.1	-0,3
Expected life expectancy, years	68	70	68	68
Urban population, %	67,9	73,0	42	72,9
Index of human development	0,8	0,83	0,72	0,82
HDI rank (out of 182)	85	68	117	71
Index of education of the United Nations	0,96	0,96	0,90	0,93
Gender equality (1)	0,45	-*	0,41	0,54
GNP per capita ($)	6 933	10 886	2 646	14 690
Gini index of inequality	28,2	27,9	35,6	37,5
Poverty (2), %	<2	2,0	28,9	<2

(1) Measure of realization of the rights of women is Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).

* There is no data

(2) Percent of the population living on less than $2 a day.

A radical reduction of Ukraine's population (according to the USSR census of 1989 in Ukraine there lived 51,5 million people while according to the state committee of statistics of Ukraine there were 45,9 million people in 2010) became the most essential demographic change in the countries of the Eastern Europe Borderland whereas in Belarus and Moldova the population decrease was not so dramatic in the last two decades. Thus, the USSR census of 1989 showed that there were 10,15 million people in Belarus (9,7 million in 2009) and there were 4,3 million inhabitants in Moldova(3,7 million in 2009). The scholars argue that the essential reasons for a sharp reduction of Ukraine's population were

– long-term consequences of the Chernobyl disaster 1986, such as the deterioration of health of the population and the increase in the number of illnesses that increased death rate,

– a sharp decrease of the birth rate and the reduction of the life expectancy,

– poverty and the deterioration of nutrition,

– decline in a healthy life style (the growth of the population alcoholization processes and mass spread of smoking among all age groups in the 1990–2000s),

– emigration processes.

Suicide statistics also made its contribution to the decrease of the population as social shocks and the crisis of the USSR disintegration led to a dramatic increase in the number of anomie suicides (E. Durkheim's terminology) that reached its peak in 1995-2000 (see picture 2).




Figure 2. Suicide rate dynamics (number of people who committed suicide per 100 000 of the population) 1985–2010 in Borderland countries according to the World Health Organization12

The main challenge now is the social health of the society that is influenced not only by global ecological challenges and local environment conditions, but also the processes of individualization, globalization and change in the type of rationality during the post-Soviet transformation as well as mass social expectations oriented towards implementing the European social model of quality of life.

The medical terminology was often included into the sociological diagnostics of the initial stage of the post-Soviet transformation generating the society's self-description

in terms of medical pathology. Such concepts as a "transformation as a social and cultural *trauma*" (Sztompka 2001), "social *madness*" (Golovaha, Panina 1994); "*crisis* society" (Lapin, Beljaeva 1994), a "great post-Soviet *depression*" (Minchenko 2002) (*italicized by me, S.B.)* could serve as vivid examples. While analyzing society in terms of pathology and deviations, these and the other scholars used to have a certain image of some average European society. Most typically they imply the European model of welfare society; to implement this model was one of the most shared goals for social and economic reforms and initial transformation of the Soviet society in the former USSR countries. They used such an average European model as a "normal" or socially healthy society, and took it as a point for a comparison defining the current rapidly transforming societies as deviant, marginal, "sane", "crisis", etc. But they did not have as a point of reference the Soviet society, which was a previous sustainable condition of the societal system in post-USSR societies, it was not "normal" for their further comparison.

The society's social health does not represent only a set of indicators of the population health that are more often measured through statistics of life expectancy, illnesses, birth rate and death rate parity, deviant behavior (in particular, the level of suicide and mental deviations). Social health of a society also includes the factors of social perception of quality of life and social state of health, life satisfaction and social optimism, parameters of social integration and solidarity. The inclusion of social and cultural indicators into the concept "social health of society" allows to describe and explain the quality of the social development in the conditions of a radical social transformation within the frame of its cultural and social order. Moreover, the society of the late modernity operates as a self-reflexive system, so the discourse about the health of society directly affects society's further functioning. So, the trust (distrust) in the generalized others and social institutes gives a feedback of expectations and social actions of people in the conditions of risks and uncertainty of situations of the social systemic transformation. This leads to the institutionalization of those practices where the trust prevails over the mistrust. For example, a high share of informal economy in post-Soviet societies is based on a high level of mistrust to formal social institutes and a high level of interpersonal trust (strong and weak social relations). This situation prolongs the Soviet informal institutes of protection ("blat"), barter, bribes and "gifts" for solving everyday problems at the mass level of public interactions instead of (and together with) appealing to the formal institutions of courts, rights protection, etc.

The globalization of social inequalities is an essential re-orientation and an epistemological challenge to the theoretical explanation as well as empirical (including comparative) research of social transformations. First of all, it becomes possible to describe social dynamics on a global scale due to macrosocial indexes developed for the measurement of societal dynamics worldwide, and accumulation of databases of world statistics (Gini indexes, GNP per capita, human development index, etc.).

Thus, in order to make a complex analysis of social consequences of the post-Soviet transformation of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (which allows to analyze the heuristic

potential of their analysis as countries of the Eastern Europe Borderland) it becomes necessary to add socio-cultural indicators which could complete institutional indicators of transformation measured by Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI). The social consequences of the post-Soviet transformation describe the specific changes at the level of human potential and social perception of transformation; they are presented through a complex parameter "the social cost of transformation" which includes the following system of indicators (Figure 3).

Social Cost of Transformation		
Social health	Social inequality	
– Life expectancy – Health index – Dynamics of suicide level	– Indexes of human development (HDI by UNDP) – GNP per capita at par purchasing capacity(GDP PPP), – Gini index (inequality of incomes)	Level of Macroindicators
– Level of social optimism – Level of Trust – Self-estimation of quality of life – Self- estimation of health	– Perception of inequality – Dynamics of evaluation of financial position – Life satisfaction	Level of Social Perception

Figure 3. Scheme of Transformation Measurement
(system of indicators of the social cost of post-Soviet society transformation)

Human Development Index is one of the integral society development indicators in the global measurement of the world public development worked out within the frame of the UNDP program calculated on the basis of statistical data. It is the most consistent macroindicator among the parameters of social inequality among societies caused by the post-communist transformation. Availability of databases and online possibilities of descriptive comparative statistics allows to make a comparative analysis of inequality levels of the population of the countries and world regions through different indicators in comparable units. This statistics also allows to describe the dynamics of changes in inequalities, whereas the period of coverage of this dynamics is limited by the introduction of the generalized ways of the statistical data gathering both in particular countries and by updating and improving the techniques of generalization of the data introduced recently. The human development index (HDI) consists of three components (health index, income index and education). Some changes in the calculation of the HDI and sub-indexes were

done in 2009, and the UNDP HDI report 2010 contained those changes. It included the data from 169 countries. The indexes comprising HDI were re-calculated with the help of the generalized renewed method in those countries having the data for a 40-year-old period. The site "International indicators of human development" (International 2010) provides access to interactive statistical data and trends of change of indexes for 1970–2010, the description of the method of index calculation as well as a possibility to compare indicators using the updated method applying the interval of 5 years. These data clearly show the gap and deepening of inequalities in the development of regions including the Global North (the so-called West) and the Global East as well as separate countries during the last 30 years. This tendency is true for the post-Soviet territory divided endwise into the West (the European part of the post-communist region) and the East (Transcaucasia and the countries of middle Asia of the former USSR). The data on divergences in the development of the former Soviet Union countries are quite indicative. After the period of the crisis and decline in the 1990s to 2010 these countries by the majority of HDI indicators are only catching up the level of this index for 1985 (except for Kazakhstan and Belarus which demonstrate a fast growth of HDI indicators throughout 2005-2010) (see table 5).

Table 5. **Dynamics of the Human Development Index in the countries of the former USSR and some countries of Central and Eastern Europe 1985–2010**[13]

Country / Year	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Azerbaijan	0,669	0,669	0,6	0,63	0,693	0,746
Armenia	0,644	0,642	0,608	0,65	0,695	0,718
Georgia	0,731	0,713	0,612	0,65	0,686	0,703
Kazakhstan	0,705	0,713	0,668	0,68	0,733	0,75
Russia	0,757	0,761	0,715	0,723	0,741	0,766
Ukraine	***0,744***	***0,742***	***0,682***	***0,682***	***0,716***	***0,73***
Belarus	***0,727***	***0,728***	***0,688***	***0,72***	***0,749***	***0,777***
Moldova	***0,65***	***0,657***	***0,60***	***0,599***	***0,632***	***0,645***
Latvia	0,742	0,737	0,692	0,746	0,791	0,792
Lithuania	0,759	0,758	0,716	0,762	0,798	0,802
Estonia	0,753	0,747	0,723	0,774	0,812	0,818
Bulgaria	0,721	0,731	0,722	0,731	0,761	0,78
Hungary	0,747	0,743	0,745	0,78	0,813	0,82
Poland	0,731	0,736	0,755	0,789	0,807	0,826
Romania	0,725	0,723	0,702	0,713	0,755	0,785
Slovakia	0,738	0,747	0,753	0,769	0,799	0,822
Czechia	0,77	0,778	0,783	0,796	0,826	0,841

In the 2000s Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are characterized by a more sustainable development than Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia while Moldova even in 2010 did not reach the level of 1985 in all HDI indicators. Azerbaijan and Armenia show a high HDI

level in 2010 due to the life expectancy component (one of the indicators of the health index comprising the total HDI index) while the countries of the European part of the CIS show a prompt decrease whereas according to other components of the HDI (indicators of income, consumption and education) their development is comparable to that of Georgia and Kazakhstan. At the same time, Georgia, unlike other countries of this region and despite a significant growth of HDI indicators did not reach the HDI level of 1985 in 2010.




Figure 4. Dynamics of the Human Development Index (HDI) 1985–2010 in the Borderland countries[14]

Unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including the Baltic States) the post-Soviet countries demonstrate the most clear differentiation of transformation results if we compare the parameters of human development and institutional indicators. The Baltic States reached the peak of the social and economic system crisis in 1995. They also faced a significant decrease of the HDI the same year similar to all other former USSR countries. However, already in 2000 the level of the HDI in the Baltic States reached the indicators of 1985 and continued to grow rapidly throughout the next decade. It has moved to the level of indicators of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe due to the growth of GNP per capita. Let's consider more thoroughly the data for the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland (figure 4) and compare the trends using the average results of the human development index according to the types of the countries of the transformed post-communist space (figure 5).

The data demonstrate an obvious difference in the dynamics of development of human potential in Moldova to the other countries of Eastern Europe Borderland; also indicators of HDI (both at starting and final points of comparison) are very similar in Belarus and Russia, and slightly different (a bit lower) in Ukraine (figure 4).




Figure 5. Comparison of Human Development Indexes Means' 1985–2010 dynamics in four blocks of countries of post-communist transformation (means are calculated according to data in table 5)

Abbreviations: av. – average; GAAK – Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan; UBM – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova; CEE – the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania).

The comparison of the mean value of the human development index in different blocks of the countries of the former USSR shows something like a pattern of the human potential development in the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland, Transcaucasia and Kazakhstan along with an essential difference between these countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe where the index drop during post-communist decades was not so considerable, and more sustainable development of the human potential has been observed since 1995 (figure 5).

The essential component of the human development index of the UNDP is the index of health calculated on the basis of sets of indicators of the life expectancy at birth. According to the United Nations the dynamics of this indicator in the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland is characterized by a similar pattern, but since 1990 the dynamics of the health index in Russia is different from them (figure 6).

The Constitutions of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova guarantee general access to public health services but in reality this access to public health services is limited in many aspects. The state expenses on public health services in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova make up approximately 4% share of the GDP (in comparison it is about 7% in the EU).

However, taking into account a considerable difference in the GDP level in the EU and the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland the difference in public health services financing is significant. This sphere constantly faces insufficient financing and a budget deficit in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. It is partially compensated for by informal payments (from the population pocket) and the development of paid medicine in Ukraine and Moldova. The latter in turn becomes a significant element of inequality when accessing the public health services becomes based on the level of the material well-being of people. According to the experts shadow payments in the public health care make up at least 30–50 % of the State expenditure on public health services thus compensating a very low official salary in medical institutions (which is about 100–150 Euros per month) (Astrov et al. 2010).




Figure 6. Dynamics of the Health Index 1985-2010 in Borderland countries[15]

The state of health of the population is also rooted in the unhealthy lifestyles, such as the overconsumption of alcohol, including strong spirits, and excessive smoking, a high premature death rate, the pollution of water resources and a limited access to the water supply and sewage; in some cases (in particular, in Belarus and Ukraine) the increased level of radioactivity after the Chernobyl disaster. As a result of this, the expected life expectancy in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova is 11–12 years shorter than in the countries of Europe. There a big gap (more than 10 years) between the life expectancy for women and men in Belarus and Ukraine. The mortality rate coefficient in all three countries is higher than in the EU member states. There is a differentiation within the EU, but the gap

between old and some new EU member states (including Lithuania) decreased last decade. It should be mentioned that for example, in Bulgaria and Romania, there is a big difference in access to medical services for the rural and urban population as there is a lack of medical staff and quality equipment in the countryside. The same access problem is true for Moldova where more than 50% of the population lives in the countryside.

The subjective indicators of health also have similar characteristics in societies of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. For instance, according to the results of the monitoring conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine about half of the respondents in Ukraine indicated that they do lack health for a high quality of life and this indicator actually has not changed throughout 1992–2010. It was 48,3% in 1995, 52% in 2000, 51,3% in 2005 and 45,8 % in 2008, 46,5% in 2010. The share of those who claim that their health is sufficient is about 30% of the population (Golovaha 2011:36). The results of this monitoring also show that every fourth respondent evaluateshis/her state of health as bad or very bad while only 16–19% evaluates their health as good and only about 2% said that it is excellent (Golovaha 2011:45).

According to two waves of the "Health in Times of Transition" research[16] the subjective estimations of the state of health in three analyzed countries in 2001 was similar and differed only slightly from the evaluation of health in Russia (figure 7). The analysis of subjective estimations of the state of health in 8 countries of the former USSR allows to fix a difference in the pattern of the condition of health problems (self-estimations of respondents) and a general state of health in the countries of the Eastern European part of the former USSR and Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Abbot et al. 2010).




Figure 7. Health self-evaluation in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia (in %, 2001 and 2010)

The description of the condition of social health in the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland also presupposes the inclusion of indicators of interrelations between society and a person registered by means of comparative sociological surveys. The comparisons of self-estimation of the economic well-being of one's own family and the country is one of such indicators. According to the Eurasian monitoring, only Belarus demonstrates consistency in the evaluation of the economic situation of the country and one's own family, while in Ukraine and Moldova these estimations differ almost twice (figure 8).




Figure 8. Self-evaluation of own family's and country's economic situation ("Eurasian monitoring", in % to the interviewed, December, 2010)[17]

It characterizes a gap between the perception of one's own standard of living and the estimation of economic development of the country as unsatisfactory. It indirectly testifies to the importance of influence of informal (not official) economy on the standard of well-being of the population in these countries. A high spread of the level of poverty and inequality is also characterized by self-estimations of the consumer status of a family in the post-Soviet countries (figure 9). The latter also shows specific features in social results of the economic development in the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland. For example, in 2010 in Moldova 42% of the people lived at the level of survival (they indicated that their income is insufficient to buy food that is comparable to the level of absolute poverty) whereas in Ukraine the figure was twice less with 22% and there are only 4% of people in this situation in Belarus.

The results of the evaluation of the life satisfaction in the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland correspond to the possibility of satisfying primary needs, and that are not surprising. For example, 73% of the interviewed are dissatisfied with their life in Moldova while in Ukraine this number is 64% and in Belarus only 29 % of the population was dissatisfied with their life (Figure 10).




Figure 9. Self-estimation of family consumer status in the countries of the former USSR ("Eurasian Monitoring", in % to the interviewed, December, 2010)[18]




Figure 10. Life satisfaction in the countries of the former USSR ("Eurasian Monitoring", in % to the interviewed, December, 2010)[19]

The dynamics of life satisfaction is a social adaptation indicator representing a generalized characteristic of the level of the population adaptation to the changing social environment and finding one's place in it. According to the Eurasian monitoring conducted in the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland the growth of the life satisfaction level has

been registered in Belarus (from 44 % in 2004 to 65% in December, 2010) while this indicator was in a stagnating position in Ukraine (in a range of 34 % (2004) – 32 % in December, 2010) and fell down from 45% in 2007 to 26% in December, 2010 in Moldova (figure 11). If we compare the indicators of life satisfaction in European countries then according to the European social survey in 2009 on a 10-point scale (where 10 means "completely satisfied" and 1 means "completely dissatisfied") the mean level of life satisfaction is about 7,5 in the countries of Western Europe; it is 6,0-6,3 in the Baltic States (Estonia and Latvia); it is 4,2 in Ukraine and 5,4 in Russia (Golovaha, Gorbachik 2010:76).




Figure 11. Dynamics of life satisfaction of inhabitants of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova in 2004–2010 ("Eurasian Monitoring", % of answers "satisfied with life I have now" December, 2010)[20]

Finally, a significant indicator of the social health of society as a part of social cost of the post-Soviet transformation is the dynamics of the level of social optimism among the population, which also characterizes the level of social adaptation and integration of societies fixing the level of social stability of societies through the confidence in future. All three countries of the post-Soviet space demonstrate a rather low level of social optimism. Despite splashes in social hopes in Ukraine related to the events of the orange revolution of 2004–2005 and the presidential election of 2005 in Belarus, two thirds of the population of Eastern Europe Borderland view the development of events next year in a pessimistic manner while the level of social optimism fluctuates in the range of 14–18% in Ukraine, 21–28% in Moldova and 28–33 % in Belarus with slight deviations (figure 12).

Summing up the results of the study we should emphasize several ideas about specific features and differences of the social context of the post-USSR transformation. In order to develop a complete estimation of the social cost of transformation we need both the theoretical development of the description and explanation of transformation processes in post-Soviet societies and its empirical testing. The empirical indicators of social cost of transformation are based on the results of the analysis of the accessible empirical data of comparative sociological research and the international comparative macroindexes of

social development. The dynamics of parameters of social cost of the post-Soviet transformation includes both the evaluation of the indexes and sociocultural indicators, such as social health, social optimism and pessimism, life satisfaction, social expectations, quality of life of the population that allow to make a number of conclusions.




Figure 12. Dynamics of social optimism (a set of positive replies to the question "Will the position of the family greatly improve or slightly improve within the next year?", "Eurasian Monitoring", in % to the interviewed, December, 2010)[21]

Firstly, both the data of the institutional development of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and social consequences of the results of the post-Soviet transformation do not provide any reason to identify the region of Eastern Europe Borderland as a coherent social and cultural space of the post-USSR transformation where the processes of societal changes have led to such results.

Secondly, the main borders of the social space of the post-Soviet transformation are the borders between the EU (including the Baltic States) and the countries of Eastern Europe Borderland (including Russia and other countries of the former USSR except for the Baltic States) which mark the divergence of development vectors of the post-Soviet societies that is demonstrated in the differences of the social perception of inequality, social health and social adaptation in the societies under review.

Thirdly, the social construction of the "Eastern European Borderland" as an analytical category to identify a part of the post-Soviet transformation social space does not find any empirical arguments within the frame of the sociological analysis. It does not works neither for the indicators of the institutional order, such as democracy and market economy development measured by BTI, nor for the social perception of the process and the results of societal transformation in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

Literature

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Notes

1 The article was written within the frame of the CASE program "Social Transformation in Borderland (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova)" in 2010–2011 with the financial support of Carnegie Corporation (New York) and ACTR/ACCELS.

2 *Path dependency* (or dependence on the passed way) is D. Stark and L. Bruszt's concept aimed at the description of the historical conditionality of complexities and reversion of the post-communist transformation caused by the stability and continuity in reproduction of social structures, social institutes and social networks of the Soviet society's type.

3 To read more about the problem of methodological nationalism see the discussion Beck, The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails in *Theory Culture Society* 2007; 24; 286.; *Babenko S.* Social Inequalities in European Society or European Societies? Methodological Nationalism Challenge for Social Inequalities Theorizing and Research // European Societies: European Society? Abstracts book of the 9th European Sociological Association Conference. Lisbon, 2009. P. 265.; *Patel S.* An International Sociology with Diverse Epistemes // Global Dialogue. The ISA Newsletter. Vol. 1, № 4. 2011. P. 12–13/available at http://www.isa-sociology.org/global-dialogue/

4 "*Natural to the whole world* aspiration for material benefits" is an arguable point, it is the generalization based on the American-centered vision of culture claimed to be universal, but it does not cover *"the whole world"* with its variety of values and norms rooted, for example, in Buddhism or Orthodox Christianity.

5 We use the term a "post-Soviet" society (culture, phenomenon etc.) to define the countries of the former USSR and to underline their prominent features. We use the term a "post-communist" society as a wider concept to define common features of societies including besides the post-Soviet society of Central and Eastern Europe other societies with communist regimes.

6 To read more about phases of transformation see Kutsenko 2004.

7 *Source:* http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de

8 Data can be found at the site of Bertelsmann Fund (Bertelsmann Stiftung) http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de

9 Data can be found at the site of Bertelsmann Fund (Bertelsmann Stiftung) http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de

10 Data can be found at the site of Bertelsmann Fund (Bertelsmann Stiftung) http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de

11 *Source*: Human Development Report 2009. UNDP; World Development Indicators 2009. The World Bank Selected Indicators.

12 The source of data is the site of the World Health Organization [electronic resource]. http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/country_reports/en/index.html)

13 The source of data is the site of the UNDP [electronic resource]. http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/1980-2010

14 The source of the data is the site of the UNDP [electronic resource]. The http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/1980-2010/

15 The source of the data is the site of the UNDP [electronic resource]. The http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/1980-2010/

16 Living Conditions, Lifestyle and Health (2001), Health in Times of Transition (2010) Research Projected funded by the EU under the 7th Framework Programme. The information is accessible on the sites http://www.hitt-cis.net/ru/results/ and http://www.llh.at/

17 The source of the data is the site "Eurasian Monitoring" [electronic resource]: http://www.eurasiamonitor.org

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

Svetlana Suveice, Ludmila Coada

REVIEW
Sergiu Musteata, Igor Casu.
Fără termen de prescripţie. Aspecte ale investigării crimelor comunismului în Europa
(No Prescription. Aspects of the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Europe).
Chisinau: Cartier Publishing House, 2011, 789 p.
(in romanian)

This year the prestigious Moldovan Publishing House Cartier released an important volume, No Prescription. Aspects of the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Europe, published with the support of the East – East: Partnership without Borders, Soros Foundation-Moldova and Soros-Foundation-Romania. The publication of such long-time expected work was possible as a result of the collective effort of the great majority of members of the Commission for the Study and Appreciation of the Totalitarian Communist Regime in Moldova, created by Presidential decree of January 14, 2010. The international conference "Democracy after Totalitarianism: Lessons learned in 20 years", organized in Chisinau in May 2010 by the National Association of Young Historians of Moldova, was another event that impulsioned its publication: it gathered together Moldovan researchers that studied communist past, as well as researchers from Central and Eastern Europe that were ready to share their research and institutional experience, and efforts toward the appreciation of the totalitarian regime of the countries these represented.

The release of the volume revived public discussions on the communist period in Moldova. Here the state authorities failed to condemn the communist regime, following the example of other Central and East European states; the vacuum left by the absence of an official statement on condemning communism – necessary for the present and the future of Moldova – is an issue that creates the feeling of uncertainty toward the communist past. This is the message of the book coordinators who, in the Foreword, characterized the

communist regime in former MSSR as a regime established by force of arms and terror, promoted by propaganda, as one inhuman, repressive, responsible for acts of genocide and that caused suffering to Moldovan society (p. 7–12).

The first section of the volume, entitled The Experience of the former socialist countries in studying and condemning the communist regime, consists of sixteen scholarly articles authored by experts from various disciplines – historians, archivists, political scientists – mainly from the former Soviet and/or former socialist states, but also from the USA and UK. These are primarily devoted to analyzing the communist history and experience of the six countries, Romania and Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, that assumed studies and condemned their totalitarian past.

The section begins with Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu's study of the communism phenomenon. Going beyond presenting communism as an economic, moral, social and cultural doctrine, the scholar draws attention to the main factors that have grounded it: the privileged role of the party and the revolutionary transformation of human nature (p. 13). The study is a comprehensive analysis of the concepts of communism, of the circumstances in which Marx's political thought has been reviewed by Lenin, who established in Russia an authoritarian system, based from the very beginning on the violence and repression against any form of opposition (p. 16). The author of the introductive study served as the president of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, created by President Traian Basescu in April 2006.

One of the most important subjects addressed in the first section of the book concerns the creation of research centers and commissions to investigate the repressive policies. Such institutions were founded and have operated in Estonia, the Czech Republic and Romania. Thus, according to the Aigi Rahi-Tamm's article regarding the investigation of the Soviet repressions in Estonia, several similar commissions were established in Estonia, such as: the Commission created by the Academy of Sciences of Estonia in 1990 that provided a comprehensive overview of the extent of the damage inflicted by the Soviet Union to Estonia and its people, and whose report has served as the basis for assessing the Soviet political and military actions against Estonia in 1940, as aggression, military occupation and annexation (p. 54); the State Commission of Estonia, created by the Estonian Parliament in 1993, which estimated in 2005 the extent of damages and losses supported by Estonians as the result of the Soviet and German occupation (p. 55–56). The Museum of Occupations in Tallinn opened with the support of the Kistler-Ritso Foundation in 2003, and dedicated to the 1940-1991 period of Estonian history. The investigation of crimes against humanity committed in Estonia and against Estonian citizens constituted also the priority of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity, presented by Meelis Maripuu and Meelis Saueauk in their study, Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (1998–2008) and the New Perspectives. The authors show that the above Commission acted during a decade and, up to the completion of its primary mission, published important materials on the recent Estonian history (p. 76).

The Czech experience in studying the communist past at the institutional level is reflected in Vojtech Ripka's work about the repression and legitimacy in the late communist Czechoslovakia and the Institute for the Study of totalitarian regimes. The author discusses the foundation of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes by the Czech government in 2007, and both the goal and the role of the Institute in evaluating the nature of the Nazi and Communist regimes, as well as in gathering, analyzing and making accessible documents from the Nazi and Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia during 1938–1945 and 1948–1989 (p. 106, 108–109).

Similar institutions aiming to investigate communist crimes were created in Romania. Professor Denis Deletant's study, Interrogating the Past: Some Reflections on the Post-1990 Study of the Communism in Romania, reflects on the activity of the Institute for the Investigation of the Communist Crimes, created by the Romanian government in December 2005, and whose members have provided – through monographs, scholarly articles, textbooks – a clear picture of what the phenomenon of Romanian communism meant (p. 128–131). The scholar also mentioned the Romanian Institute for the Recent History (p. 131–132), the National Council for the Study of the former Securitate Archives (CNSAS) (p. 133), the Civic Academy Foundation, created by Ana Blandiana and Romulus Rusan, who most recently worked on the founding of the Memorial of the Victims of Communism and Sighet Resistance, seen by the author as "the most prominent museum of communist repression in Europe if not in the world"(p. 136), the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, which operates under the aegis of the Romanian Academy and has become a credible source of information about the communist past (p. 136).

Cristian Vasile, the member of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, discusses in his essay the conditions under which the Commission has functioned, its activity, achievements and major difficulties encountered. The author points out that the Commission's mission was to "develop a scientific synthesis of institutions and methods that fed abuses and crimes of the Romanian communist regime since its establishment until the Revolution of 1989", but also to open the archives on the communist regime, to remove the National Archives from the subordination of the Ministry of Administration and Interior (p. 201–203) and thus, to facilitate the investigation of the crimes committed by the communist regime. The Final Report of the Commission, presented in December 2006, highlighted the iniquities committed by the totalitarian communist regime. It was adopted as the official document of the Romanian Presidency and qualified as a "milestone in the Romanian society's effort to clarify its attitude to the past" (p. 126).

The access to archives in order to investigate the totalitarian past is another issue addressed in the first section of the book. Aigi Rahi-Tamm argues that in Estonia the scientific research into the communist era became possible after the interdiction to access once-secret documents was cancelled, and after the Estonian Communist Party Archives were gradually opened from 1991 onward (p. 52–53). In the Czech Republic, as Paul Navratil relates, the opening of the archives became possible after Czechoslovak Parliament adopted

a series of laws designed to ease the scholars' efforts in investigating the recent history, such as: The Lustration Law of 1991 made the first move towards opening up the archives of security, the former being available at the outset for only the administrative purposes; the 1996 Law on declassification of files created during the activities of the State Security Services, amended in 2000, that marked a new important step undertaken to facilitate the access to archives; the Law on archives in 2004 that guaranteed an unlimited access to all archival material of the Czechoslovak security service by 1 January 1990 (p. 96).

In Romania the opening of the communist archives was a more prolonged and difficult process. It has occurred in the context of the activity of Tismaneanu's Commission. (Cristian Vasile affirms that the Commission got, almost from the very beginning, a privileged access to the National Archives, but in no case a complete one and some files were hidden (p. 205). The Commission has encountered difficulties in accessing the Ministry of Health's Archives (p. 207), the Archive of the National Institute of Statistics (p. 208), the Archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service, ecclesiastical archives (p. 214), and others. Resistance expressed by the National Archives to the Commission and the divergences between historians and archivists in the post-December Romania are explained by Alina Pavelescu, who concludes that those two categories have different ways in assuming their social roles (p. 193). What really matters, however, is that eventually, due to the insistent approach of the Commission's members many archival funds were opened (Cristian Vasile, p. 215), and that all the documents explored by the Commission became available to all other interested researchers (p. 205).

The first section of the book also addresses topics related to the impact of the communist past on the modern, post-communist eastern- and central-European societies. Thus Rahi-Tamm Aigi analyzes the subject of deportation of Estonians concluding that deportation has been seen in Estonia as a political action of violence and that its impact made itself felt in all areas of life (p. 68–69). Uve Poom examines identity and integrationist politics in Estonia that constitutes one of the most significant post-communist struggles, largely because of the different ways the two ethnic groups, Estonians and Russians, interpreted recent history of the region (p. 78). Matej Medvecky focuses on Czechoslovakia's security service that has changed its statute from a key instrument in the Communist Party's successful rise to power to an instrument of control and repression, spreading fear and terror and being responsible for engineering monstrous crimes and processes (p. 94). Vladimir Tolz is concerned with the Western broadcasting to the Soviet Union and the Kremlin's response and measures undertaken to limit public access to Voice of America, BBC and other international broadcasters.

The essayist and literary critic Smaranda Vultur scrutinizes Romanian historiography for the period of 1990–2000 and states that different topics regarding the communist past and concerning the anticommunist resistance, deportations, collectivization, but also topics related to the international relations and diplomacy and political history including the identity and gender issues – all of them ignored before 1989 – make up the content of the post-revolutionary Romanian historiography (p. 170). Octavian Roske's article that exam-

ines a very painful subject, collectivization of Romanian agriculture point out at the fact that Romanian collectivization have started with slow steps, but ended – because of the violent methods authorities used – rather tumultuous, at rates similar only to those in the USSR (p. 237). Adrian Cioflanca focuses on the role of the Romanian Union of Communist Youth and concludes that the League of Youth, as well as other youth movements and organizations created by the regime, became a lever of control of the population by 1989, when all these organizations fell largely due to the contribution of the young people to the overthrowing of the regime (p. 305). Nikolai Vukov concludes the first part of the volume with an analysis of the main trends in representation and interpretation of Bulgarian national historic monuments after 1989, denoting the problems raised by the monuments erected both over the communist and transition periods (p. 307).

The second section of the book that bears the suggestive title, The Study of the Communist Regime in Moldova, includes thirteen studies produced by Moldovan historians, mostly members of the Commission for the Study and Appreciation of the Totalitarian Communist Regime. While presenting different methodological approach and varying in content, these aim at restoring little-known pages of the history of the region during the Soviet times, analyze concepts and terms, depict the way how the point of view of the Soviet historiography evolved and address the problem of the collective memory and the legacy of the communist regime. Thus, it is confirmed that the purpose of the book was to present arguments not only of factual and statistical nature, which are also very useful for the reconstruction of a missing puzzle, but also for the multidimensional analysis of the mostly unpublished sources, as well as the interpretation and evaluation as an essential component of the study of Moldovan Soviet history. Most of the authors are experienced researchers and the topics analyzed in the volume are the fruit of a prolonged effort, embodied also in monographs and articles published during the last two decades.

Octavian Ticu's study provides a retrospective view on the evolution of the Soviet „moldovenism"and identity policies in Moldavian Autonomous SSR and Moldavian SSR during the years of 1924–1991. The author observes that today we cannot discuss Moldovan identity construction without analyzing how in the geographic and social space "moldovenism – a state policy in MASSR, MSSR and the USSR that had a fixed idea to cultivate a political, ethnic, historical, cultural and linguistic distinctiveness among Romanian population of the Moldavian SSR and the rest of Romania „ was imposed (p. 334).

Another discussed issue is that of the Great Terror of 1937–1938. The contribution of Ion Varta and Tatiana Varta covers the subject of the Great Terror of 1937–1938 which reprezented the peak of the Soviet crimes and was carried out in MASSR; filoromanism was considered a serious end of charges for those Transnistrians that tried „illegal border crossing in Bessarabia, maintained correspondence with relatives, even with of the first degree, located on the right bank" (p. 387), along charges of espionage in favor of Romania. Thus, several hundred people were sentenced to death, inclusively ethnic Ukrainians and Germans, convicted by the „special troika" – a group of three created ad-hoc who

sentenced people to death. In addition to an extremely complex framework of repression in the years 1937–1938 in the country and in the region, the authors present case studies which are shocking by personal tragedy, but also by pedantry and cool blood of the executioners. Gheorghe Negru and Mihai Tasca come with original details about „Coulacs operation" and „Romanian operation" which were the key directions of political repression in MASSR during the years of the Great Terror The study has three appendices that reveal the lists of the „special troikas" and the names of those who made decisions become known (p. 444–455). The authors reconstruct both sides of the barricade, of "enemies" and "heroes", leaving at the same time place for reflection on the division of the society and the consequences of these processes.

Viorica Olaru-Cemârtan offers a retrospective analysis of the three waves of deportations that took place in Bessarabia during 1940–1941 and 1944–1956, thus deportations they in fact become a constant phenomenon during the Soviet period. Regardless of the selection criteria of the victims – political, social or religious – deportations had a mass social, economic and psychological impact. An important point that emerges from her study is that "repressions are a sign of weak character of the Soviet power, because these were the only way to maintain it" (p. 466).

The historian Aurelia Felea presents an original and useful research on the famine of 1946–1947 in Moldavian SSR, in which both memoirs and official sources are placed "face to face" . The author points out that the memoirs confirm the data collected from the official sources about the drastic policy of the Soviet Union in agriculture. Her conclusion is that the drama of hunger did not endanger the preservation of moral values of the daily life elements of Bessarabian village, which included the traumatic memory of most villagers that suffered from famine.

As university professors, the authors of this review confronted themselves with the reluctance of peers on the introduction of the course on the study of anticommunist resistance in Romania and Moldavian SSR. In this sense, the study of Elena Postica, along with her book, present sufficient arguments that resistance was a constant phenomenon that varied in its intensity but manifested throughout the Soviet period among the participants being various categories of people who choose passive or active resistance to protest against the regime. Igor Casu, one of the editors of the present volume, continues the theme of the anticommunist resistance manifested after the XXth CPSU Congress and until the mid 1980s. Based on the files of the KGB archives that opened to the researchers at the time the Commission for the Study and Appreciation of the Totalitarian Communist Regime was formed, the author outlines the face of political opponents of the regime – undesirables and dissidents – that "expressed explicitly anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitudes or manifested certain behaviors stigmatized by the regime " (p. 520).

The fundamental and distinctive feature of the Soviet socialism was egalitarianism, the desire to level the differences in the state, which constrain, crush and dominate" (p. 564), so that the population of the Moldavian SSR, along with other union republics, was subject to extensive processes of social transformation, reflect the authors of the study Social

Inequalities in Soviet Moldova, Nicolae Enciu and Sergiu Chirca. Property was the center of gravity of radical social change in the village, and it forced liquidation by imposed collectivization, nationalization and consolidation of cooperative farm-kolkhoz, had as a consequence the destruction of material and moral values that formed the integrity of the individual and the society.

Another characteristic of the regime, its anti-religious policy, was investigated by Ludmila Tihonov. She emphasizes the mechanisms of state repression against religion, the believers and the church (p. 599–646), and stresses out that the fight against cults had a constant character throughout the Soviet period, having as the consequence the destruction of moral-ethical values. Nevertheless, the researched material clearly indicates that there was individual and group resistance of religious character, manifested by clergy and believers.

Sergiu Musteata and Petru Negura conducted a study that explains the interconnectedness between the processes of indoctrination, Sovietization and Russification and education in Moldovan SSR and their complex impact on the Moldovan society (p. 646-676). As in the last decade an increased attention has been paid to the analysis of the standards and content of textbooks, the analysis of the Soviet textbook which served as an effective means of propaganda for the party as it was full of "stereotypes aimed at instilling fear and hatred of the "enemy" (p. 671), distorted interpretations and conclusions politicized is useful in this sense. The authors conclude by emphasizing that restructuring the education system in Moldova continues, and "communist legacy in this area continues to manifest recurrences" (p. 675).

About how the "point of view of the Soviet historiography on national history" was invented wrote the well-known researchers Demir Dragnev and Pavel Parasca (p. 676–717) which explains in detail the intercalation of political discourse in historical writings, the development of Party organs from scientific directions of activity, the role of specialized institutions and individuals in part. In fact, the last two studies should be considered as a whole when it comes to the development of history education in MSSR. Many of the conclusions on this topic can be found in a recent book signed by one of the editors of the volume, Sergiu Musteață, History education - between political and identity discourse in Moldova" (Chişinău: Pontos, 2010).

Nostalgia for the glorious past feeds itself on the Bolshevic toponimy, so that its significance must be constantly brought to the attention of citizens who subsequently require return to the old names of towns, emphasizes in his study the historian Anatol Petrencu, also member of the Commission for the Study and Appreciation of the Totalitarian Communist Regime (p. 717–725). And last, but not least, comes the contribution to the understanding of the link between communist past and present, signed by Igor Sarov and Andrei Cusco. Using the words of Pierre Nora, the authors ask themselves whether "the change of the attitude toward the past" has produced in Moldovan case, reflecting on the fact that the past remains an "open field" for interpretation, and collective memory still merges historical knowledge. Distancing from the past remains extremely important for our historians, and Western as well as East European experience and strategies are extremely valuable in

this regard, as scarce research of the period that is related to the traumatic memory creates deficiencies for distancing from the past, a past which remains unknown, and perceptions on which are truncated. So far, the political discourse in the public space is marked by the so-called "symbolic competition" for objectivity. Historians note that distancing from the past is a gradual process that requires serious professional effort, as well as preparing the society. The past must be understood in the way that it becomes "a reservoir of meaning and moral vector of the present", conclude I. Sarov and A. Cusco.

The collective volume No Prescription invites to comparative reflections, and these at least from two perspectives: rethinking the past through the lenses of the communist experience of different geographical areas of the Central and Eastern Europe, and assessing the role of various institutions and commission for the study of communist regimes and the impact of the work done for the society. Without any exception, the authors analyze sources with detachment, corroborate official documents with memoirs and interviews, thus highlighting the importance of various sources for the research of certain topic, on the one hand, and providing alternative "truth" which raises new questions, on the other.

The book represents the first collective effort of the Commission for the Study and Appreciation of the Totalitarian Communist Regime in Moldova. Along with scientific and educational implications, it is, without any doubt, a clear signal to political authorities that have not yet proceeded to condemn the communist regime that it is time to act. It will remain as a landmark for the researchers, as well as for those entrusted to educate the younger generation and to help shape a collective memory of a healthy society that learns from past experience, but looks with dignity and confidence into the future.

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Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) on Social Transformation in the Western Eurasia Border Region – Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine

The Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) on Social Transformation in the Western Eurasian Border Region was established in 2003 with funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to American Councils for International Education. CASE is a vital research center which works to strengthen research on social transformation in the region, improve the system of higher education in social science and the humanities, and form effective networks of university academics and scholars. CASE is affiliated with the European Humanities University (EHU), but is open to participation by eligible scholars throughout the three-nation region Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.

The CASE mission is to promote and foster research on the transformational processes of the western Eurasia border region in the post-Soviet period. The key elements of the CASE project mission are the following:

– Develop professional networks within the western Eurasia border region;
– Raise the level of professionalism in social science scholarship;
– Promote interdisciplinary collaboration;
– Strengthen vital partnerships with affinity organizations;
– Disseminate and popularize the results of the study of social transformation processes in the region.

CASE intends to achieve these objectives through a range of complementary activities:

– Providing collective and individual research grants;
– Organizing international seminars and conferences;
– Publishing the scholarly journal *Perekrestki*;
– Publishing the volume of the English language digest;
– Publishing the scholarly monographs;
– Maintaining the library of resources for scholars
– Introducing intensive short-term seminars on social sciences methods.

The main topics proposed by CASE include, but are not limited to:

– The border region in between the East Partnership and post-imperial Russia;
– Energy issues in international relations in the West Eurasia Region;
– The world economic crisis as a political force on the regional scale;
– Old and new minorities and the practices of official identity; and
– Language, identity, and education in an era of transformation.